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Self-Evaluation as a Defense Against Adversarial Attacks on LLMs

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arxiv 2407.03234 v3 pith:4Y72YSCY submitted 2024-07-03 cs.LG cs.CLcs.CR

classification cs.LGcs.CLcs.CR
keywords attacksllmsmethodadversarialattackdefensemethodsmodel
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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We introduce a defense against adversarial attacks on LLMs utilizing self-evaluation. Our method requires no model fine-tuning, instead using pre-trained models to evaluate the inputs and outputs of a generator model, significantly reducing the cost of implementation in comparison to other, finetuning-based methods. Our method can significantly reduce the attack success rate of attacks on both open and closed-source LLMs, beyond the reductions demonstrated by Llama-Guard2 and commonly used content moderation APIs. We present an analysis of the effectiveness of our method, including attempts to attack the evaluator in various settings, demonstrating that it is also more resilient to attacks than existing methods. Code and data will be made available at https://github.com/Linlt-leon/self-eval.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. SecurityLingua: Efficient Defense of LLM Jailbreak Attacks via Security-Aware Prompt Compression

    cs.CR 2025-06 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A security-aware prompt compressor that reveals the hidden intent of jailbreak prompts and injects it into the system prompt reduces average attack success from 35% to 1% with negligible overhead.

  2. To Protect the LLM Agent Against the Prompt Injection Attack with Polymorphic Prompt

    cs.CR 2025-06 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Polymorphic Prompt Assembling randomizes per-request system-prompt separators, cutting prompt-injection attack success to as low as 1.83% on GPT-3.5 with 0.06 ms runtime overhead.

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