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Mirage in the Eyes: Hallucination Attack on Multi-modal Large Language Models with Only Attention Sink

T0 review · 5 major / 6 minor · reviewed 2026-08-10 · deepseek-v4-flash

Pith's one-line read Adversarial image perturbations that force attention-sink behavior can inflate hallucinated objects, attributes, and relationships in MLLM responses without hurting fluency, and the perturbations transfer to black-box models and…

desk verdict A new and plausible hallucination attack with broad transfer results, but the title overclaims 'only attention sink' and the evaluation lacks ablations, controls, and error bars. read the letter →

arxiv 2501.15269 v1 pith:F4KWQSEI submitted 2025-01-25 cs.LG cs.CRcs.CV

classification cs.LGcs.CRcs.CV
keywords hallucinationattackattentionsinkmulti-modallargelanguagemodelsadversarialperturbationblack-boxtransferabilityinstructiontuningmitigationvisualquestionanswering
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

The paper tries to establish that the hallucination problem in multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) is not only a natural failure mode but an exploitable vulnerability: small, nearly invisible perturbations to an input image can make an MLLM produce substantially more fabricated objects, attributes, and relationships while the text stays fluent and useful. The claimed mechanism is the attention sink, a token that receives a columnar pattern of abnormally high attention and aggregates global input information; the authors trace its origin to the two-segment response pattern in instruction-tuning data, where ground-truth captions drift from image-bound description into associative filler. The attack optimizes an epsilon-bounded perturbation with two losses, one forcing columnar attention onto a chosen token and one raising that token's embedding similarity to the global input, and reports up to 10.90% and 12.74% increases in hallucinated sentences and words. If these results hold, any pipeline that accepts user-uploaded images, such as AI assistants, customer service, medical aids, or driving aids, can be fed images that look normal but systematically corrupt the model's factual reporting.

What carries the argument

The attention sink is the central object: a generated token, usually a word like 'the' or a comma, that receives disproportionately high attention from all subsequent tokens, forming a columnar pattern in the attention map and acting as a compressed global-context summary. The paper's mechanism has two parts: sink tokens appear at the point where image-text relevance falls, and their embeddings carry higher-than-normal cosine similarity to the mean embedding of the visual and textual input tokens. The attack machinery is a two-term objective: $L_{\mathrm{attn}}$ uses cross-entropy to force later tokens to attend to a chosen potential sink token, and $L_{\mathrm{emb}}$ uses a hinge loss to raise that token's embedding similarity to the global input mean while keeping the perturbation inside an $\ell_p$ ball. A multi-round optimizer re-identifies the potential sink token on each response and updates the perturbation by signed gradients. This mechanism is what makes the attack dynamic, since it needs no fixed target response, and transferable, because it targets a structural behavior rather than a specific output phrase.

What would settle it

Take a fixed image and the $8/255$ budget; add a perturbation of the same magnitude optimized to maximize image-feature corruption or response drift without any attention-loss or embedding-loss term. If the hallucinated-sentence ratio rises as much as it does in Table 2, attention sink is not the operative mechanism; if it stays near the clean level, the sink objective is confirmed as the cause.

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Extended reading notes

Core claim

The core claim is that attention-sink behavior can be adversarially induced, and that inducing it is sufficient to worsen object, attribute, and relationship hallucination in MLLMs across decoding strategies. The paper shows that instruction-tuned MLLMs reproduce a two-segment response pattern inherited from training data: an image-faithful opening followed by loosely associated content, with the attention sink appearing exactly at the CLIPScore turning point. Sink tokens are mostly non-content tokens whose embeddings are unusually similar to the mean embedding of the multi-modal input, which the authors interpret as aggregation of misleading global context. Their attack identifies the token most likely to become a sink by cosine similarity, then minimizes an attention cross-entropy loss over a localized attention window plus a hinge loss that pushes the chosen token's embedding closer to the global mean, under an $\ell_p$ budget up to $8/255$. They report a single-response hallucinated-word ratio as high as 75.74%, black-box increases up to 10.90 percentage points in sentence ratio and 12.74 in word ratio, a VQA accuracy drop of up to 7.67 points, successful transfer to GPT-4o mini and Gemini 1.5 Flash, and bypassing of four mitigation families plus an adaptive early-stopping defense.

