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Machine Learning · arXiv:2610.22292 v1 · submitted 15 Oct 2026 · 68 references

CAT-alyzing Honesty: Continuous Adversarial Training for Transferable LLM Honesty

Yuan-Chen Chang, Niklas Herbster, Gauthier Gidel, Tommaso Tosato

The paper says

“Large language models (LLMs) are becoming prevalent in scenarios where honesty is critical.”

more of the abstract

However, despite alignment training, these models still exhibit dishonest behaviour, such as outputting claims that contradict some knowledge or are not supported by what is accessible in context. We introduce Continuous Adversarial Training for Consistent Honesty (CATCH), inspired by a method originally developed to robustly refuse harmful queries. CATCH trains the model towards an honest answer and away from a dishonest one while maintaining the model's capabilities. We evaluate two architectures (Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct and Qwen3-3.6-27B). We show that trained with only hundreds of targets built from self-reporting scenarios, CATCH learns an honest behaviour that robustly generalizes and transfers across distinct benchmarks. It consistently reduces dishonesty under pressure on MASK, increases confessions in the multi-agent game of Among Us, and improves the discovery rates of the model's hidden behaviours in AuditBench. We show that CATCH outperforms prompting and supervised fine-tuning in improving honesty, and it is on par with state-of-the-art honesty activation steering. However, CATCH surpasses honesty steering in maintaining utility, thanks to a novel choice of utility data.

from the abstract

Pith says

Machine review · deepseek-v4-flash · 16 Oct 2026 · what was read was not recorded · not checked by a person

It can be wrong. Challenge this review or reply to it.

Holds up, with conditions. Solid and data-efficient honesty training with strong MASK and Among Us results; the AuditBench trained-in-concealment claim needs an organism-integrity check before it can carry the third arrow. This line is wrong

2 major objections · 6 minor

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Not checked: figures, code, what the 68 references say.

The paper says, at §4, AuditBench (Fig. 4; b128-b129)

The review did not quote this passage.

Pith says: Objection 1 of 2 · major

The AuditBench result is the only evidence for transfer to trained-in concealment, and as reported it does not distinguish honest disclosure from adapter-induced damage to the organism. The CATCH LoRA adapter is trained on the base Llama-3.3-70B and then applied to the SFT/KTO organisms, but the paper reports only auditor discovery rates (79% and 93%).

more of objection 1

No check is reported that after applying the adapter the organism still (a) performs the synthetic-document task and (b) exhibits the hidden behavior in ordinary, non-audited completions. Without such checks, the high discovery rates can be explained by the adapter disrupting the fine-tuned concealment policy rather than by CATCH producing honest behavior. The stated limitations in §6 (white-box access, LoRA layer choice, future probing) do not address this confound. Please add task-competence and hidden-behavior controls on the organisms with and without the adapter, and run SFT-tau on AuditBench, since SFT-tau is the no-perturbation ablation of Eq. 3 and would attribute the effect to the adversarial component.

The paper says, at §4, AuditBench scope (Fig. 4)

The review did not quote this passage.

Pith says: Objection 2 of 2 · major

The AuditBench evaluation uses only the two synthetic-document organisms and excludes the transcript-trained organisms because, in the authors' words, no method beats the default auditor there. This exclusion is disclosed, but the abstract and introduction state a general claim that CATCH 'improves the discovery rates of the model's hidden behaviours in AuditBench'. The claim should be explicitly scoped to the two synthetic-document organisms, or the exclusion should be justified on grounds independent of the reported outcome.

6 minor objections

The paper says, at Abstract and §1

Pith says: minor objection 1 of 6

Please correct the typos 'Qwen3-3.6-27B' and 'Continous Adversarial Training' to 'Qwen3.6-27B' and 'Continuous Adversarial Training'; the rest of the paper uses the correct spellings.

The paper says, at Appendix A.1, Eq. (5)

Pith says: minor objection 2 of 6

The placeholder notation '•' makes the clamped loss definition hard to read; spelling out the expressions for the toward and away terms separately would improve clarity.

show 4 more

The paper says, at Fig. 4 caption

Pith says: minor objection 3 of 6

StTP is run with a slightly edited auditor prompt while CATCH uses the unedited prompt, so the 'on par' comparison in the text is not a controlled comparison; please state the effect of this change and, ideally, report CATCH under the same auditor prompt.

