Computers and Society · arXiv:2611.04278 v1 · submitted 3 Nov 2026 · 11 references
Unmitigated? How are the world's largest companies responding to AI risks?
The paper says
“AI is introducing new risks to large companies and amplifying existing risks, but whether companies are addressing the AI risks they are exposed to is largely untested. We investigated what outsiders can observe: whether companies publicly acknowledge AI risks.”
more of the abstract
We coded public documents from 200 of the largest companies worldwide, collected in early 2026, against the 24 AI risks in the MIT AI Risk Repository, and compared acknowledgements with expert judgements of risk severity, sector vulnerability, and AI role responsibility from a companion Delphi study of 272 AI risk experts. Of the 100 largest companies, 32% did not publicly acknowledge any AI risks. Of the largest 1000 companies, we estimate that 62% [95% CI: 54%, 70%] did not publicly acknowledge any AI risks. Where companies did acknowledge risks, five accounted for over half of all acknowledgements: discrimination, weapons & cyberattacks, fraud & scams, loss of privacy, and devaluation of human creativity. Several risks that experts judged most severe were almost absent: almost no company acknowledged power centralization (concentration of power among those who control advanced AI), competitive dynamics (racing to deploy AI at the expense of safety), or dangerous capabilities. Companies in sectors experts judged more vulnerable to a risk were more likely to acknowledge that risk. But even companies in sectors judged 'extremely vulnerable' to a risk usually did not acknowledge it. Companies with roles experts judged most responsible for addressing a risk were no more likely to acknowledge it than other companies. General-purpose AI developers acknowledged AI misalignment (15%) far less often than discrimination (85%). These findings provide an empirical baseline for the design of AI risk disclosure requirements.
from the abstract
Pith says
Machine review · deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Nov 2026 · what was read was not recorded · not checked by a person
It can be wrong. Challenge this review or reply to it.
The passes disagreed. Reader: holds up. Skeptic: holds up only with conditions. Referee: minor revision.
First systematic measurement of AI risk disclosure across 200 global companies; methodologically strong but the headline estimate relies on a single human reviewer at the company level without reported reliability. This line is wrong
4 major objections · 6 minor
How often objections from reviews like this one are right: not yet measured
Not checked: figures, code, what the 11 references say.
The paper says, at Methods (§Data classification, final paragraph; §Risk validation)
The review did not quote this passage.
Pith says: Objection 1 of 4 · major
The company-level aggregation step (determining whether each company acknowledged each risk) is performed by a single human reviewer with no reported reliability check. The passage-level LLM validation (κ = 0.64–0.88) shows that the raw material is coded consistently, but the final, load-bearing decision—whether a company as a whole has acknowledged a risk—is not validated.
more of objection 1
Because the headline estimate (62%) is a company-level count, any idiosyncrasy in the reviewer's interpretation (e.g., overly strict criteria for what counts as an acknowledgement, or difficulty integrating conflicting evidence across documents) could systematically affect the result. The authors should provide inter-rater reliability for a random sample of companies (e.g., a second reviewer independently codes 20–30 companies) and report the agreement, or at minimum describe the decision rules that the single reviewer followed when aggregating passage-level codes. Without this, the claim that the estimate is reliable rests entirely on the passage-level validity.
The paper says, at Methods (§Data classification; §Determination of company risk acknowledgements)
The review did not quote this passage.
Pith says: Objection 2 of 4 · major
The paper defines risk acknowledgement at the document-passage level as a statement in which the company 'recognizes the existence or relevance' of a risk. However, the rules for aggregating multiple passages across a company's entire document set into a binary 'company acknowledged risk X' are not detailed.
more of objection 2
For example, if one document explicitly names a risk but another document from the same company contradicts or ignores it, is the company coded as acknowledging? What if the risk is mentioned only in a boilerplate risk-factor listing versus in a dedicated AI governance document? The human reviewer's process is described as 'considered all available evidence,' but the criteria for a positive decision are not formalized. Providing a small set of examples of borderline cases and how they were resolved would strengthen the replicability and trust in the company-level variable.
