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Cryptography and Security · arXiv:2611.16311 v1 · submitted 12 Nov 2026 · 32 references

What Does It Cost to Force-Close a Lightning Channel? Evidence from 974,000 Channel Closes, 2018-2026

Saurabh Kumar

The paper says

“Bitcoin's Lightning payment network returns the funds of a channel that cannot close cooperatively through pre-signed transactions whose fees and delays fall on its operators.”

more of the abstract

That fee design is being replaced: Bitcoin Core 31.0 removed the mempool rule anchor channels relied on, and the Lightning specification adopted zero-fee commitments in May 2026. What the old design costs has never been measured across fee regimes. We trace every public channel close and every force close on-chain from January 2018 to October 2026, 973,581 closes, and follow each output to its spend. A separate chain index confirms all 698,476 public closes we could compare. Fee spikes did not bring a wave of force closes. Force closes in a spike week and the next were 0.97 times the four weeks before, against 1.02 after ordinary weeks of the same years. A force close costs 2-6 times a cooperative close in fees and locks the closer's balance for days, which outweighs the fees only in low-fee years. When fees are high, pending payments are exposed: in 2023, 18.2% of HTLC timeouts confirmed more than 40 blocks after expiry. Yet since 2021, forwarding nodes lost only 38 payments, each with the preimage already on-chain. Anchor outputs cut late timeouts in fee spikes (20.6% against 30.5%), yet owners rarely bump commitments with them, and miners take most of what third parties sweep. Zero-fee commitments would save only 12% of the anchor mechanism's block space; they should be judged by how promptly payments resolve when fees spike.

from the abstract

Pith says

Machine review · deepseek-v4-flash · 13 Nov 2026 · what was read was not recorded · not checked by a person

It can be wrong. Challenge this review or reply to it.

Holds up, with conditions. This is the baseline measurement the Lightning fee-migration debate needed, and the central spike result holds up under the paper's own placebo framework; the broadcast-timing caveat is real, acknowledged, and tested as far as the chain allows. This line is wrong

5 major objections · 9 minor

How often objections from reviews like this one are right: not yet measured

Are you an author? What you can do.

Not checked: figures, code, what the 32 references say.

The paper says, at §VIII-A, Table V

The review did not quote this passage.

A classifier read this sentence of the paper as acknowledging the concern (probability 0.75):

“The caveat is that the chain records confirmation, not broadcast.”

Pith says: Objection 1 of 5 · major

The fee-spike test uses confirmation weeks as a proxy for broadcast weeks. The authors acknowledge this limitation (§VIII, §XI), but the central claim that fee spikes do not bring a wave of force closes rests on this timing proxy. If a spike causes operators to broadcast commitments at fee rates too low to confirm promptly, those broadcasts would appear in the confirmation series only after a delay that could exceed the tested windows (spike week +1, and lags 1–4 weeks).

more of objection 1

The paper's placebo tests preserve the confirmation series and shift the fee series, so they test whether a spike in fees is followed by a spike in confirmations within those windows. They do not test whether a spike in fees is followed by a spike in broadcasts that confirm later or never confirm (because the operator replaced the transaction with a higher-fee version). The paper reports that unlisted force closes fell when fees rose (elasticity −0.22), which is consistent with delayed confirmation or failed bumps, but the main test excludes unlisted closes. The 0.97 ratio and the placebo comparisons are all defined on confirmation weeks, so the timing proxy is the most fragile load-bearing premise for the headline claim.

The paper says, at §VIII-A, Table V

The review did not quote this passage.

Pith says: Objection 2 of 5 · major

The placebo tests (A, B, C) are described but the paper does not report the distribution of the test statistic under the null for the spike ratio (0.97). It reports percentile 23 of placebo A, but does not give a p-value or confidence interval.

more of objection 2

For the elasticity, it reports percentiles but no p-value. The paper states that nominal 5% tests rejected in 12–14% of draws of B and 21–25% of draws of C, indicating that the placebos do not produce uniform p-values. The paper should report the exact p-values or confidence intervals for the main null hypotheses (no wave, no delayed rise) under each placebo, and discuss the implications of the inflated rejection rates for the interpretation of the results.