The paper says, at Fig. 4 caption

Pith says: minor objection 4 of 6

StTP and CATCH values are from 70 runs while the other tool values are digitized from the published 224-run figure; the caption already discloses this, but the text should note the heterogeneity when making pointwise comparisons.

The paper says, at §4, MASK evaluation

Pith says: minor objection 5 of 6

The main text says the full n=1000 MASK set is used, while Table 3 reports accuracy over 726 labeled scenarios; please state explicitly that the 726 denominator applies only to the accuracy columns and not to the honesty rates.

The paper says, at §5, Utility preservation

Pith says: minor objection 6 of 6

The utility comparison against StTP is made at a single steering strength. Since the paper itself notes that weaker steering would trade honesty for utility, a StTP trade-off curve or an explicit statement that the comparison is at the StTP operating point reported by its authors would strengthen the 'surpasses honesty steering in maintaining utility' claim.

What would settle it

On both AuditBench organisms, measure before and after applying the CATCH adapter: (i) the rate at which each of the 14 hidden behaviors appears in neutral task completions away from the audit protocol, (ii) the organism's original task performance, and (iii) default-auditor discovery on a held-out set using the published 224-audit count. If hidden-behavior expression or task performance collapses after the adapter, the 79%/93% values are better explained by adapter-induced degradation than by honesty transfer. If both are preserved, run the SFT-tau baseline under the same audit protocol to determine whether the adversarial perturbation contributes.

from the skeptic's reading

How the review went

4 readings by deepseek-v4-flash · 16 Oct 2026

  1. Reader holds up, with conditions confidence moderate
  2. Skeptic disagrees 1 min 38 s · 24,188 tokens read, 11,468 written
  3. Editor wrote the verdict above 34 s · 25,075 tokens read, 4,372 written
  4. Referee major revision: 2 major objections, 6 minor 1 min 30 s · 24,563 tokens read, 10,301 written

Not run on this paper: the simulated authors' defence.

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The review in full

The review in brief, machine-written

With a couple hundred contrast pairs, CATCH moves MASK honesty from 34% to 86% on Llama and 47% to 91% on Qwen, raises Among Us confession rates from single digits to 84-85%, and stays at AlpacaEval parity where StTP drops Llama to 8.6%. That is a real empirical result, and the reporting is unusually clean: no-belief shares are separated out, Wilson intervals on the game numbers, exact hyperparameters, and SFT-tau isolates the attack contribution on the first two benchmarks. The on-policy utility data finding is a genuinely useful contribution on its own.

The soft spot is AuditBench, and the stress-test note is right. The CATCH adapter is trained on the base model and then applied to the SFT/KTO organisms; the paper never checks that the organism still exhibits the hidden behavior in ordinary completions or retains task competence after the adapter is added. If the LoRA update damages the concealment policy, the auditor succeeds because the deception was corrupted, not because the model learned to disclose. That matters because AuditBench is the only evidence for the trained-in-concealment arrow in the abstract, and SFT-tau was not run there. The stated limitations do not cover this. It is fixable: add behavior-following and task checks on the adapted organisms, and ideally an SFT-tau point on AuditBench. Without that, the trained-in-dishonesty claim should be scaled back.

Smaller issues: MASK pooled rates have no confidence intervals; the reduced AuditBench run count is a precision issue; code, data, and adapters are promised only on publication. The threat model is bounded embedding-space perturbations, so transfer to naturalistic deception is an empirical claim. MASK and Among Us make it credible, but it remains the method's assumption.

This paper is for alignment and adversarial-training researchers, and it deserves a serious referee. I would send it out and require the AuditBench verification as a condition of acceptance, not desk-reject.