The paper says, at Results (§AI risks acknowledged by sector; linear probability model, p. 20)
The review did not quote this passage.
Pith says: Objection 3 of 4 · major
The linear probability model estimating that 'every one point of increase in vulnerability was associated with a 7.4 percentage point increase in the probability that a company acknowledged a risk' does not report standard errors that account for clustering of risks within companies (each of the 100 companies contributes up to 24 observations, one per risk).
more of objection 3
Given that company-level acknowledgement decisions are likely correlated across risks, the current confidence intervals (4.0, 10.8) may be too narrow. The authors should re-estimate with company-level clustered standard errors or a multilevel model and report whether the result remains significant. The same concern applies to the statement about the Spearman correlation between severity and acknowledgement (p. 19).
The paper says, at Results (§AI risks acknowledged by the largest companies; Table 1)
The review did not quote this passage.
Pith says: Objection 4 of 4 · major
For the top-1000 estimates, the 95% confidence intervals for several low-prevalence risks (e.g., AI misalignment: 0.2%, 95% CI [0.2, 2.9]) are derived from a design-based weighted estimate. The interval for multi-agent risks (0.1% [0.1, 2.8]) appears suspiciously wide for a point estimate near zero, and the lower bound equals the point estimate, suggesting possible rounding or a computational artifact.
more of objection 4
The authors should clarify the method used to compute these intervals (e.g., linearized variance, bootstrap, or Wilson score) and check that the intervals for rare events are appropriate. If they used a normal approximation, a logit or exact method might be more accurate for proportions near zero.
6 minor objections
The paper says, at Figure 1 and Table 1
Pith says: minor objection 1 of 6
The y-axis labels in Figure 1 list risk names; some are quite long and may be hard to read. Consider using abbreviated names and providing a full-name footnote. In Table 1, the 'Description' column duplicates the definition from the MIT AI Risk Repository; a short reference or a footnote would suffice, saving space.
The paper says, at p. 4, Highlights
Pith says: minor objection 2 of 6
The second bullet says 'Almost no company acknowledged the risks experts judged most severe, including power centralization, competitive dynamics, and dangerous capabilities.' The text later reports that 0% of top-100 companies acknowledged power centralization and competitive dynamics, while 4% acknowledged dangerous capabilities. 'Almost no company' is acceptable but should be consistent with the precise numbers reported in the main results.
show 4 more
The paper says, at p. 23, Figure 7
Pith says: minor objection 3 of 6
The axis labels '<– Mean responsibility' and 'Percent acknowledging –>' are ambiguous because the arrows point in opposite directions. It would be clearer to label the bars directly as 'Mean responsibility' and 'Percentage acknowledging' with a note that bars are sorted by mean responsibility. Also, the figure caption should explain why the blue and red bars share the same x-axis but have different scales (they appear to share the 0% line).
The paper says, at p. 8, last paragraph
Pith says: minor objection 4 of 6
The sentence 'Because all general-purpose AI developers were in the Information sector' refers to a sensitivity check; the wording 'Because all general-purpose AI developers were in the Information sector' could be misinterpreted as a causal statement. Rephrase as 'As a robustness check, we tested whether the higher acknowledgement rate in Information was driven solely by general-purpose AI developers...'
The paper says, at Supplementary Materials, Table S3 and S4
Pith says: minor objection 5 of 6
The footnotes repeatedly warn that estimates are based on few companies and should be treated with caution. This is appropriate, but the main text occasionally cites these estimates without the same caveats (e.g., 'Information sector companies acknowledged a mean of 7.1 risks' for top-100 is fine, but the top-1000 estimate for Information should be flagged more prominently in the main text because it is based on only 7 sampled companies from ranks 101–1000).
