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The Security of Deep Learning Defences for Medical Imaging

Cryptography and Security · Submitted 21 Jan 2022

abstract compiled · 2026-09-23 · no language-model review

The authors' main claim We show that an informed attacker can evade five of the current state of the art defences while successfully fooling the victim's deep learning model, rendering these defences useless.

how it is stated · asserted 1.00 read the record →

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arXiv ID2201.08661 (version 1)
Pith IDO6JKVGI6, Pith's permanent record of this paper and its review
CitationGuy Amit, Moshe Levy, Yisroel Mirsky, Yuval Elovici. "The Security of Deep Learning Defences for Medical Imaging." arXiv:2201.08661 (2022). https://pith.science/paper/O6JKVGI6
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The paper's own sentences, arranged. Each label is drawn from a closed vocabulary; the number beside it is the probability the classifier gave that label. Numbers in the tables are the authors', checked by code. No sentence in this record was written by a model.

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Compiled by classifier-1.13.0 via TypeSafe API, question bank abstract-p1-20260923, 2026-09-23: 1 request, 5,476 input tokens.

What the abstract itself states, as probabilities: claims first 0.39 · states limitation 0.11 · human participants 0.10 · controlled comparison 0.09 · randomized assignment 0.01 · states quantitative result 0.92 · compares with prior results 0.88 · mentions code or data availability 0.03.

The abstract, sentence by sentence

arXiv listing abstract v1. Results and the main claim are underlined; .

Deep learning has shown great promise in the domain of medical image analysis. Medical professionals and healthcare providers have been adopting the technology to speed up and enhance their work. These systems use deep neural networks (DNN) which are vulnerable to adversarial samples; images with imperceivable changes that can alter the model's prediction. Researchers have proposed defences which either make a DNN more robust or detect the adversarial samples before they do harm. However, none of these works consider an informed attacker which can adapt to the defence mechanism. We show that an informed attacker can evade five of the current state of the art defences while successfully fooling the victim's deep learning model, rendering these defences useless. We then suggest better alternatives for securing healthcare DNNs from such attacks: (1) harden the system's security and (2) use digital signatures.

background contribution method result interpretation main claim

What the classifier reports for each sentence. The number is the probability it gave the label.
#sentencerolethe authors' own workstates the main conclusionstrength
s0 Deep learning has shown great promise in the domain of medical image analysis. background 1.00 0.05 0.01 asserted 0.96
s1 Medical professionals and healthcare providers have been adopting the technology to speed up and enhance their work. background 1.00 0.03 0.01 asserted 1.00
s2 These systems use deep neural networks (DNN) which are vulnerable to adversarial samples; images with imperceivable changes that can alter the model's prediction. background 1.00 0.05 0.02 asserted 1.00
s3 Researchers have proposed defences which either make a DNN more robust or detect the adversarial samples before they do harm. background 1.00 0.04 0.02 asserted 1.00
s4 However, none of these works consider an informed attacker which can adapt to the defence mechanism. gap 1.00 0.07 0.07 asserted 1.00
s5 We show that an informed attacker can evade five of the current state of the art defences while successfully fooling the victim's deep learning model, rendering these defences useless. result 0.97 0.95 0.88 asserted 1.00
s6 We then suggest better alternatives for securing healthcare DNNs from such attacks: (1) harden the system's security and (2) use digital signatures. future work 0.68 0.54 0.22 hedged possibility 0.81

What kind of paper the classifier reports this is: empirical study 0.92 · evidence from observation or experiment 0.75.

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  • arXiv listing abstract v1
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  • full text
  • figures and tables
  • references and citing sentences
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  • P abstract
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  • S sections
  • T body sentences
  • C citations
  • R cross-paper relations

Every quoted sentence on this record is the authors'. Every label is from Pith's closed vocabulary, with the probability shown beside it. Every number in the measurements table is the authors', checked by code. Record as JSON

The paper
Original abstract

Deep learning has shown great promise in the domain of medical image analysis. Medical professionals and healthcare providers have been adopting the technology to speed up and enhance their work. These systems use deep neural networks (DNN) which are vulnerable to adversarial samples; images with imperceivable changes that can alter the model's prediction. Researchers have proposed defences which either make a DNN more robust or detect the adversarial samples before they do harm. However, none of these works consider an informed attacker which can adapt to the defence mechanism. We show that an informed attacker can evade five of the current state of the art defences while successfully fooling the victim's deep learning model, rendering these defences useless. We then suggest better alternatives for securing healthcare DNNs from such attacks: (1) harden the system's security and (2) use digital signatures.

Human review
How the literature uses it

3 arXiv papers cite this in 3 sentences

Each citing sentence is taken from the citing paper's LaTeX source and typed by Pith's classifier. A label appears at probability 0.8 or more (0.95 for support), a contest at 0.7 or more; the quoted words are the citing authors'. How each label was checked · JSON

Papers citing it · 2 sentences without a confident label

Cites it as support 1 paper

What it cites · 6 sentences without a confident label

Uses the method or tool of 1 paper
Cites as background 2 papers
  • The attacker who crafts $x'$ can perform a targeted attack (choose which label or mask should be predicted) [ref] or an untargeted attack (cause a general misclassification) [ref] .

    Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples · Adversarial Samples · 0.97

  • The attacker who crafts $x'$ can perform a targeted attack (choose which label or mask should be predicted) [ref] or an untargeted attack (cause a general misclassification) [ref] .

    Adversarial Machine Learning at Scale · Adversarial Samples · 0.97

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