Load-bearing premise

The load-bearing premise is that forcing columnar attention on a chosen token and raising that token's embedding similarity to the global input is what causes the extra hallucination; the paper itself labels this aggregation account as speculation, so if generic feature degradation from the perturbation is the real driver, the title claim and the proposed defense implications collapse.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

  • If the central claim is right, an image perturbed by as little as $2/255$ can raise the hallucination rate on a white-box model, and at $8/255$ the ratio of hallucinated words in a single caption can reach 75.74% while sentence length stays roughly unchanged.
  • Adversarial images made on one open MLLM transfer to other open MLLMs, with the largest gains on models sharing the same visual encoder architecture; black-box HSR and HWR increases reach 10.90 and 12.74 percentage points.
  • The attack degrades question answering by up to 7.67 accuracy points on OK-VQA, so visual understanding, not just captioning, is affected.
  • Existing hallucination mitigations, including OPERA and VCD in decoding, Less is More and LRV-Instruction in retraining, and LURE in post-hoc revision, can be bypassed, with hallucination returning to or exceeding the undefended level.
  • Commercial APIs are also vulnerable: adversarial inputs crafted on open models raise hallucinated-word ratios on GPT-4o mini and Gemini 1.5 Flash by 3.40% and 5.32%, respectively.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • I infer that the strongest practical test of the mechanism would be a mechanism ablation: optimize a perturbation with the same budget but no attention-sink loss, maximizing instead generic image-feature drift; if hallucination rises equally, the attention-sink story is not what carries the attack.
  • I infer that the attention-sink account points to a cheap data-side hardening not tested in the paper: since the two-segment response pattern comes from instruction-tuning tails, truncating or reweighing the associative final sentences in those datasets may reduce both natural and attack-induced hallucination.
  • I infer a deployable detection side-channel: monitoring for columnar attention peaks or abruptly high embedding similarity between a generated token and the mean input embedding could flag adversarial images even when the text looks fluent, since the attack explicitly maximizes both quantities.
  • I infer that the GPT-4-based hallucination metric may be a limiting factor for the precise numbers: a fully human-labeled replication on an open image set would clarify whether the reported 10.90 and 12.74 percentage-point increases overstate verifiable fabrication, although the paper's own human alignment study reports comparable directions.
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Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Referee Report

5 major / 6 minor

Summary. The paper studies attention-sink phenomena in multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) and proposes an adversarial visual attack that, by optimizing two loss terms—columnar attention on a selected token (Eq. 8) and embedding similarity between that token and the mean global input representation (Eq. 9)—aims to increase hallucinated objects, attributes, and relationships in generated captions. The authors report consistent HSR/HWR increases on four open-source MLLMs, black-box transferability across architectures, transfer to GPT-4o mini and Gemini 1.5 Flash, partial success against mitigation methods such as OPERA and VCD, and preserved response quality. The core empirical claim is that epsilon-bounded perturbations (2/255 to 8/255) substantially increase GPT-4-judged hallucination while random Gaussian noise of the same magnitude does not.

Significance. If the central claim holds, the paper makes a useful contribution to the security analysis of MLLMs: it introduces a gradient-based attack that does not require predefined target responses, and it connects an observable internal phenomenon (columnar attention sinks) to a concrete failure mode. The transfer experiments to closed commercial APIs and the evaluation against several mitigation families are valuable, and the finding that random noise does not reproduce the effect is a meaningful control. The code release statement and the human-alignment study are also positive elements. However, the mechanistic attribution of the attack to attention-sink formation is explicitly labeled as speculation, no ablation isolates the two loss terms, and the evaluation relies on a single GPT-4 judge with a limited alignment study and no significance testing. These issues currently prevent the paper from fully supporting its title-level claim that the effect is caused by attention-sink manipulation.