The paper says, at §VI-C, Fig. 4a

The review did not quote this passage.

Pith says: Objection 3 of 5 · major

The comparison of HTLC timeout lateness between pre-anchor and anchor channels at high fee rates (50+ sat/vB) is based on a small number of observations? The paper does not report the sample sizes for each fee bucket. The claim that anchor channels have fewer late timeouts (20.6% vs 30.5%) is important for the anchor design evaluation. The paper should report the number of HTLC timeouts in each bucket and a confidence interval or test for the difference.

The paper says, at §VII, Table IV

The review did not quote this passage.

Pith says: Objection 4 of 5 · major

The paper reports that no P2WSH anchor is left unspent, but this is based on the cutoff date. The paper should clarify whether this is a definitive statement or subject to future spends. Also, the claim that no third party has swept a simple-taproot anchor is based on the absence of script-path spends.

more of objection 4

The paper should discuss whether key-path spends by third parties are possible (they are not, as the paper notes the key is not revealed until the matching output is spent). The statement is correct but could be clearer.

The paper says, at §IX, Table VII

The review did not quote this passage.

Pith says: Objection 5 of 5 · major

The zero-fee counterfactual block space saving (12%) is based on assumptions about which anchor force closes would need a child under zero-fee commitments. The paper assumes that the 88% of anchor closes that were not already bumped would need a child with a wallet input and change output (111 vB).

more of objection 5

This is a reasonable assumption but should be explicitly stated as a modeling choice. The paper should discuss how sensitive the 12% saving is to this assumption, e.g., if some of those closes could use a simpler child without change.

9 minor objections

The paper says, at Abstract

Pith says: minor objection 1 of 9

The abstract states 'Zero-fee commitments would save only 12% of the anchor mechanism's block space'. This is a specific number from §IX, but the abstract does not mention that this is a counterfactual estimate based on assumptions. Consider adding a qualifier like 'under our assumptions'.

The paper says, at §III-b

Pith says: minor objection 2 of 9

The description of the public channel list could be clearer about the coverage in 2018 and early 2019. The paper states that the list holds few channels from 2018 and that January 2019 is still incomplete. This is important for interpreting the early years' results.

show 7 more

The paper says, at §IV-G

Pith says: minor objection 3 of 9

The definition of a spike week uses a threshold of 2 times the previous eight weeks and at least 10 sat/vB. The paper should justify these thresholds or cite prior work. The sensitivity of the results to these thresholds should be discussed.

The paper says, at Table I

Pith says: minor objection 4 of 9

The table shows 'All force' for 2018 as 35,218, but the paper states that the list of public channels holds few of the channels that closed in 2018. The table should include a note that the 2018 force close count is based on the commitment fingerprint and may include some non-Lightning transactions? The paper should clarify the reliability of the 2018 count.

The paper says, at §VI-B

Pith says: minor objection 5 of 9

The description of the breach wave in September-October 2026 is detailed and plausible. However, the paper should note that the attribution to a Core Lightning bug is based on the pattern of transactions and the timing of the fix, but the chain does not definitively prove the cause. The paper already acknowledges this (§XI: 'Only punished breaches are visible').

The paper says, at §VII-f

Pith says: minor objection 6 of 9

The paper states that no third party has swept a simple-taproot anchor. This is an interesting finding. The paper should discuss possible reasons: the key is not revealed until the matching output is spent, so third parties cannot spend the anchor via the script path until that happens. The paper mentions this but could be more explicit.

The paper says, at §X-d

Pith says: minor objection 7 of 9

The discussion states 'the wait outweighs the fees only in low-fee years'. This is a key result from §VI-Ae. The paper should ensure that the break-even rate calculation is clearly explained and that the assumptions (e.g., cost of capital) are stated.

