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Jigsaw Puzzles: Splitting Harmful Questions to Jailbreak Large Language Models

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arxiv 2410.11459 v1 pith:4VQMBQXL submitted 2024-10-15 cs.CL

Jigsaw Puzzles: Splitting Harmful Questions to Jailbreak Large Language Models

classification cs.CL
keywords harmfuljailbreakllmsquestionsmodelsmulti-turnadvancedattack
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
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Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited outstanding performance in engaging with humans and addressing complex questions by leveraging their vast implicit knowledge and robust reasoning capabilities. However, such models are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, leading to the generation of harmful responses. Despite recent research on single-turn jailbreak strategies to facilitate the development of defence mechanisms, the challenge of revealing vulnerabilities under multi-turn setting remains relatively under-explored. In this work, we propose Jigsaw Puzzles (JSP), a straightforward yet effective multi-turn jailbreak strategy against the advanced LLMs. JSP splits questions into harmless fractions as the input of each turn, and requests LLMs to reconstruct and respond to questions under multi-turn interaction. Our experimental results demonstrate that the proposed JSP jailbreak bypasses original safeguards against explicitly harmful content, achieving an average attack success rate of 93.76% on 189 harmful queries across 5 advanced LLMs (Gemini-1.5-Pro, Llama-3.1-70B, GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini). Moreover, JSP achieves a state-of-the-art attack success rate of 92% on GPT-4 on the harmful query benchmark, and exhibits strong resistant to defence strategies. Warning: this paper contains offensive examples.

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Cited by 3 Pith papers

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  1. VoxSafeBench: Not Just What Is Said, but Who, How, and Where

    cs.SD 2026-04 unverdicted novelty 8.0

    VoxSafeBench reveals that speech language models recognize social norms from text but fail to apply them when acoustic cues like speaker or scene determine the appropriate response.

  2. MultiBreak: A Scalable and Diverse Multi-turn Jailbreak Benchmark for Evaluating LLM Safety

    cs.CL 2026-05 unverdicted novelty 6.0

    MultiBreak is a large diverse multi-turn jailbreak benchmark that achieves substantially higher attack success rates on LLMs than prior datasets and reveals topic-specific vulnerabilities in multi-turn settings.

  3. GRM: Utility-Aware Jailbreak Attacks on Audio LLMs via Gradient-Ratio Masking

    cs.SD 2026-04 unverdicted novelty 6.0

    GRM ranks Mel bands by attack contribution versus utility sensitivity, perturbs a subset, and learns a universal perturbation to reach 88.46% average jailbreak success rate with improved attack-utility trade-off on fo...