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Generalization Bound and New Algorithm for Clean-Label Backdoor Attack

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arxiv 2406.00588 v1 pith:POLNIOKO submitted 2024-06-02 cs.LG cs.CRmath.STstat.TH

classification cs.LGcs.CRmath.STstat.TH
keywords attackbackdoorgeneralizationboundclean-labellearningpoisonadversarial
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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The generalization bound is a crucial theoretical tool for assessing the generalizability of learning methods and there exist vast literatures on generalizability of normal learning, adversarial learning, and data poisoning. Unlike other data poison attacks, the backdoor attack has the special property that the poisoned triggers are contained in both the training set and the test set and the purpose of the attack is two-fold. To our knowledge, the generalization bound for the backdoor attack has not been established. In this paper, we fill this gap by deriving algorithm-independent generalization bounds in the clean-label backdoor attack scenario. Precisely, based on the goals of backdoor attack, we give upper bounds for the clean sample population errors and the poison population errors in terms of the empirical error on the poisoned training dataset. Furthermore, based on the theoretical result, a new clean-label backdoor attack is proposed that computes the poisoning trigger by combining adversarial noise and indiscriminate poison. We show its effectiveness in a variety of settings.

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Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. BadSR: Stealthy Label Backdoor Attacks on Image Super-Resolution

    cs.CV 2025-05 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    BadSR creates stealthy poisoned high-resolution labels for super-resolution backdoors, achieving above 80% attack success across five SR models while keeping labels visually close to clean images.

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