The paper says, at §XI

Pith says: minor objection 8 of 9

The limitations section is thorough. One additional limitation: the fee-spike test uses a specific definition of spike (2x previous 8 weeks, at least 10 sat/vB). The results may be sensitive to this definition. The paper should discuss this.

The paper says, at References

Pith says: minor objection 9 of 9

Reference [17] is the author's previous paper on the Core Lightning shutdown. The paper should ensure that this reference is publicly available and has been peer-reviewed or is a preprint. The paper states it is on arXiv.

What would settle it

Re-run the fee-spike analysis using the broadcast week estimated from the commitment's locktime and the fee rate of the block it confirmed in, for the subset of closes where the commitment's fee rate is below the block median and the confirmation delay exceeds 1 week. If the estimated broadcast week shifts the ratio above 1.10 (the +2/+3 window's value), the headline claim weakens.

from the skeptic's reading

How the review went

4 readings by deepseek-v4-flash · 13 Nov 2026

  1. Reader holds up, with conditions confidence moderate
  2. Skeptic agrees 7 s · 24,902 tokens read, 636 written
  3. Editor wrote the verdict above 16 s · 25,678 tokens read, 2,387 written
  4. Referee major revision: 5 major objections, 9 minor 14 s · 25,193 tokens read, 1,835 written

Not run on this paper: the simulated authors' defence.

Pith did not check this review's objections against the paper.

The review in full

The review in brief, machine-written

This is the quantitative baseline the Lightning fee-migration debate has been missing, and it's careful measurement work. The headline claim — fee spikes don't bring waves of force closes (0.97 vs 1.02) — rests on a placebo framework with a fixed seed and pre-registered verdict rules, a separate chain index confirms 698,476 public closes with perfect label agreement, and the code plus aggregates let you check the numbers yourself. That's real evidence.

What's new is genuinely new: no prior work follows force-close outputs to their costs, measures anchor usage across fee regimes, or quantifies HTLC deadline exposure. The anchor money trail alone — owners spending 81% of anchors in 2022 and 5% in 2026, miners taking 87% of swept value, no third party touching simple-taproot anchors — settles a developer-forum dispute with data rather than a few nodes' logs. The zero-fee counterfactual, a 12% block-space saving, is a bounded, explicit assumption of the kind measurement papers should make.

The stress-test concern is real but proportionate, and the authors already did much of the work. The chain records confirmation, not broadcast, and the paper says so plainly (§VIII-c, §XI). A spike-driven wave whose broadcasts confirm weeks late could be missed. But the paper tests exactly that smearing — lags of one to four weeks, elasticity at most 0.02, p=0.42 against the circular shift — and finds nothing. The residual risk is longer delays or replaced bumps that confirm never, which is acknowledged as untestable from the chain. I don't see a feasible way to do better, short of mempool archives that don't exist.

The weak spots are minor and honestly reported. The +2/+3 event window was chosen after seeing the data; they say so in the Table V footnote and report its percentile 88 anyway. The 2024 reversal — anchor HTLC timeouts late more often than pre-anchor (12.8% vs 6.3%) — is unexplained and cuts against their own narrative; that deserves a referee's push. Unlisted force closes have no external check, and the per-transaction tables are on request rather than shipped, which slows verification.

Bottom line: the central claim holds up, the caveats are disclosed rather than buried, and the two things to push on are the 2024 anomaly and the broadcast-timing proxy. This deserves a serious referee and, with light revision, publication. For anyone working on Lightning fee design or timelocked pre-signed transaction systems, this is the reference measurement.

The strongest objection

The central claim that fee spikes do not bring a wave of force closes rests on the timing proxy: the paper measures confirmed force closes per week, not broadcast force closes per week. The authors acknowledge this limitation (§VIII, §XI). If a fee spike causes operators to broadcast commitments at fee rates too low to confirm promptly, those broadcasts would appear in the confirmation series only after a delay that could exceed the tested windows (spike week +1, and lags 1–4 weeks). The paper's placebo tests preserve the confirmation series and shift the fee series, so they test whether a spike in fees is followed by a spike in confirmations within those windows. They do not test whether a spike in fees is followed by a spike in broadcasts that confirm later or never confirm (because the operator replaced the transaction with a higher-fee version). The paper reports that unlisted force closes fell when fees rose (elasticity −0.22), which is consistent with delayed confirmation or failed bumps, but the main test excludes unlisted closes. The 0.97 ratio and the placebo comparisons are all defined on confirmation weeks, so the timing proxy is the most fragile load-bearing premise for the headline claim.