major comments (5)
  1. [§3.2(2) and §4.3.3, Eqs. (8)-(10)] The causal mechanism is not established. Section 3.2(2) explicitly states 'We speculate that...' for the link between misleading global aggregation and hallucinated output, and the attack objective in Eqs. (8)-(10) optimizes two proxies—columnar attention and embedding similarity to the global input—without any ablation isolating Lattn alone, Lemb alone, or the combination. As written, the observed hallucination increase could be caused by generic feature degradation rather than by the formation of attention sinks. I recommend adding ablations over the two losses and, crucially, a control that optimizes an attention-independent objective (e.g., cross-entropy loss on the visual encoder or a feature-divergence loss) at the same perturbation budget; without such a control, the phrase 'with Only Attention Sink' in the title is not supported.
  2. [§5.6, Table 7] The baseline comparison is too weak to support the claim that the attack works through attention-sink manipulation. Random Gaussian noise is not an adversarial control, and several random-noise cells produce increases comparable to the attack: for InstructBLIP, δ=5/255 gives HWR +5.29% versus the attack's +5.91% at ε=5/255 (Table 7); for MiniGPT-4, δ=2/255 gives HSR +5.22% versus the attack's +6.46% at ε=2/255. The text asserts that random perturbation 'shows no significant attack effect,' but no significance test is provided. I recommend reporting per-image paired tests and comparing against at least one existing adversarial attack or an attention-independent adversarial objective.
  3. [Tables 2-6 and Fig. 7] All headline hallucination metrics are reported as point estimates with no error bars, confidence intervals, or statistical tests. The central quantitative claims—for example, '+10.90% HSR and +12.74% HWR' in Table 3 for LLaVA-1.5 to Shikra—could be within run-to-run or image-level variance, especially given that some adjacent cells in the same table show negative or near-zero deltas (e.g., InstructBLIP to LLaVA-1.5 at ε=5/255: -0.20% HSR, -0.20% HWR). I request standard errors or bootstrap confidence intervals over the evaluation images, and paired significance tests for at least the main white-box and black-box tables.
  4. [§J, Table 15] The GPT-4 assisted evaluation is the sole outcome measure for the main hallucination tables, but the alignment study covers only two models (MiniGPT-4 and LLaVA-1.5) and four response sets, reports averaged human scores without inter-annotator agreement (e.g., Cohen's kappa), and does not examine black-box or mitigation conditions. Given that the paper's conclusions depend entirely on the reliability of this judge, the alignment evidence is insufficient. I recommend adding agreement statistics and human evaluation on at least one black-box transfer condition and one mitigation condition, or supplementing the main tables with an automatic metric (e.g., a rule-based object/attribute consistency check) for at least one model.
  5. [§5.3.1, Table 4] The QA accuracy results do not consistently support the claim of 'strong transferability.' Several cells show accuracy increases under attack, including InstructBLIP→MiniGPT-4 at ε=2/255 (+1.67), LLaVA-1.5→MiniGPT-4 at ε=5/255 (+3.00), and Shikra→InstructBLIP at ε=2/255 (+1.33), while other cells show decreases of comparable magnitude. The text attributes the increases to 'limitations of the manually labeled answers,' but no analysis is provided to substantiate this. I recommend either restricting the transferability claim to the captioning task, where the direction is more consistent, or reporting error bars and a breakdown that addresses the positive-delta cells.
minor comments (6)
  1. [Abstract vs. Ethics/Open Science] The abstract states that code is available at a Hugging Face URL, while the Ethics section says access is granted only upon request and the Open Science section says the code is 'not hosted on a platform with persistent access.' These statements are inconsistent and should be reconciled.
  2. [Table 1] The row labels in Table 1 appear to be swapped: the 'Visual Encoder' row lists Vicuna-7b and LLaMA-7b, while the 'LLM Backbone' row lists EVA-ViT-g/14 and CLIP-ViT-L/14. As printed, the table contradicts the model descriptions in Section 2.1.
  3. [Figures 14-17] The prompt text in Figures 14-17 reads 'Pease describe this image in detail.' and should read 'Please describe this image in detail.'
  4. [§5.4, Figs. 8 and 13] The response-quality results are presented only as figures without numeric tables or error bars; given that the stealthiness claim depends on quality being preserved, adding the underlying numbers and variability would strengthen the presentation.
  5. [§4.3.3 and Appendix B] The hyperparameters α, σ, the intermediate layer l, and Smax are described as set 'following an ablation study,' but no ablation results for these choices are presented. I suggest reporting sensitivity curves for α and σ and for the selected layer.
  6. [§1, Contributions] The phrase 'the first hallucination attack' is stronger than necessary and is not supported by the related-work discussion, which already describes attacks that degrade MLLM performance. I recommend softening this to 'a new attack' or 'the first attack, to our knowledge, that explicitly targets attention-sink behavior.'

