Pith. sign in

REVIEW 4 cited by

Why Are My Prompts Leaked? Unraveling Prompt Extraction Threats in Customized Large Language Models

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2408.02416 v2 pith:LQYDSLOZ submitted 2024-08-05 cs.CL cs.CR

classification cs.CLcs.CR
keywords promptextractionpromptsllmsattacksalignmentsanalyzedownstream
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
0 comments
read the original abstract

The drastic increase of large language models' (LLMs) parameters has led to a new research direction of fine-tuning-free downstream customization by prompts, i.e., task descriptions. While these prompt-based services (e.g. OpenAI's GPTs) play an important role in many businesses, there has emerged growing concerns about the prompt leakage, which undermines the intellectual properties of these services and causes downstream attacks. In this paper, we analyze the underlying mechanism of prompt leakage, which we refer to as prompt memorization, and develop corresponding defending strategies. By exploring the scaling laws in prompt extraction, we analyze key attributes that influence prompt extraction, including model sizes, prompt lengths, as well as the types of prompts. Then we propose two hypotheses that explain how LLMs expose their prompts. The first is attributed to the perplexity, i.e. the familiarity of LLMs to texts, whereas the second is based on the straightforward token translation path in attention matrices. To defend against such threats, we investigate whether alignments can undermine the extraction of prompts. We find that current LLMs, even those with safety alignments like GPT-4, are highly vulnerable to prompt extraction attacks, even under the most straightforward user attacks. Therefore, we put forward several defense strategies with the inspiration of our findings, which achieve 83.8\% and 71.0\% drop in the prompt extraction rate for Llama2-7B and GPT-3.5, respectively. Source code is avaliable at https://github.com/liangzid/PromptExtractionEval.

Discussion (0). Sign in to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 4 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score.

  1. To trust or not to trust: Attention-based Trust Management for LLM Multi-Agent Systems

    cs.CR 2025-06 unverdicted novelty 6.0 of 10

    Introduces six-dimension trustworthiness definition and attention-based A-Trust score with a TMS to improve LLM-MAS robustness against malicious or unreliable messages.

  2. Understanding and Mitigating Prompt Leaking Attacks in Real-World LLM-Based Applications

    cs.CR 2026-06 unverdicted novelty 5.0 of 10

    Large-scale empirical study finds widespread prompt leaking in commercial LLM apps and introduces AREA defense that improves usability while resisting leaks.

  3. SLIP: Soft Label Mechanism and Key-Extraction-Guided CoT-based Defense Against Instruction Backdoor in APIs

    cs.CR 2025-08 unverdicted novelty 5.0 of 10

    SLIP combines a soft label mechanism with key-extraction-guided CoT to reduce instruction backdoor attack success rate to 25.13% and raise clean accuracy to 87.15% in LLM agents.

  4. A Survey on Model Extraction Attacks and Defenses for Large Language Models

    cs.CR 2025-06 conditional novelty 4.0 of 10

    A taxonomy of model extraction attacks and defenses for large language models, with proposed evaluation metrics and future research directions.

Pith tools