The paper says, at General
Pith says: minor objection 6 of 6
Several references to the companion Delphi study (Saeri et al., 2026) appear as 'companion Delphi study' or 'companion study' without a page reference. Since readers may want to verify specific expert judgments, providing the arXiv or DOI number at first mention would be helpful. The reference is listed in the bibliography but should also be cited in the text with the identifier, e.g., 'Saeri et al. (2026, arXiv:2606.04490)'.
What would settle it
Have a second independent human reviewer, blind to the first reviewer's decisions, independently determine for a random sample of 40 companies (20 from ranks 1–100, 20 from the random lower sample) whether each of the 24 AI risks was acknowledged, using the same LLM passage outputs and the original source documents (as needed). Compute Cohen's κ for the dichotomous company-level variable "any risk acknowledged" and for each risk individually. If κ for "any risk" falls below 0.70, the single-reviewer aggregation is a measurable source of uncertainty that should be reported and, if possible, corrected via consensus or a second coder.
from the skeptic's reading
How the review went
4 readings by deepseek-v4-flash · 4 Nov 2026
- Reader holds up
- Skeptic partly agrees: says it holds up only with conditions Company-level risk classification relies on a single human reviewer aggregating LLM output, with no reported inter-rater reliability at that level, which could affect the 62% estimate.
- Editor wrote the verdict above
- Referee minor revision: 4 major objections, 6 minor
Not run on this paper: the simulated authors' defence.
Pith did not check this review's objections against the paper.
The review in full
The review in brief, machine-written
The paper does what the climate disclosure literature did a decade ago: it systematically measures what the largest companies publicly acknowledge about AI risks, using a validated 24-risk taxonomy and a companion expert Delphi for comparison. That is genuinely new and useful. The sampling design is transparent (all top 100 plus 100 randomly drawn from ranks 101–1000), the LLM-assisted coding is validated against human coders at the passage level, and the data and code are public. The central finding—62% of the largest 1000 companies do not acknowledge any AI risk—is policy-relevant and well-supported by confidence intervals.
The soft spot is the one the stress-test picks up. The company-level classification is done by a single human reviewer who aggregates LLM output for each risk across all documents. No inter-rater reliability is reported at that level. Since the headline number is a company-level count, any systematic tendency in that reviewer's judgment (e.g., being conservative about what counts as acknowledgement) propagates directly into the 62% estimate. The paper validates the passage-level coding well (LLM–human agreement beats human–human), but the aggregation step is uncalibrated. This is a methodological gap, not a known error, but it is load-bearing.
The paper's own limitations section is honest: it notes that disclosure is not practice, that sampling by market cap omits unlisted frontier AI developers, and that the snapshot is from early 2026. These are acknowledged thoughtfully.
For whom is this paper? Anyone working on AI governance, corporate disclosure policy, or comparative risk regulation. It provides an empirical baseline that the field needs. I would bring it to a reading group and cite it in related work.
The paper deserves a serious referee. The main issue—company-level reliability—can be fixed with a dual-coding sample and a kappa statistic. Even as is, the finding is robust enough to be informative, but the authors should address this gap before publication.
The strongest objection
The paper's headline estimate—that 62% of the largest 1000 companies did not acknowledge any AI risk—depends on a final step where a single human reviewer examined all LLM-classified passages for each company and decided whether the company had acknowledged each risk. The paper validates the LLM passage-level classifications against independent human coders (Cohen's κ 0.64–0.88), which is good, but does not report any reliability check for the reviewer's company-level aggregation. The Methods section (§"Data classification", final paragraph) describes this as: "A human reviewer considered all available evidence to determine whether a company acknowledged each risk." No inter‑rater statistic, not even a sample of doubly‑coded companies, is provided. Because the central claim is a company‑level count, any systematic error or idiosyncrasy in this single reviewer's judgments (e.g., overly conservative interpretation of what counts as an acknowledgement, or overlooking a risk mentioned in an auxiliary document) would propagate directly into the 62% figure. The LLM validation shows the raw material is reliable, but the synthesis step is uncalibrated. This is a methodological gap, not a known error, but it is load‑bearing because the headline is the paper's most widely cited result.