The reader's weakest_assumption correctly identifies the timing proxy (confirmation for broadcast) as the most fragile load-bearing premise. The paper acknowledges this limitation explicitly (§VIII, §XI). The concrete test I propose would settle whether the concern actually lands: if the estimated broadcast week shifts the ratio, the headline claim weakens; if not, the concern is bounded. I agree with the reader that the main 0 to +1 window is pre-specified and supported, and that the post-hoc window and the on-request availability of raw per-transaction tables should be addressed. The verdict should remain CONDITIONAL because the timing proxy is acknowledged but not fully testable, and the concrete test would address it. I do not see a stronger concern that would move the verdict to REJECT or ACCEPT. The paper's internal consistency, explicit limitations, and released code support the CONDITIONAL verdict.

The referee's report

If correct, the paper provides the first large-scale empirical baseline for Lightning Network fee design, directly informing the ongoing migration to zero-fee commitments. The data release and reproducible methodology are strengths.

Pith's reading of the paper (a machine's summary, not the authors')

This paper examines every public and private Lightning channel close on the Bitcoin blockchain from January 2018 to October 2026, totaling 973,581 closes. The central finding is that fee spikes did not trigger a wave of force closes: in the week of a fee spike and the following week, force closes were 0.97 times the level of the four weeks before, while ordinary weeks showed a ratio of 1.02. The paper also measures the cost of force closes, finding they are 2–6 times more expensive than cooperative closes in fees and lock funds for days. Despite these costs, actual losses from stuck payments are rare: only 38 payments were lost by forwarding nodes since 2021. The study provides a baseline for evaluating the upcoming zero-fee commitment design, which the paper argues will save little block space but may improve payment resolution during fee spikes.

What carries the argument. The central object is the set of 973,581 Lightning channel closes traced on the Bitcoin blockchain from 2018 to 2026. The key mechanism is the event study comparing force close counts in fee spike weeks versus placebo weeks, using three placebo tests to rule out confounding. The paper also uses a regression of the weekly force-close rate on median block fee rates with year fixed effects. The identification of force closes relies on the fingerprint of commitment transactions (locktime byte 0x20 and sequence byte 0x80). The cost analysis follows all 1,346,588 outputs of force closes to their spend transactions, classifying each spend by type (sweep, HTLC, anchor, penalty).

Core claim. The paper establishes that fee spikes do not cause a wave of force closes in the Lightning Network, for both pre-anchor channels (where fees are fixed at signing) and anchor channels (where fees can be bumped). This is based on an event study of nine fee spikes and a regression analysis using placebo tests. The paper also provides the first comprehensive measurement of force close costs across fee regimes, showing that while force closes are more expensive than cooperative closes and lock funds for days, the exposure of pending payments (HTLCs) has rarely led to actual losses. Anchor outputs, designed to help bump fees, are increasingly left unspent by owners and swept by third parties, with miners taking most of the value. The paper concludes that zero-fee commitments will save only 12% of block space compared to the anchor mechanism, and their main benefit will be in how promptly payments resolve during fee spikes.

The premise it rests on. The fee-spike test treats the weekly series of confirmed force closes as a faithful proxy for the series of force closes actually broadcast, but the chain records confirmation, not broadcast; if a spike causes operators to broadcast commitments at fee rates too low to confirm promptly, a wave could appear after the tested windows, and the paper cannot observe longer delays or failed and replaced bumps.

If the paper is right (Pith's inferences, not the authors')

If the paper is correct, the common assumption that fee spikes force channels closed is false; operators do not need to fear mass force closes during fee spikes.

