Pith. sign in

REVIEW 1 cited by

Temporal Context Awareness: A Defense Framework Against Multi-turn Manipulation Attacks on Large Language Models

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2503.15560 v1 pith:YKPYPOCJ submitted 2025-03-18 cs.CR cs.LG

Temporal Context Awareness: A Defense Framework Against Multi-turn Manipulation Attacks on Large Language Models

classification cs.CR cs.LG
keywords frameworkcontextconversationalmanipulationattacksmulti-turnsecuritytemporal
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
0 comments
Share X Bluesky LinkedIn Reddit HN
read the original abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated multi-turn manipulation attacks, where adversaries strategically build context through seemingly benign conversational turns to circumvent safety measures and elicit harmful or unauthorized responses. These attacks exploit the temporal nature of dialogue to evade single-turn detection methods, representing a critical security vulnerability with significant implications for real-world deployments. This paper introduces the Temporal Context Awareness (TCA) framework, a novel defense mechanism designed to address this challenge by continuously analyzing semantic drift, cross-turn intention consistency and evolving conversational patterns. The TCA framework integrates dynamic context embedding analysis, cross-turn consistency verification, and progressive risk scoring to detect and mitigate manipulation attempts effectively. Preliminary evaluations on simulated adversarial scenarios demonstrate the framework's potential to identify subtle manipulation patterns often missed by traditional detection techniques, offering a much-needed layer of security for conversational AI systems. In addition to outlining the design of TCA , we analyze diverse attack vectors and their progression across multi-turn conversation, providing valuable insights into adversarial tactics and their impact on LLM vulnerabilities. Our findings underscore the pressing need for robust, context-aware defenses in conversational AI systems and highlight TCA framework as a promising direction for securing LLMs while preserving their utility in legitimate applications. We make our implementation available to support further research in this emerging area of AI security.

discussion (0)

Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.

Forward citations

Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score.

  1. Behind the Mask: Benchmarking Camouflaged Jailbreaks in Large Language Models

    cs.CR 2025-09 conditional novelty 5.0

    A benchmark of 500 camouflaged jailbreak prompts finds open-weight LLMs comply with 94% of harmful requests, but the result is confounded by task complexity and an overly permissive compliance metric.