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Building Safe GenAI Applications: An End-to-End Overview of Red Teaming for Large Language Models

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arxiv 2503.01742 v2 pith:ESFIJHBO submitted 2025-03-03 cs.CL

Building Safe GenAI Applications: An End-to-End Overview of Red Teaming for Large Language Models

classification cs.CL
keywords teamingllmsapplicationsend-to-endlanguagelargemethodsmodels
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
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The rapid growth of Large Language Models (LLMs) presents significant privacy, security, and ethical concerns. While much research has proposed methods for defending LLM systems against misuse by malicious actors, researchers have recently complemented these efforts with an offensive approach that involves red teaming, i.e., proactively attacking LLMs with the purpose of identifying their vulnerabilities. This paper provides a concise and practical overview of the LLM red teaming literature, structured so as to describe a multi-component system end-to-end. To motivate red teaming we survey the initial safety needs of some high-profile LLMs, and then dive into the different components of a red teaming system as well as software packages for implementing them. We cover various attack methods, strategies for attack-success evaluation, metrics for assessing experiment outcomes, as well as a host of other considerations. Our survey will be useful for any reader who wants to rapidly obtain a grasp of the major red teaming concepts for their own use in practical applications.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

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  1. How Reliable Are AI Attackers Against a Fixed Vulnerable Target? A 400-Run Empirical Study of LLM Penetration Testing Consistency

    cs.CR 2026-05 unverdicted novelty 7.0

    Empirical study of 400 LLM attack runs finds exploitation success rates of 25-85% across four models against a fixed multi-service honeypot, with model-distinctive failure modes and p<0.001 differences.

  2. DoubleAgents: Human-Agent Alignment in a Socially Embedded Workflow

    cs.HC 2025-09 unverdicted novelty 6.0

    DoubleAgents shows that a distributed-cognition design with coordination agent, dashboard, and policy module increases user comfort and reliance on AI agents for coordination tasks over time.