The strongest objection

The most load-bearing gap is in the AuditBench pillar (Fig. 4, §4), the only evidence for transfer to trained-in concealment. The CATCH adapter trained on the base Llama-3.3-70B is applied to organisms that were SFT/KTO-trained to conceal 14 hidden behaviors; the reported discovery rates are 79% (55/70) and 93% (65/70) ([b128], [b129]). Nothing reported verifies that after applying the adapter the organism still (a) exhibits the hidden behavior in ordinary completions and (b) retains its task competence. If the additive LoRA adapter disrupts the organism's fine-tuned policy, the auditor can succeed because concealment has been corrupted, not because CATCH induces honest disclosure. The paper also omits SFT-tau on AuditBench, so the result is not attributed to the adversarial component. The paper is transparent about 70 vs 224 runs, but that is a precision issue; this is a construct-validity issue. The authors' stated limitations ([b165]) do not address this.

The paper's central claim is that a few hundred self-reporting pairs make CATCH honest across three distinct manifestations. The MASK and Among Us results are internally well controlled: SFT-tau isolates the contribution of the adversarial perturbation, and Among Us includes valid-action, speak-rate, and refusal checks so the confession gains are not mere task withdrawal. The AuditBench result is the weakest pillar because it combines a small number of audits, digitized baselines, and, more importantly, a transfer operation whose side effects are unmeasured: applying a LoRA adapter to a fine-tuned organism can alter the organism's policy in ways unrelated to honesty. Without a preservation check, the claimed 'disclose behaviours it was trained to conceal' is underdetermined. I do not adopt the reader's threat-model coverage assumption as the lead concern: the paper's SFT-tau ablation already shows that the perturbation matters on two benchmarks, and T_cont being a proxy is a scope limitation rather than a demonstrated flaw in the stated results. My concern is testable and does not contradict the paper; it supports keeping CONDITIONAL (UNCHANGED) pending the check and the already-required release of code and adapters.

The referee's report

If the results hold, CATCH is a genuinely useful method: it induces more honest behavior from a few hundred training targets, transfers across three distinct manifestations of dishonesty, and does so without the capability collapse typical of steering and of some preference-optimization baselines. The paper has several concrete strengths: MASK results are reported with the no-belief share separated, so the honesty rate cannot be inflated by refusals; Among Us results include Wilson intervals and game-validity controls (valid action rate, SPEAK rate, refusal to play); capability is checked on MMLU, MT-Bench, and length-controlled AlpacaEval; and the utility-corpus ablation is informative. The use of externally maintained benchmarks rather than fitted evaluation sets also mitigates circularity concerns. The main unresolved issue is the construct validity of the AuditBench pillar, which is the only evidence for transfer to trained-in concealment; the current protocol does not yet rule out adapter-induced damage to the organism.

Pith's reading of the paper (a machine's summary, not the authors')

This paper claims that honesty can be trained into an LLM as a robust, transferable property rather than a fragile behavior tied to specific prompts. The method, CATCH, adapts continuous adversarial training — previously used to make models refuse harmful requests — to honesty: during training, small bounded perturbations are added to the instruction-token embeddings to make the model's dishonest answer more likely, and the model is then trained to prefer the honest answer even on those perturbed inputs. With only about 216–224 training pairs drawn from self-reporting scenarios, the authors report that CATCH raises MASK honest rates from 34% to 86% on one model and 47% to 91% on another, raises in-game confessions in Among Us from 5% to 84% and 19% to 85%, and roughly doubles auditing success on models trained to conceal behaviors, while keeping general capability at parity with the untrained model. If right, this means a handful of adversarial examples can substitute for much larger honesty-tuning corpora, and that an embedding-space training distribution can cover dishonesty that arises from instruction, from game incentives, and from training itself.

