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Square Attack: a query-efficient black-box adversarial attack via random search

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arxiv 1912.00049 v3 pith:6Q2SLA7A submitted 2019-11-29 cs.LG cs.CRcs.CVstat.ML

classification cs.LGcs.CRcs.CVstat.ML
keywords attackblack-boxsquarestate-of-the-artadversarialcomparedgradientinfty
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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abstract

We propose the Square Attack, a score-based black-box $l_2$- and $l_\infty$-adversarial attack that does not rely on local gradient information and thus is not affected by gradient masking. Square Attack is based on a randomized search scheme which selects localized square-shaped updates at random positions so that at each iteration the perturbation is situated approximately at the boundary of the feasible set. Our method is significantly more query efficient and achieves a higher success rate compared to the state-of-the-art methods, especially in the untargeted setting. In particular, on ImageNet we improve the average query efficiency in the untargeted setting for various deep networks by a factor of at least $1.8$ and up to $3$ compared to the recent state-of-the-art $l_\infty$-attack of Al-Dujaili & O'Reilly. Moreover, although our attack is black-box, it can also outperform gradient-based white-box attacks on the standard benchmarks achieving a new state-of-the-art in terms of the success rate. The code of our attack is available at https://github.com/max-andr/square-attack.

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Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Fooling the Watchers: Breaking AIGC Detectors via Semantic Prompt Attacks

    cs.CV 2025-05 reject novelty 4.0 of 10

    A grammar-tree and Monte Carlo search method automatically crafts prompts that can make synthetic portraits evade AIGC detectors, but the reported evidence is sparse and partly contradictory.

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