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Heuristic-Induced Multimodal Risk Distribution Jailbreak Attack for Multimodal Large Language Models
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Heuristic-Induced Multimodal Risk Distribution Jailbreak Attack for Multimodal Large Language Models
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With the rapid advancement of multimodal large language models (MLLMs), concerns regarding their security have increasingly captured the attention of both academia and industry. Although MLLMs are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, designing effective jailbreak attacks poses unique challenges, especially given the highly constrained adversarial capabilities in real-world deployment scenarios. Previous works concentrate risks into a single modality, resulting in limited jailbreak performance. In this paper, we propose a heuristic-induced multimodal risk distribution jailbreak attack method, called HIMRD, which is black-box and consists of two elements: multimodal risk distribution strategy and heuristic-induced search strategy. The multimodal risk distribution strategy is used to distribute harmful semantics into multiple modalities to effectively circumvent the single-modality protection mechanisms of MLLMs. The heuristic-induced search strategy identifies two types of prompts: the understanding-enhancing prompt, which helps MLLMs reconstruct the malicious prompt, and the inducing prompt, which increases the likelihood of affirmative outputs over refusals, enabling a successful jailbreak attack. HIMRD achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of 90% across seven open-source MLLMs and an average ASR of around 68% in three closed-source MLLMs. HIMRD reveals cross-modal security vulnerabilities in current MLLMs and underscores the imperative for developing defensive strategies to mitigate such emerging risks. Code is available at https://github.com/MaTengSYSU/HIMRD-jailbreak.
Forward citations
Cited by 5 Pith papers
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DSR decomposes harmful intents into benign textual and visual primitives that MLLMs fuse into harmful outputs, achieving high attack success with low input toxicity.
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PRISM: Programmatic Reasoning with Image Sequence Manipulation for LVLM Jailbreaking
PRISM decomposes harmful instructions into benign visual gadgets and directs LVLMs via prompts to compose them through reasoning into harmful outputs, achieving ASR over 0.90 on SafeBench.
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AuthChain poisons a single document to achieve high-success attacks on RAG systems for multi-hop queries across six LLMs while evading defenses.
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A survey paper maps how external tools are used to augment multimodal large language models across data, tasks, evaluation, and future directions.
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