What carries the argument. The engine of the method is the min-max objective in Eqs. 1–3: an inner loop that treats the pressure prompt as an attack surface, perturbing each instruction-token embedding by at most $\epsilon$ in $\ell_\infty$ norm with $K$ steps of projected signed gradient ascent so that the dishonest answer $y^-$ becomes more likely, and an outer loop that trains the model toward $y^+$ and away from $y^-$ on the perturbed prompt. Three design choices carry the argument. First, the honest and dishonest targets must be built case-by-case, because unlike a generic refusal, a truthful answer depends on the scenario's facts. Second, the toward and away losses are clamped once satisfied (cut-offs $t_{\text{cut}} = 0.5$ and $a_{\text{cut}} = -5$), so training cannot over-optimize either direction. Third, a utility loss on on-policy data keeps the model's capabilities intact, and the authors argue this choice is what separates their results from earlier adversarial training: their ablation attributes most of the capability loss of prior work to the off-policy utility corpus rather than to the adversarial objective itself. That same utility choice is what distinguishes CATCH from the StTP steering baseline, which reaches comparable honesty but collapses the AlpacaEval win rate on one model.

Core claim. On the paper's own terms, the central claim is that honesty behaves like a robustness property: train against worst-case perturbations of the prompt, and honesty survives in settings where it was not directly trained. CATCH builds on the observation, imported from safety alignment, that adversarial training in embedding space is far cheaper than searching over discrete attack strings, and adapts it to honesty — where the honest and dishonest continuations must be constructed per scenario because the truth depends on context. For each scenario the training pair is a pressure prompt $x$, an honest answer $y^+$, and a dishonest answer $y^-$; the inner loop runs $K$ steps of projected signed gradient ascent ($\epsilon = 0.05$, $K = 5$–$10$) to push the model toward $y^-$, and the outer loop raises the likelihood of $y^+$ and lowers the likelihood of $y^-$ on the perturbed prompt, interleaved with a utility dataset. The authors report that on Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct and Qwen3.6-27B this raises MASK honesty from 34% to 86% and from 47% to 91%, lowers the Among Us Impostor win rate from 39% to 20% and 48% to 12%, and raises confessions from 5% to 84% and 19% to 85% — while the same auditor that finds 43% of hidden behaviors in an SFT-concealing organism finds 79% after CATCH, and 93% on a KTO-concealing organism on which no auditing tool scores above 50%. A second, separable claim is that the choice of utility data decides whether the training preserves capability: on-policy data (generated once by the model being trained) keeps the AlpacaEval win rate at parity, while the off-policy UltraChat corpus drops it to the low 20s, and the paper reports the no-belief share on MASK alongside honesty rates so the reader can see whether a method raises honesty or merely suppresses belief-commitment.

The premise it rests on. The load-bearing premise is that a handful of bounded perturbations of the instruction-token embeddings — the only attacks used in training — form a training distribution broad enough to cover the prompts that actually make a model lie, so that robustness to those perturbations transfers to naturalistic dishonesty.

If the paper is right (Pith's inferences, not the authors')

Honesty alignment no longer needs large synthetic corpora: with roughly 200 contrast pairs, CATCH matches or beats an SFT baseline trained on roughly fifty times as much data, a claim the authors deliberately restrict to the small-data regime.

The same trained adapter transfers across three different dishonesty mechanisms — instructed lying, incentive-driven lying in a multi-agent game, and trained-in concealment — suggesting the three share a common vulnerability surface that embedding-space perturbation exploits.

Because CATCH stays at utility parity while the strongest honesty steering baseline degrades AlpacaEval win rate to 8.6% on one model, training-time robustness is a viable alternative to inference-time steering when capability preservation matters.

Models trained with CATCH become easier to audit: discovery of hidden behaviors roughly doubles on the AuditBench organisms, which matters for oversight of models that have been trained to conceal behaviors.

On-policy utility data generated by the model being trained is sufficient to preserve capability, whereas off-policy corpora can degrade it substantially, so the utility-data choice rather than the adversarial objective carries much of the capability cost.

If embedding-space robustness is the actual transfer mechanism, a testable corollary is that the perturbation which most increases the likelihood of the dishonest answer is roughly shared across scenarios within a model; measuring the overlap of these attack directions across the 45–47 training scenarios would distinguish a common lie direction from scenario-specific hacks.

The audit results suggest a use CATCH was not built for: the same adapter, rather than only making a model honest, could serve as an auditing instrument that makes concealment-trained behaviors easier to elicit from a suspect model.

The utility-data finding implies that adversarial training pipelines in general could trade off-policy corpora for on-policy samples without losing robustness, and that when a stronger teacher exists its data acts as distillation; one could test whether on-policy data is the safe default for other traits trained with the same objective.

