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Improving Black-box Adversarial Attacks with a Transfer-based Prior
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We consider the black-box adversarial setting, where the adversary has to generate adversarial perturbations without access to the target models to compute gradients. Previous methods tried to approximate the gradient either by using a transfer gradient of a surrogate white-box model, or based on the query feedback. However, these methods often suffer from low attack success rates or poor query efficiency since it is non-trivial to estimate the gradient in a high-dimensional space with limited information. To address these problems, we propose a prior-guided random gradient-free (P-RGF) method to improve black-box adversarial attacks, which takes the advantage of a transfer-based prior and the query information simultaneously. The transfer-based prior given by the gradient of a surrogate model is appropriately integrated into our algorithm by an optimal coefficient derived by a theoretical analysis. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method requires much fewer queries to attack black-box models with higher success rates compared with the alternative state-of-the-art methods.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
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SegPAR: Class-Centric Decision-Based Sparse Attack for Semantic Segmentation
SegPAR, a class-centric decision-based sparse attack with a discrepancy reward, outperforms black-box sparse baselines in semantic segmentation MIoU reduction and sparsity efficiency.
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Hybrid Batch Attacks: Finding Black-box Adversarial Examples with Limited Queries
Starting black-box optimization attacks from local-model adversarial candidates reduces query cost by up to 81 percent, and seed prioritization lets batch attacks succeed with a few queries.
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