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Knowledge-to-Jailbreak: Investigating Knowledge-driven Jailbreaking Attacks for Large Language Models
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Large language models (LLMs) have been increasingly applied to various domains, which triggers increasing concerns about LLMs' safety on specialized domains, e.g. medicine. Despite prior explorations on general jailbreaking attacks, there are two challenges for applying existing attacks on testing the domain-specific safety of LLMs: (1) Lack of professional knowledge-driven attacks, (2) Insufficient coverage of domain knowledge. To bridge this gap, we propose a new task, knowledge-to-jailbreak, which aims to generate jailbreaking attacks from domain knowledge, requiring both attack effectiveness and knowledge relevance. We collect a large-scale dataset with 12,974 knowledge-jailbreak pairs and fine-tune a large language model as jailbreak-generator, to produce domain knowledge-specific jailbreaks. Experiments on 13 domains and 8 target LLMs demonstrate the effectiveness of jailbreak-generator in generating jailbreaks that are both threatening to the target LLMs and relevant to the given knowledge. We also apply our method to an out-of-domain knowledge base, showing that jailbreak-generator can generate jailbreaks that are comparable in harmfulness to those crafted by human experts. Data and code are available at: https://github.com/THU-KEG/Knowledge-to-Jailbreak/.
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SoK: Systematizing LLM Prompt Security: Taxonomies, Datasets, and Unified Evaluation of Attacks and Defenses
A systemization of LLM jailbreak security that adds linked taxonomies, an evaluation platform, and JailbreakDB, while its main attack–defense comparison results remain deferred.
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