REVIEW 1 cited by
PoisonPrompt: Backdoor Attack on Prompt-based Large Language Models
Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.
This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.
SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event
T0 review · schema-true
One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.
pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp
PoisonPrompt: Backdoor Attack on Prompt-based Large Language Models
read the original abstract
Prompts have significantly improved the performance of pretrained Large Language Models (LLMs) on various downstream tasks recently, making them increasingly indispensable for a diverse range of LLM application scenarios. However, the backdoor vulnerability, a serious security threat that can maliciously alter the victim model's normal predictions, has not been sufficiently explored for prompt-based LLMs. In this paper, we present POISONPROMPT, a novel backdoor attack capable of successfully compromising both hard and soft prompt-based LLMs. We evaluate the effectiveness, fidelity, and robustness of POISONPROMPT through extensive experiments on three popular prompt methods, using six datasets and three widely used LLMs. Our findings highlight the potential security threats posed by backdoor attacks on prompt-based LLMs and emphasize the need for further research in this area.
Forward citations
Cited by 1 Pith paper
-
Multimodal Prompt Injection Attacks: Risks and Defenses for Modern LLMs
Across four attack types, six of eight tested LLMs were successfully injected in at least one category, and GPT-4o failed every test.
discussion (0)
Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.