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A Large-Scale Exploit Instrumentation Study of AI/ML Supply Chain Attacks in Hugging Face Models

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arxiv 2410.04490 v1 pith:6B3MBIJP submitted 2024-10-06 cs.CR cs.LGcs.SE

classification cs.CRcs.LGcs.SE
keywords modelsfacehuggingunsafemethodsserializationdevelopersdevelop
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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The development of machine learning (ML) techniques has led to ample opportunities for developers to develop and deploy their own models. Hugging Face serves as an open source platform where developers can share and download other models in an effort to make ML development more collaborative. In order for models to be shared, they first need to be serialized. Certain Python serialization methods are considered unsafe, as they are vulnerable to object injection. This paper investigates the pervasiveness of these unsafe serialization methods across Hugging Face, and demonstrates through an exploitation approach, that models using unsafe serialization methods can be exploited and shared, creating an unsafe environment for ML developers. We investigate to what extent Hugging Face is able to flag repositories and files using unsafe serialization methods, and develop a technique to detect malicious models. Our results show that Hugging Face is home to a wide range of potentially vulnerable models.

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Cited by 3 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. ShadowPickle: Evading Machine Learning Model Scanners via Stealthy Pickle Deserialization Attacks

    cs.CR 2026-07 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    Three stealthy pickle attacks—PyPI, external-module, and overwritten-module—evade most model scanners, with the whitelisted-module attack reaching a 63% scanner evasion rate.

  2. Cyber-Capable AI Agents: Vulnerabilities, Evaluation Containment, and Defensive Response

    cs.AI 2026-07 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    A structured review organizes cyber-capable-agent risks into five vulnerability classes and argues that evaluation environments must be treated as operational security systems rather than background.

  3. A Large-Scale Measurement of AI Bill of Materials Completeness in Hugging Face Models

    cs.SE 2026-07 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    Across ~97,940 generated AIBOM artifacts, required fields are complete but AI-specific documentation (model cards, ethics, limitations, environment) is largely missing.

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