The reader's weakest_assumption concerns the proxy validity of public disclosure. I identify a separate, more technical concern about measurement reliability at the company‑level aggregation stage. While the paper's methodology is otherwise rigorous, the absence of inter‑rater reliability for the final company‑level classification is a gap that could affect the headline estimate. The concern is not fatal—the authors' careful validation of the LLM step and transparency about limitations are commendable—but it warrants a condition before full acceptance: either provide the missing reliability check or explicitly discuss this as a limitation. Thus the verdict should shift from ACCEPT to CONDITIONAL, requiring documentation of inter‑rater agreement at the company level.
The referee's report
If the findings hold, this paper provides the first large-scale empirical baseline showing that most large companies do not publicly acknowledge any AI risks, and that the risks they do acknowledge are operational (e.g., discrimination) rather than the systemic risks experts consider most severe (e.g., power centralization, competitive dynamics). This directly challenges a key assumption behind voluntary governance instruments—that companies recognize the risks they create. The paper is methodologically careful: it validates LLM-assisted coding against human coding at the passage level, reports inter-rater statistics, provides confidence intervals for the headline estimate, and makes all data and code publicly available. The comparison with a structured expert Delphi study is a novel design that grounds the 'expectation' side of the disclosure gap. The practical proposal for a calibrated three-tier disclosure framework is specific and actionable, and the paper positions its contribution as a measurement step analogous to early climate disclosure research, which proved influential.
Pith's reading of the paper (a machine's summary, not the authors')
The paper systematically examines whether the world's largest companies publicly acknowledge risks from artificial intelligence. By coding public documents from 200 companies against a comprehensive taxonomy of 24 AI risks, the authors find that an estimated 62% of the largest 1000 companies do not acknowledge any AI risk at all. Among the largest 100 companies, 32% are silent on AI risks. The risks that are acknowledged cluster around discrimination, weapons and cyberattacks, fraud, privacy, and devaluation of human creativity, while risks that experts rate as most severe—such as power centralization, competitive dynamics, and dangerous capabilities—are almost never mentioned. Even companies in sectors judged extremely vulnerable to a risk, and companies judged most responsible for addressing a risk, are no more likely to acknowledge that risk than others. The findings challenge a key assumption behind many AI governance instruments: that companies recognize the risks they face and act on them.
What carries the argument. The study pairs a systematic content analysis of corporate public documents with a structured expert elicitation (Delphi) to compare what companies say with what experts think they should be saying. The content analysis scans up to 80 search results per company (plus annual reports, LLM-agent searches, and company feedback) and codes each passage for the presence of any of the 24 AI risks defined by the MIT AI Risk Repository (Slattery et al., 2026). A large language model performs initial classification, validated by human review against a random sample. The expert Delphi study (Saeri et al., 2026) provides median ratings of each risk's expected severity, each sector's vulnerability, and each AI ecosystem role's responsibility. The comparison is then made across three dimensions: severity, vulnerability, and responsibility, using weighted estimates for the top 1000 companies and direct counts for the top 100.
Core claim. The paper establishes that public acknowledgement of AI risks by the world's largest companies is both sparse and misaligned with expert priorities. Of the largest 100 companies by market capitalization, 32% did not publicly acknowledge any AI risk; for the largest 1000, the estimated share is 62% (95% CI: 54%, 70%). When companies do acknowledge risks, over half of all mentions fall into five categories: discrimination, weapons and cyberattacks, fraud and scams, loss of privacy, and devaluation of human creativity. Meanwhile, risks that a companion Delphi study of 272 experts identified as most severe over 2025–2030—power centralization, competitive dynamics, dangerous capabilities, AI misalignment, and multi-agent risks—are virtually absent from corporate disclosures. A quantitative comparison shows no correlation between expert-judged severity and company acknowledgement (Spearman's rho = –0.16). Sector vulnerability is weakly predictive: companies in more vulnerable sectors are more likely to acknowledge a risk, but even among 'extremely vulnerable' sectors, 77% of risk–company combinations go unacknowledged. Role responsibility is not predictive: companies judged most responsible for addressing a risk are no more likely to acknowledge it than others. For example, only 15% of general-purpose AI developers acknowledge AI misalignment, whereas 85% acknowledge discrimination.