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged · score 0.0 of 10

No significant circularity: the attack optimizes attention/embedding proxies and hallucination is measured by an external GPT-4 judge, so the central claim is not reduced to its inputs by construction.

full rationale

No circular step can be exhibited with the paper's own equations. The attack minimizes the attention loss Lattn (Eq. 8) and the embedding loss Lemb (Eq. 9) with respect to the visual perturbation, while hallucination is evaluated afterward by GPT-4 using HalluBench references; there is no gradient or fitted parameter flowing from the hallucination metric into the optimization. The paper's selection of a 'potential sink token' (Eq. 7) and the embedding loss (Eq. 9) both use the same cosine similarity to the global input mean, but this is a self-reinforcing optimization objective, not a derivation of the empirical claim that hallucination increases. The claimed increases in HSR/HWR are measured externally with GPT-4 and human-annotated references, not manufactured by the attack objective. The causal mechanism in Section 3.2 is explicitly labeled speculation ('We speculate that it is still due to deficiencies in the instruction tuning phase'), which is a correctness-risk caveat, not circularity. The attention-sink and aggregation concepts are cited from prior external work ([34], [85], [95], [82], [20]), not from the authors' own prior results, so there is no load-bearing self-citation chain. The sigma hyperparameter in Eq. 9 is hand-tuned from observed sink-token similarities, but it is not fitted to, or renamed as, the hallucination prediction. The paper's baseline comparison is limited to random noise, and the 'only attention sink' framing is broader than the actual two-loss objective, but these concerns concern strength of evidence and scope, not circularity in the derivation chain.

Assumptions & free parameters 4 free parameters · 5 assumptions · 0 invented entities

The paper introduces two attack-specific hyper-parameters (alpha, sigma) and a per-model layer choice, all hand-tuned rather than derived from first principles. It relies on several empirical claims about attention sinks and instruction-tuning data that are partially hedged as speculation in Section 3, and on GPT-4 as an evaluation judge with only a small alignment study. No new physical or conceptual entities are invented.

free parameters (4)
  • alpha = 1
    Regularization weight between attention loss and embedding loss (Eq. 10); set to 1 after an ablation study reported only in Appendix B, with the ablation results not shown.
  • sigma = not reported
    Threshold in the embedding hinge loss (Eq. 9), described as 'predefined with the observation of sink tokens in different MLLMs'; the numeric value is never given.
  • intermediate layer l = second-to-last or third-to-last per model
    Layer used for extracting hidden states and attention scores is hand-picked per model in Appendix B, and the attack success depends on this choice.
  • Smax = 30
    Total number of adversarial optimization steps chosen in Appendix B; the convergence and effect depend on this value.
assumptions (5)
  • domain assumption MLLMs inherit a two-segment response pattern from instruction-tuning datasets, with the second segment loosely related to the image.
    Section 3.1 asserts this based on per-sentence CLIPScore analysis of LLaVA-Instruct-150k and ALLaVA-4V (Fig. 3), but does not prove causality.
  • domain assumption Attention sinks appear at the turning point of image-text relevance and aggregate global input information into a single token.
    Section 3.2 and Figs. 4-5 present correlational evidence; the causal reading is explicitly hedged with 'We speculate'.
  • domain assumption Aggregating global context into a single token inevitably loses information and diminishes factual accuracy.
    Section 3.2(2) states this as the mechanism behind hallucination; it is the load-bearing premise for the attack objective and is labeled as speculation.
  • domain assumption GPT-4 based hallucination judgments are sufficiently aligned with human judgments.
    Section J reports an alignment study covering only two models and four response sets, with human scores slightly lower than GPT-4 scores; this is a weak empirical basis for a central evaluation tool.
  • standard math Softmax sum-to-one property leads to attention sinking in initial tokens; columnar attention patterns indicate sink tokens.
    Borrowed from prior work [34, 85] and used to define the attention loss and to detect sink tokens; standard attention mechanism mathematics.

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Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of Mirage in the Eyes: Hallucination Attack on Multi-modal Large Language Models with Only Attention Sink." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/F4KWQSEI

@misc{pith2026250115269,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: Mirage in the Eyes: Hallucination Attack on Multi-modal Large Language Models with Only Attention Sink},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/F4KWQSEI}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2501.15269}
}
read the original abstract

Fusing visual understanding into language generation, Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are revolutionizing visual-language applications. Yet, these models are often plagued by the hallucination problem, which involves generating inaccurate objects, attributes, and relationships that do not match the visual content. In this work, we delve into the internal attention mechanisms of MLLMs to reveal the underlying causes of hallucination, exposing the inherent vulnerabilities in the instruction-tuning process. We propose a novel hallucination attack against MLLMs that exploits attention sink behaviors to trigger hallucinated content with minimal image-text relevance, posing a significant threat to critical downstream applications. Distinguished from previous adversarial methods that rely on fixed patterns, our approach generates dynamic, effective, and highly transferable visual adversarial inputs, without sacrificing the quality of model responses. Comprehensive experiments on 6 prominent MLLMs demonstrate the efficacy of our attack in compromising black-box MLLMs even with extensive mitigating mechanisms, as well as the promising results against cutting-edge commercial APIs, such as GPT-4o and Gemini 1.5. Our code is available at https://huggingface.co/RachelHGF/Mirage-in-the-Eyes.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2501.15269 by the authors.

