Pith. sign in

REVIEW 3 cited by

MuTRAP: Multi-trigger Trojans Attacking Robot Task Planning Systems

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2504.17070 v3 pith:52ZPOVXL submitted 2025-04-23 cs.RO cs.AI

MuTRAP: Multi-trigger Trojans Attacking Robot Task Planning Systems

classification cs.RO cs.AI
keywords mutraprobottaskplanninglargemodelsactiondevelop
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
0 comments
read the original abstract

Robots need task planning methods to achieve goals that require more than one action. Recently, large pretrained models have demonstrated impressive performance in task planning. For instance, large language models (LLMs) can generate task plans using action and goal descriptions. Despite the rapid progress of large models in robot intelligence, their security implications remain only partially understood, leaving important gaps in the exploration of potential vulnerabilities in LLM-driven robotic planning systems. To investigate such risks, in this paper, we develop MuTRAP, the first multi-trigger trojan attack specifically designed and targeted for LLM-assisted robot task planners. MuTRAP follows the standard practice of LLM usage in robotics where the backbone LLM is typically frozen and hosted in a central server limiting attacker's reach. In contrast, MuTRAP injects backdoor using a small set of task-specific parameters. In addition, we develop a trigger optimization method for selecting multiple-trigger words that are most effective for different robot applications. For instance, one can use unique trigger word "herical" to activate a specific malicious behavior, e.g., cutting hand on a kitchen robot. Through MuTRAP that demonstrates the vulnerability of current LLM-based planners, our goal is to promote the development of secured robot intelligence. Details and demos are provided in: https://mutrap.github.io/MuTRAP/

discussion (0)

Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.

Forward citations

Cited by 3 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score.

  1. CacheTrap: Unveiling a Stealthier Gray-Box Trojan against LLMs

    cs.CR 2025-11 conditional novelty 8.0

    CacheTrap achieves 100% targeted attack success on five open-source LLMs by using an efficient search to locate and flip a single bit in the KV cache as a transient trigger, while preserving normal accuracy without th...

  2. Safety in Embodied AI: A Survey of Risks, Attacks, and Defenses

    cs.CR 2026-03 unverdicted novelty 6.0

    The survey organizes over 400 papers on embodied AI safety into a multi-level taxonomy and flags overlooked issues such as fragile multimodal fusion and unstable planning under jailbreaks.

  3. Safety in Embodied AI: A Survey of Risks, Attacks, and Defenses

    cs.CR 2026-03 accept novelty 6.0

    A multi-level taxonomy of risks, attacks, and defenses across the full embodied AI pipeline, synthesizing 500+ papers and flagging overlooked failure modes.