In the proportional high-dimensional regime, stronger backdoor training triggers improve clean accuracy and make attack success non-monotonic for regularized GLMs on Gaussian mixtures, with closed-form proofs for squared loss and fixed-point extensions to convex losses.
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BadNets: Identifying Vulnerabilities in the Machine Learning Model Supply Chain
Canonical reference. 91% of citing Pith papers cite this work as background.
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Pith papers citing it
Background
91% of classified citations
abstract
Deep learning-based techniques have achieved state-of-the-art performance on a wide variety of recognition and classification tasks. However, these networks are typically computationally expensive to train, requiring weeks of computation on many GPUs; as a result, many users outsource the training procedure to the cloud or rely on pre-trained models that are then fine-tuned for a specific task. In this paper we show that outsourced training introduces new security risks: an adversary can create a maliciously trained network (a backdoored neural network, or a \emph{BadNet}) that has state-of-the-art performance on the user's training and validation samples, but behaves badly on specific attacker-chosen inputs. We first explore the properties of BadNets in a toy example, by creating a backdoored handwritten digit classifier. Next, we demonstrate backdoors in a more realistic scenario by creating a U.S. street sign classifier that identifies stop signs as speed limits when a special sticker is added to the stop sign; we then show in addition that the backdoor in our US street sign detector can persist even if the network is later retrained for another task and cause a drop in accuracy of {25}\% on average when the backdoor trigger is present. These results demonstrate that backdoors in neural networks are both powerful and---because the behavior of neural networks is difficult to explicate---stealthy. This work provides motivation for further research into techniques for verifying and inspecting neural networks, just as we have developed tools for verifying and debugging software.
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representative citing papers
VIPER exposes Functional Fusion in dynamic prompt architectures, enabling a backdoor that resists pruning by tightly integrating attack and utility parameters in the same high-magnitude core.
Poisoning a single connector in MLLMs establishes a reusable latent backdoor pathway that transfers across modalities with over 95% attack success rate under bounded perturbations.
MirageBackdoor is the first backdoor attack that preserves clean chain-of-thought reasoning in LLMs while steering the final answer to a specific incorrect target under a trigger.
DDIPE poisons LLM agent skills by embedding malicious logic in documentation examples, achieving 11.6-33.5% bypass rates across frameworks while explicit attacks are blocked, with 2.5% evading detection.
An adversary controlling an intermediate pipeline stage in decentralized LLM post-training can inject a backdoor that reduces alignment from 80% to 6%, with the backdoor persisting in 60% of cases even after subsequent safety training.
BadImplant is the first multi-targeted backdoor attack on GNN graph classification that uses subgraph injection to achieve high success rates on multiple target labels with minimal clean accuracy loss.
The paper presents Proactive Availability Backdoor (PAB) attacks on LLMs that achieve 73.1% effective success rate by proactively inducing users via suggestions in a Five-Factor Model simulation.
ToBAC is the first backdoor attack on unified autoregressive models, using data or model poisoning to make triggers elicit cross-modal malicious behavior in text and image generation.
HTell detects backdoors by random probing of the model head, reporting 99.03% true positive rate and 2.11% false positive rate at 12.69 ms per model on a benchmark of over 6700 models.
MetaBackdoor shows that LLMs can be backdoored using positional triggers like sequence length, enabling stealthy activation on clean inputs to leak system prompts or trigger malicious behavior.
Steganographic exfiltration attacks succeed on embedding stores via retrieval-preserving perturbations such as small-angle orthogonal rotation, but an Ed25519-based provenance signature closes the attack class.
BadDLM implants effective backdoors in diffusion language models across concept, attribute, alignment, and payload targets by exploiting denoising dynamics while preserving clean performance.
Sparse Backdoor plants a provably undetectable backdoor in neural network weights via structured sparse perturbations and isotropic Gaussian dithering, with detection hardness reduced to Sparse PCA.
A new 7x4 taxonomy organizes agentic AI security threats by architectural layer and persistence timescale, revealing under-explored upper layers and missing defenses after surveying 116 papers.
Stealth Pretraining Seeding plants persistent unsafe behaviors in LLMs via diffuse poisoned web content that activates on precise triggers and evades standard evaluation.
SET detects input-level backdoors in T2I diffusion models by learning a benign cross-attention response space from clean samples and flagging deviations under multi-scale perturbations.
RLVR can be backdoored with under 2% poisoned data using an asymmetric reward trigger, implanting jailbreaks that cut safety performance by 73% on average without harming benign tasks.
CLIP-Inspector reconstructs OOD triggers to detect backdoors in prompt-tuned CLIP models with 94% accuracy and higher AUROC than baselines, plus a repair step via fine-tuning.
Backdoor attacks on VLM-based scanpath predictors can redirect fixations toward chosen objects or inflate durations using input-conditioned triggers that evade cluster detection, and no tested defense blocks them without hurting clean accuracy.
ROI coding enables backdoor triggers to survive lossy compression by embedding malicious information into binary bitstreams via sample-specific or customized masks for both learned and traditional codecs.
BadSNN injects backdoors into spiking neural networks by adversarially tuning LIF neuron hyperparameters and optimizing triggers, achieving higher attack success than prior data-poisoning methods while remaining robust to common defenses.
BadVSFM is the first effective backdoor attack on prompt-driven video segmentation foundation models, using a two-stage encoder-decoder strategy to achieve high attack success rates with limited clean performance loss.
PAR fine-tunes CLIP to remove backdoors from structured triggers while preserving standard performance, and works even with only synthetic image-text pairs.
citing papers explorer
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Intelligence Delivery Network: Toward an Internet Architecture for the AI Age
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