The anchor output design has largely failed its intended purpose: owners rarely bump commitments with anchors, and third-party sweeps are inefficient, with miners taking most of the swept value.

Zero-fee commitments, which the Lightning specification adopted in May 2026, will save little block space (12%) but may improve payment resolution during fee spikes, which is where the anchor design showed its value.

The migration to zero-fee commitments will be slow because channels keep their format until they close; old formats will remain on-chain for years, as seen with pre-anchor channels persisting long after anchors became available.

The paper's method of detecting on-chain events (breach waves, replacement-cycling tests) without node logs can be used as a monitoring tool for the Lightning Network's health.

The paper's finding that fee spikes do not cause force closes may be specific to the fee regimes observed (2018–2026). If future fee spikes are more severe or sustained (e.g., >100 sat/vB for weeks), the result might not hold; the paper's data includes only 9 spikes with a median fee rate at least 2x the previous 8 weeks and at least 10 sat/vB.

The paper's reliance on confirmation timing rather than broadcast timing (acknowledged in §XI) means that a wave of force closes broadcast during a spike but confirming later could be missed. The paper checks lags of 1–4 weeks and finds no rise, but longer delays or failed bumps are not observable.

The finding that only 38 payments were lost by forwarding nodes since 2021, all with the preimage already on-chain, suggests that the Lightning Network's security assumptions are holding in practice, but this may change if replacement-cycling attacks become more sophisticated or if node operators become less diligent.

The paper's measurement that zero-fee commitments save only 12% block space implies that the main motivation for the migration is not efficiency but the removal of the CPFP carve-out (Bitcoin Core 31.0) and the simplification of the fee model. The paper implicitly argues that the migration should be judged by HTLC resolution during fee spikes, not by block space savings.

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The paper

Abstract

Bitcoin's Lightning payment network returns the funds of a channel that cannot close cooperatively through pre-signed transactions whose fees and delays fall on its operators. That fee design is being replaced: Bitcoin Core 31.0 removed the mempool rule anchor channels relied on, and the Lightning specification adopted zero-fee commitments in May 2026. What the old design costs has never been measured across fee regimes. We trace every public channel close and every force close on-chain from January 2018 to October 2026, 973,581 closes, and follow each output to its spend. A separate chain index confirms all 698,476 public closes we could compare. Fee spikes did not bring a wave of force closes. Force closes in a spike week and the next were 0.97 times the four weeks before, against 1.02 after ordinary weeks of the same years. A force close costs 2-6 times a cooperative close in fees and locks the closer's balance for days, which outweighs the fees only in low-fee years. When fees are high, pending payments are exposed: in 2023, 18.2% of HTLC timeouts confirmed more than 40 blocks after expiry. Yet since 2021, forwarding nodes lost only 38 payments, each with the preimage already on-chain. Anchor outputs cut late timeouts in fee spikes (20.6% against 30.5%), yet owners rarely bump commitments with them, and miners take most of what third parties sweep. Zero-fee commitments would save only 12% of the anchor mechanism's block space; they should be judged by how promptly payments resolve when fees spike.

The paper's own sentences, arranged, kept beside the review and separate from it. Each label is drawn from a closed vocabulary; the number beside it is the probability the classifier gave that label. No sentence in this record was written by a model.

abstract compiled · 2026-11-13

The authors' main claim, as the classifier picked it out 0.52

“Zero-fee commitments would save only 12% of the anchor mechanism's block space; they should be judged by how promptly payments resolve when fees spike.”

How the main claim is stated: asserted 0.95

What the abstract itself states, as probabilities: claims first 0.67 · states limitation 0.36 · human participants 0.02 · controlled comparison 0.86 · randomized assignment 0.01 · states quantitative result 0.99 · compares with prior results 0.79 · mentions code or data availability 0.05

The abstract, sentence by sentence

This table labels the abstract only (arXiv listing abstract v1). The number is the probability the classifier gave the label.