Because the attack is confined to instruction-token embeddings within a small ball, coverage is bounded by what that attack family can express; dishonesty that arises through changed task structure, tool use, or long-horizon planning lies outside the training distribution and is left untested by the authors.

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The paper

Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming prevalent in scenarios where honesty is critical. However, despite alignment training, these models still exhibit dishonest behaviour, such as outputting claims that contradict some knowledge or are not supported by what is accessible in context. We introduce Continuous Adversarial Training for Consistent Honesty (CATCH), inspired by a method originally developed to robustly refuse harmful queries. CATCH trains the model towards an honest answer and away from a dishonest one while maintaining the model's capabilities. We evaluate two architectures (Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct and Qwen3-3.6-27B). We show that trained with only hundreds of targets built from self-reporting scenarios, CATCH learns an honest behaviour that robustly generalizes and transfers across distinct benchmarks. It consistently reduces dishonesty under pressure on MASK, increases confessions in the multi-agent game of Among Us, and improves the discovery rates of the model's hidden behaviours in AuditBench. We show that CATCH outperforms prompting and supervised fine-tuning in improving honesty, and it is on par with state-of-the-art honesty activation steering. However, CATCH surpasses honesty steering in maintaining utility, thanks to a novel choice of utility data.

The paper's own sentences, arranged, kept beside the review and separate from it. Each label is drawn from a closed vocabulary; the number beside it is the probability the classifier gave that label. No sentence in this record was written by a model.

abstract compiled · 2026-10-16

The authors' main claim, as the classifier picked it out 0.80

“We show that trained with only hundreds of targets built from self-reporting scenarios, CATCH learns an honest behaviour that robustly generalizes and transfers across distinct benchmarks.”

How the main claim is stated: asserted 1.00

What the abstract itself states, as probabilities: claims first 0.06 · states limitation 0.26 · human participants 0.10 · controlled comparison 0.88 · randomized assignment 0.02 · states quantitative result 0.34 · compares with prior results 0.98 · mentions code or data availability 0.03

The abstract, sentence by sentence

This table labels the abstract only (arXiv listing abstract v1). The number is the probability the classifier gave the label.

SentenceRoleThe authors' own workStates the main conclusionStrength
Large language models (LLMs) are becoming prevalent in scenarios where honesty is critical. background 1.00 0.05 0.02 asserted 1.00
However, despite alignment training, these models still exhibit dishonest behaviour, such as outputting claims that contradict some knowledge or are not supported by what is accessible in context. background 0.74 0.10 0.03 asserted 1.00
We introduce Continuous Adversarial Training for Consistent Honesty (CATCH), inspired by a method originally developed to robustly refuse harmful queries. contribution 0.80 0.81 0.04 asserted 0.99
CATCH trains the model towards an honest answer and away from a dishonest one while maintaining the model's capabilities. method 0.98 0.66 0.10 asserted 1.00
We evaluate two architectures (Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct and Qwen3-3.6-27B). method 0.94 0.87 0.02 asserted 0.93
We show that trained with only hundreds of targets built from self-reporting scenarios, CATCH learns an honest behaviour that robustly generalizes and transfers across distinct benchmarks. result 0.99 0.96 0.61 asserted 1.00
It consistently reduces dishonesty under pressure on MASK, increases confessions in the multi-agent game of Among Us, and improves the discovery rates of the model's hidden behaviours in AuditBench. result 1.00 0.94 0.17 asserted 1.00
We show that CATCH outperforms prompting and supervised fine-tuning in improving honesty, and it is on par with state-of-the-art honesty activation steering. result 1.00 0.93 0.31 asserted 1.00
However, CATCH surpasses honesty steering in maintaining utility, thanks to a novel choice of utility data. result 0.96 0.91 0.19 asserted 1.00

What kind of paper the classifier reports this is: method or tool 1.00 · evidence from observation or experiment 0.98