Figure 1
Figure 1. An illustration of the attention sink phenomenon [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p002_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Examples of inferred elements in ground truth responses: [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p004_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Per-sentence CLIPScore between input images and ground truth responses in instruction-tuning datasets. We report [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p005_3.png] view at source ↗
Figures from the paper (13 more)
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: (a)-(b) Per-sentence CLIPScore between input images and MLLM responses of InstructBLIP and LLaVA-1.5. (c) Mean CLIPScore of MLLM responses before and after the sink token. The postfix -beam, -greedy, and -nucleus represent beam search, greedy search, and nucleus sampli…
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: Distribution of cosine similarity between multi-modal input embeddings and generated token embeddings. We compare [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p006_5.png]
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: Left: The visualization of sink tokens and model responses during the hallucination attack. We display an optimization process of LLaVA-1.5 on the HalluBench dataset. Right: The black-box transfer effect of the constructed adversarial visual input on InstructBLIP. A pr…
Figure 7
Figure 7. Figure 7: Results of GPT-4 assisted hallucination evaluation [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p012_7.png]
Figure 8
Figure 8. Figure 8: Results of GPT-4 assisted response quality evalua [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p013_8.png]
Figure 9
Figure 9. Figure 9: The prompt for GPT-4 assisted hallucination evaluation. The bounding boxes coordinates, detailed descriptions, and [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p022_9.png]
Figure 10
Figure 10. Figure 10: The prompt for GPT-4 assisted response quality evaluation. The evaluation criteria, and detailed steps are provided as [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p022_10.png]
Figure 13
Figure 13. Figure 13: Results of Perplexity-based response quality evalu [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p025_13.png]
Figure 12
Figure 12. Figure 12: Results of QA Accuracy on commercial APIs: [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p025_12.png]
Figure 14
Figure 14. Figure 14: A case of model responses with clean image and adversarial visual input on InstructBLIP. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p026_14.png]
Figure 15
Figure 15. Figure 15: A case of model responses with clean image and adversarial visual input on LLaVA-1.5. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p027_15.png]
Figure 16
Figure 16. Figure 16: A case of model responses with clean image and adversarial visual input on MiniGPT-4. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p027_16.png]
Figure 17
Figure 17. Figure 17: A case of model responses with clean image and adversarial visual input on Shikra. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p027_17.png]

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    This metric cap- tures the average proportion of hallucinated words in the total word count across different MLLM responses on various images

    HWR: The ratio of hallucinated words. This metric cap- tures the average proportion of hallucinated words in the total word count across different MLLM responses on various images. In addition to the hallucinated content, we also consider the quality of model responses as part...

  102. [110]

    Cannot judge

    Notably, the human-evaluated hallucination metrics are slightly lower than those obtained from GPT-4, likely due to the limited scope of descriptions and the factual infor- mation annotated in the HalluBench dataset. Additionally, the results for adversarial visual inputs show...

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    hallucination or correct or cannot judge: <reason>

  104. [112]

    The bounding boxes coordinates, detailed descriptions, and human-annotated factual knowledge are provided as context information

    Here are the region descriptions of the image: {} Here is the comment for you to judge (hallucination, correct, or cannot judge): {} Figure 9: The prompt for GPT-4 assisted hallucination evaluation. The bounding boxes coordinates, detailed descriptions, and human-annotated fac...

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    Read the paragraph carefully and identify the main points of the article

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    Assess how many errors it has that affect the clarity or smoothness of the text, and whether the main points are still comprehensible

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    Paragraph: {} Your output should be: - Fluency (1-10): (scores ONLY) Figure 10: The prompt for GPT-4 assisted response quality evaluation

    Assign a relevance score from 1 to 10. Paragraph: {} Your output should be: - Fluency (1-10): (scores ONLY) Figure 10: The prompt for GPT-4 assisted response quality evaluation. The evaluation criteria, and detailed steps are provided as context information. 22 Table 8: Result...

Pith tools

Reviewed August 10, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.