The premise it rests on. The paper assumes that a company's public acknowledgement of AI risks in its documents is a meaningful proxy for whether the company recognizes and manages those risks; if companies manage risks internally without disclosing them, or disclose only symbolically, then the observed silence may overstate the governance failure.
If the paper is right (Pith's inferences, not the authors')
If most large companies do not even acknowledge AI risks, governance instruments that rely on corporate self-recognition and voluntary disclosure are unlikely to be effective without stronger mandates.
The five risks that dominate current disclosures (discrimination, weapons & cyberattacks, fraud & scams, loss of privacy, devaluation of human creativity) are precisely those with direct operational or financial impact on the company, suggesting that firms neglect risks whose costs fall primarily on society.
A tiered reporting framework—common core risks, sector-specific risks, and role-specific risks—could align disclosure with actual exposure and responsibility, analogous to climate reporting (Scope 1/2/3 and sector-specific IFRS S2 standards).
The absence of any acknowledgement of power centralization, competitive dynamics, or dangerous capabilities by the largest companies implies that systemic and catastrophic AI risks are invisible in corporate reporting, making it impossible for outsiders to assess preparedness.
If mandatory disclosure requirements are introduced, the study provides a baseline against which future improvements can be measured, similar to the role of early climate disclosure research.
The gap between what companies acknowledge and what experts consider severe may reflect a structural misalignment: corporate risk management is incentivized by shareholder value, not by public harm, so risks that externalize costs are systematically underdiscussed.
The finding that general-purpose AI developers acknowledge misalignment much less than discrimination suggests that even technically sophisticated firms avoid the hardest governance questions, possibly because acknowledging misalignment carries reputational or regulatory risk.
The methodology could be extended to other documents (e.g., patent filings, hiring postings, internal memos leaked or subpoenaed) to test whether non-public recognition matches or diverges from public acknowledgement, providing a stronger test of the paper's proxy assumption.
A natural experiment would be to track disclosure rates before and after a major AI incident or regulatory fine; an increase in acknowledgements of specific risks after the event would support the paper's implication that current silence is not due to genuine absence of risk.
Check this review
Pith stored no record of this review's passes and took no fingerprint of it. Reviews made by code from 13 Nov 2026 on carry both.
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The paper
Abstract
AI is introducing new risks to large companies and amplifying existing risks, but whether companies are addressing the AI risks they are exposed to is largely untested. We investigated what outsiders can observe: whether companies publicly acknowledge AI risks. We coded public documents from 200 of the largest companies worldwide, collected in early 2026, against the 24 AI risks in the MIT AI Risk Repository, and compared acknowledgements with expert judgements of risk severity, sector vulnerability, and AI role responsibility from a companion Delphi study of 272 AI risk experts. Of the 100 largest companies, 32% did not publicly acknowledge any AI risks. Of the largest 1000 companies, we estimate that 62% [95% CI: 54%, 70%] did not publicly acknowledge any AI risks. Where companies did acknowledge risks, five accounted for over half of all acknowledgements: discrimination, weapons & cyberattacks, fraud & scams, loss of privacy, and devaluation of human creativity. Several risks that experts judged most severe were almost absent: almost no company acknowledged power centralization (concentration of power among those who control advanced AI), competitive dynamics (racing to deploy AI at the expense of safety), or dangerous capabilities. Companies in sectors experts judged more vulnerable to a risk were more likely to acknowledge that risk. But even companies in sectors judged 'extremely vulnerable' to a risk usually did not acknowledge it. Companies with roles experts judged most responsible for addressing a risk were no more likely to acknowledge it than other companies. General-purpose AI developers acknowledged AI misalignment (15%) far less often than discrimination (85%). These findings provide an empirical baseline for the design of AI risk disclosure requirements.