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  • references and citing sentences
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Figures (10)
Figure 1 of the paper
Figure 1. Continuous Adversarial Training for Consistent Honesty (CATCH). Honesty learnt with Con￾tinuous Adversarial Training (CAT) generalizes and transfers to out-of-distribution settings. 1 arXiv:2610.22292v1 [cs.LG] 15 Oct 2026
Figure 2 of the paper
Figure 2. CATCH improves honesty in MASK. MASK honesty of mitigation methods on Llama-3.3-70B￾Instruct and Qwen3.6-27B. Each bar splits the scenarios with an elicited belief into honest, ambiguous and dishonest responses. Base is without any honesty-intervention; Honest persona + prefill are two prompting variants; SFT-t fine-tunes on the toward targets y +; SFT-tau adds away targets y − and utility data, and is CATCH without the adversarial perturbation; StTP is SOTA honesty activation steering (Herbster et al., 2026); and CAPO-DPO trains against the base model with DPO loss. making the…
Figure 3 of the paper
Figure 3. CATCH Impostors in Among Us win less and confess more. Each honesty-intervened model play 100 Among Us games as the Impostor against base model crewmates. Above: Impostor win rate over completed games. Below: Confession rate, proportion of games where an Impostor reveals its identity (e.g., “I killed Player 5”) during meeting. Error bars are 95% Wilson intervals. training and evaluation. Qwen’s chat template still emits an empty <think></think> block at the start of the assistant turn. We treat that block as part of the prompt, so the training loss is computed only on the answer…
Figure 4 of the paper
Figure 4. CATCH makes a model disclose behaviours it was trained to conceal. Auditing-tool success on the synthetic-document model organisms of Llama-3.3-70B with 14 hidden behaviours in AuditBench (She￾shadri et al., 2026). Values except StTP and CATCH are digitized from
Figure 5 of the paper
Figure 5. CATCH preserves utility. Length-controlled AlpacaEval win rate of each honesty intervention against the base model. The dashed line at 50% is parity with the base model. CATCH stays at parity on both models. Error bars are 95% bootstrap confidence intervals over prompts. Among Us. Among Us (Golechha & Garriga-Alonso, 2025) is a seven-agent social-deduction game sandbox in which the Impostor role can only win by lying consistently across many turns. We fix the matchup in our setting such that both impostors are the model with honesty interventions and all five crewmates are the base…
Figure 6 of the paper
Figure 6. On-policy utility data retains capability better than UltraChat. Each plot shows two Pareto fronts of MASK honesty against AlpacaEval LC win rate, one with CATCH trained with an on-policy utility dataset, and the other trained with UltraChat, an off-policy utility dataset; everything else fixed. The MASK honesty score represents the proportion of honest answers out of all scenarios with elicited belief. Among Us
Figure 7 of the paper
Figure 7. All Among Us measures for Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct. Each method plays the Impostor in 100 games against base-model crewmates; the dashed line is the base model playing the Impostor. Arrows give the desired direction; kills in front of witnesses has none. Error bars are 95% Wilson intervals. willing to commit to a belief, rather than more often wrong. CATCH has the lowest no-belief share and the highest accuracy of any method on both models. A.5 EXTENDED RESULTS OF AMONG US Figures 7 and 8 report six measures for every method, computed from the Impostors’ game logs. The main text shows…
Figure 8 of the paper
Figure 8. All Among Us measures for Qwen3.6-27B. As in
Figure 9 of the paper
Figure 9. Fine-tuning and CATCH stay at parity; prompting and CAPO do not. As
Figure 10 of the paper
Figure 10. On-policy utility data holds parity on both models, while external corpora land far below or far above it. Each marker is one epoch of CATCH trained with one utility corpus, placed by MASK honesty and AlpacaEval LC win rate. Solid markers are the Pareto front of each corpus, joined in order of honesty and labelled with their epoch; the other checkpoints are drawn pale. Shading goes from light (early epochs) to dark (late epochs), and a ring marks a front with a single point. Left and right: each model against its own untrained base, where the dashed line at 50 is parity. Middle:…

Figures are the authors', reproduced from the paper.

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  1. Four Bridges: Measuring Deception Propensity in a Multi-Agent Game cs.AI · Nov 2026

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