SentenceRoleThe authors' own workStates the main conclusionStrength
Bitcoin's Lightning payment network returns the funds of a channel that cannot close cooperatively through pre-signed transactions whose fees and delays fall on its operators. background 1.00 0.05 0.07 asserted 1.00
That fee design is being replaced: Bitcoin Core 31.0 removed the mempool rule anchor channels relied on, and the Lightning specification adopted zero-fee commitments in May 2026. background 1.00 0.06 0.04 asserted 1.00
What the old design costs has never been measured across fee regimes. gap 1.00 0.08 0.04 asserted 0.98
We trace every public channel close and every force close on-chain from January 2018 to October 2026, 973,581 closes, and follow each output to its spend. method 0.88 0.96 0.04 asserted 1.00
A separate chain index confirms all 698,476 public closes we could compare. method 0.95 0.83 0.03 asserted 0.98
Fee spikes did not bring a wave of force closes. result 1.00 0.90 0.19 asserted 1.00
Force closes in a spike week and the next were 0.97 times the four weeks before, against 1.02 after ordinary weeks of the same years. result 1.00 0.93 0.13 asserted 1.00
A force close costs 2-6 times a cooperative close in fees and locks the closer's balance for days, which outweighs the fees only in low-fee years. result 0.84 0.87 0.51 asserted 1.00
When fees are high, pending payments are exposed: in 2023, 18.2% of HTLC timeouts confirmed more than 40 blocks after expiry. result 0.98 0.85 0.07 asserted 1.00
Yet since 2021, forwarding nodes lost only 38 payments, each with the preimage already on-chain. result 0.99 0.85 0.07 asserted 1.00
Anchor outputs cut late timeouts in fee spikes (20.6% against 30.5%), yet owners rarely bump commitments with them, and miners take most of what third parties sweep. result 0.92 0.79 0.09 asserted 1.00
Zero-fee commitments would save only 12% of the anchor mechanism's block space; they should be judged by how promptly payments resolve when fees spike. interpretation 0.89 0.64 0.48 asserted 0.95

What kind of paper the classifier reports this is: empirical study 1.00 · evidence from analysis of existing data 0.83

What was examined, and what was not

Sources read

  • arXiv listing abstract v1

Not examined

  • full text
  • figures and tables
  • references and citing sentences
  • relations to other papers

Levels run

  • P abstract

Not run

  • S sections
  • T body sentences
  • C citations
  • R cross-paper relations

How the labels were made

Compiled by classifier-1.13.0 via TypeSafe API, question bank abstract-p1-20260923, 2026-11-13: 1 request, 8,965 input tokens.

Every quoted sentence on this record is the authors'. Every label is from Pith's closed vocabulary, with the probability shown beside it. This record as JSON

Figures (8)
Figure 1 of the paper
Figure 1. Lightning channel closes on the chain. (a) Closes per quarter: all force closes, listed or not (dashed, from January 2018), and from 2019 the cooperative
Figure 2 of the paper
Figure 2. Share of public channels force-closed by each channel age, by the
Figure 3 of the paper
Figure 3. The cost of a public force close. (a) Median fees per close, force and cooperative (log scale; band: interquartile range of force closes). (b) Where
Figure 4 of the paper
Figure 4. HTLCs resolved on-chain. (a) Share of HTLC-timeout transactions confirmed more than 40 blocks after the HTLC’s expiry, by the median fee rate
Figure 5 of the paper
Figure 5. A public channel’s on-chain fees from funding to its last required spend. (a) Median by year of close, for lives ending in a force close or a cooperative
Figure 6 of the paper
Figure 6. The anchor money trail. (a) Who spent each P2WSH anchor, by year of the force close: its owner in the commitment’s block (fee bump) or later
Figure 7 of the paper
Figure 7. Fee spikes and force closes. (a) Weekly median block fee rate (log scale); vertical lines mark the spike weeks. (b) Weekly public force closes per
Figure 8 of the paper
Figure 8. A commitment’s fee rate divided by the median fee rate of the block it

Figures are the authors', reproduced from the paper.

References (32)
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