The paper's own sentences, arranged, kept beside the review and separate from it. Each label is drawn from a closed vocabulary; the number beside it is the probability the classifier gave that label. No sentence in this record was written by a model.
abstract compiled · 2026-11-04
The authors' main claim, as the classifier picked it out 0.65
“Of the largest 1000 companies, we estimate that 62% [95% CI: 54%, 70%] did not publicly acknowledge any AI risks.”
How the main claim is stated: asserted 0.92
What the abstract itself states, as probabilities: claims first 0.07 · states limitation 0.78 · human participants 0.70 · controlled comparison 0.28 · randomized assignment 0.02 · states quantitative result 0.99 · compares with prior results 0.45 · mentions code or data availability 0.04
The abstract, sentence by sentence
This table labels the abstract only (arXiv listing abstract v1). The number is the probability the classifier gave the label.
| Sentence | Role | The authors' own work | States the main conclusion | Strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AI is introducing new risks to large companies and amplifying existing risks, but whether companies are addressing the AI risks they are exposed to is largely untested. | gap 0.77 | 0.08 | 0.10 | asserted 0.95 |
| We investigated what outsiders can observe: whether companies publicly acknowledge AI risks. | contribution 0.84 | 0.88 | 0.04 | asserted 0.85 |
| We coded public documents from 200 of the largest companies worldwide, collected in early 2026, against the 24 AI risks in the MIT AI Risk Repository, and compared acknowledgements with expert judgements of risk severity, sector vulnerability, and AI role responsibility from a companion Delphi study of 272 AI risk experts. | method 0.99 | 0.97 | 0.04 | asserted 0.95 |
| Of the 100 largest companies, 32% did not publicly acknowledge any AI risks. | result 1.00 | 0.96 | 0.16 | asserted 1.00 |
| Of the largest 1000 companies, we estimate that 62% [95% CI: 54%, 70%] did not publicly acknowledge any AI risks. | result 1.00 | 0.93 | 0.20 | asserted 0.92 |
| Where companies did acknowledge risks, five accounted for over half of all acknowledgements: discrimination, weapons & cyberattacks, fraud & scams, loss of privacy, and devaluation of human creativity. | result 1.00 | 0.95 | 0.12 | asserted 1.00 |
| Several risks that experts judged most severe were almost absent: almost no company acknowledged power centralization (concentration of power among those who control advanced AI), competitive dynamics (racing to deploy AI at the expense of safety), or dangerous capabilities. | result 1.00 | 0.91 | 0.21 | asserted 1.00 |
| Companies in sectors experts judged more vulnerable to a risk were more likely to acknowledge that risk. | result 1.00 | 0.92 | 0.07 | asserted 0.95 |
| But even companies in sectors judged 'extremely vulnerable' to a risk usually did not acknowledge it. | result 1.00 | 0.94 | 0.15 | asserted 1.00 |
| Companies with roles experts judged most responsible for addressing a risk were no more likely to acknowledge it than other companies. | result 1.00 | 0.94 | 0.10 | asserted 1.00 |
| General-purpose AI developers acknowledged AI misalignment (15%) far less often than discrimination (85%). | result 1.00 | 0.94 | 0.09 | asserted 1.00 |
| These findings provide an empirical baseline for the design of AI risk disclosure requirements. | interpretation 0.80 | 0.35 | 0.13 | asserted 0.97 |
What kind of paper the classifier reports this is: empirical study 1.00 · evidence from analysis of existing data 0.53
What was examined, and what was not
Sources read
- arXiv listing abstract v1
Not examined
- full text
- figures and tables
- references and citing sentences
- relations to other papers
Levels run
- P abstract
Not run
- S sections
- T body sentences
- C citations
- R cross-paper relations
How the labels were made
Compiled by classifier-1.13.0 via TypeSafe API, question bank abstract-p1-20260923, 2026-11-04: 1 request, 8,946 input tokens.
Every quoted sentence on this record is the authors'. Every label is from Pith's closed vocabulary, with the probability shown beside it. This record as JSON
Figures (1)
References (11)
- [1] Artifex Software, Inc., & McKie, J. X. (2026). PyMuPDF (Version 1.28.2) [Computer software]. https://pymupdf.readthedocs.io/ Australian Government Department of Industry, Science and Resources. (2024). Voluntary AI Safety Standard. https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/volu... on Pith
- [8] drawn from ranks 101–1000. S-24 Examples of company risk acknowledgements 1 Discrimination & Toxicity 1.1 Unfair discrimination and misrepresentation Risk definition: Unequal treatment of individuals or groups by AI, often based on race, gender, or other sensitive characterist... on Pith
- [9] drawn from ranks 101–1000. The judgement for AI welfare risk is not reported due to data quality issues in the Delphi study. Role: AI Developer (General-purpose AI) Top 100 companies Top 1,000 companies* Responsibility AI risk % % 95% CI [LL, UL] Mean Label Discrimination 85% ... on Pith
- [10] https://www.sap.com/documents/2023/03/7211ee96-647e- 0010-bca6-c68f7e60039b.html S-26 2 Privacy & Security 2.1 Compromise of privacy by obtaining, leaking or correctly inferring sensitive information Risk definition: AI systems that memorize and leak sensitive personal data or... on Pith
- [11] https://www.nri.com/en/sustainability/library/files/esg_databook_2025_e.pdf As the science of AI evaluations is still developing, there are numerous limitations to current approaches to evaluations... there are gaps in how to systematize, operationalize, and measure relevant t... on Pith
- [1411] Kolt, N., Anderljung, M., Barnhart, J., Brass, A., Esvelt, K., Hadfield, G. K., Heim, L., Rodriguez, M., Sandbrink, J. B., & Woodside, T. (2024). Responsible Reporting for Frontier AI Development. arXiv. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2404.02675 Kwa, T., West, B., Becker, J., ... on PithPith's reviewarXivdoi:10.48550/arxiv.2404.02675
- [2022] Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget. https://www.census.gov/naics/reference_files_tools/2022_NAICS_Manual.pdf Primec, A., Belak, J., & Čufar, M. (2026). Artificial Intelligence as an Emerging Risk Dimension in Corporate Sustainability Reporting: ... on Pith
- [2024] https://www.ifrs.org/news-and-events/news/2023/07/foundation-welcomes-tcfd- responsibilities-from-2024/ ISO/IEC. (2023). Information technology—Artificial intelligence—Management system (ISO/IEC 42001:2023; 1st ed.). https://www.iso.org/standard/42001 Jobin, A., Ienca, M., & V... on Pithdoi:10.1038/s42256-019-0088-2
- [2025] https://www.nbc.ca/content/dam/bnc/a-propos-de-nous/relations-investisseurs/assemblee- annuelle/2026/na-annual-report-2025.pdf These cybersecurity threats and compromises could occur as a result of threat actors impersonating Blackstone or its employees, including through the ... on Pith
- [2026] arXiv. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2602.21012 Bogen, M., Kerry, C. F., Kornbluh, K., Meltzer, J. P., Mir Teijeiro, M., Munkhbayar, E., Nadgir, N., Tabassi, E., Tanner, B., & Wirtschafter, V. (2026). The HAIP Reporting Framework: Its value in global AI governance and recomme... on Pithdoi:10.48550/arxiv.2602.21012
- [2278] https://doi.org/10.3390/su18052278 39 Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on Digital Operational Resilience for the Financial Sector, OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 1 (2022). http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2554/oj Regulatio... on PithPith's reviewarXivdoi:10.48550/arxiv.2606.04490
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