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Quantum Physics · arXiv:2611.16829 v1 · submitted 12 Nov 2026 · 37 references

Quantum Keynesian Beauty Contest with Continuous Variables

Hiu Ming Lau, Kareem Raslan, Kieran Hymas, Qiang Sun, Azhar Iqbal, Derek Abbott, James Q. Quach, Andrew D. Greentree

The paper says

“The development of quantum computing has opened up opportunities to re-explore conventional game models by the integration of quantum processes.”

more of the abstract

Through the established framework of quantum game theory, we examine the problem of speculative pricing in the Keynesian Beauty Contest model – the p-Beauty Contest (p-BC). In the p-BC, players are rewarded with the optimal payoff for successfully bidding at some fraction p of the average of all of the players' bids. Consequently, rational plays in the p-BC inexorably lead to boom or bust strategies for p > 1 or p < 1 respectively. We demonstrate a quantum continuous-variable implementation of p-BC where the boom-and-bust rational behavior is mitigated through a global transformation of the players' bids generated by increasing multimode squeezing. While we focus on a quantum mechanical implementation of the p-BC, we show that an entirely analogous game can be formulated via classical channels by a global mediator. Thus we identify global mediation as the underlying game-theoretic mechanism for quenching boom and bust phenomena in our model. We analyze the quantum p-BC for two, three, and many players in a mean-field type implementation. We derive an analytical form for the probability distribution of the payoff under single-value measurements of the quantum processing circuit, and explore how the rational behavior differs from the expected-value measurement setting.

from the abstract

Pith says

Machine review · deepseek-v4-flash · 13 Nov 2026 · what was read was not recorded · not checked by a person

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The passes disagreed. Reader: holds up. Skeptic: agrees with the reader. Referee: major revision.

Solid theoretical paper on continuous-variable quantum p-Beauty Contest; the central result (gamma renormalizes p towards 1, mitigating boom-bust) is derived cleanly and honestly, with the classical global-mediation mechanism identified. Worth peer review. This line is wrong

4 major objections · 7 minor

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Not checked: figures, code, what the 37 references say.

The paper says, at Section III.C, Eq. (8) and surrounding text

The review did not quote this passage.

Pith says: Objection 1 of 4 · major

The paper states that the quantum transformation can be implemented classically via a global mediator, and that this 'does not undermine the central claim, as the paper identifies global mediation as the underlying game-theoretic mechanism.' However, the abstract and introduction emphasize the quantum implementation as the key novelty ('We demonstrate a quantum continuous-variable implementation of p-BC where the boom-and-bust rational behavior is mitigated...').

more of objection 1

The fact that the same effect can be achieved classically raises a question about the quantum advantage claimed. The authors acknowledge this (Section III.C, 'The present CV construction in the quantization process is Gaussian and hence classically simulable.') but the framing throughout the paper still presents the quantum circuit as the primary contribution. The paper would benefit from a clearer statement of what, if anything, is uniquely quantum about the result, or whether the contribution is primarily the identification of global mediation as a mechanism, with the quantum implementation as one possible physical realization. This is not a fatal flaw, but it affects the significance assessment and should be addressed explicitly.

The paper says, at Section IV.A.2, Eq. (31) and Figure 12

The review did not quote this passage.

Pith says: Objection 2 of 4 · major

The paper identifies a divergence in the payoff pdf at zero for the SV game. The derivation of the pdf (Eq. 31) appears correct, but the interpretation of the divergence is not fully explored. The authors state that 'the narrowness of the peak near 0 from the divergence does not necessarily lead to the players getting better payoff on average.'

more of objection 2

However, the divergence is a mathematical feature of the continuous pdf; in any finite-resolution measurement (which the authors acknowledge is realistic), the probability of obtaining a payoff exactly zero is zero, and the integrated probability over any finite interval is finite. The claim that the divergence 'may contribute to further incentivize non-speculative rational strategies' (end of Section IV.B) is speculative and not supported by the analysis. The paper should either provide a rigorous argument linking the divergence to strategic incentives, or tone down this claim.

The paper says, at Section III.D, Eq. (11) and (12)

The review did not quote this passage.

Pith says: Objection 3 of 4 · major

The iterative elimination analysis for the EV quantum game relies on the assumption that players are k-rational and that the elimination process converges to the Nash equilibrium. The derivation of I_elim in Eq. (12) assumes that the strategy space is [a,b] and that the derivative condition ∂⟨$Qi⟩/∂xi < 0 identifies dominated strategies.

more of objection 3

However, the paper does not explicitly verify that the IDSDS process is valid for the reparameterized payoff function, i.e., that the dominated strategies are indeed strictly dominated and that the iterative elimination is well-defined for all p and gamma. The classical analysis for p-BC is standard, but the quantum payoff includes an additional factor e^{4γ} which does not affect the sign of the derivative, so the analysis is likely correct. Nevertheless, a brief justification or reference to the standard game theory result would strengthen the presentation.

The paper says, at Section IV.B, Figure 14 and discussion of most probable payoff

The review did not quote this passage.

A classifier read this sentence of the paper as acknowledging the concern (probability 0.77):

“Given the measurement outcomes are always of finite resolution in practice, the discretization produced by the Monte Carlo simulation may be close to the ob- servations in an implemented quantum game.”

Pith says: Objection 4 of 4 · major

The analysis of the most probable payoff as a function of discretization (n_samples) is interesting, but the conclusion that 'under the limit of infinite discretization samples n_samples → ∞, the threshold diverges to negative infinity' seems to imply that the most probable payoff is always zero in the continuous limit.

more of objection 4

This is consistent with the divergence at zero. However, the practical relevance of this limit is unclear, as the authors themselves note that measurements are always of finite resolution. The discussion would benefit from a clearer separation between the mathematical properties of the continuous pdf and the observable behavior in a finite-resolution implementation.

7 minor objections

The paper says, at Abstract

Pith says: minor objection 1 of 7

The abstract states 'We demonstrate a quantum continuous-variable implementation of p-BC where the boom-and-bust rational behavior is mitigated through a global transformation of the players' bids generated by increasing multimode squeezing.' This could be misinterpreted as claiming that the quantum implementation is necessary for the mitigation. Consider rephrasing to reflect that the mitigation arises from the global transformation, which can be realized either quantumly or classically.

The paper says, at Section III.C, Figure 4

Pith says: minor objection 2 of 7

The logic flow diagram in Figure 4 is helpful, but the caption could be more descriptive. It currently says 'Logic Flow Diagram to visualize the classical computational complexity.' It would be clearer to state that this diagram implements the expected processed bid ⟨qi⟩ as given in Eq. (8).

show 5 more

The paper says, at Section IV.A.1, Figure 10

Pith says: minor objection 3 of 7

The Monte Carlo demonstration is useful, but the figure caption could note the specific parameters used (e.g., x1=5, x2=1, γ=0). Also, the text mentions '10,000 samples' but the figure shows histograms with different numbers of bins; it would be helpful to state the bin count in the caption.

The paper says, at Appendix A, Eq. (A9) and (A10)

Pith says: minor objection 4 of 7

The derivation of the action of the squeezing operators on annihilation and creation operators is detailed, but there is a minor inconsistency: Eq. (A9) gives Ĵ a_k Ĵ†, while Eq. (A10) gives Ĵ† a_k Ĵ. The text should clarify which is used in the subsequent derivation. Also, the hyperbolic functions appear with argument 2γ, but the initial commutator [Â, a_k] yields -2γ(...). The derivation appears correct, but a brief comment on the sign conventions would help readability.

The paper says, at General

Pith says: minor objection 5 of 7

The paper uses the notation ⟨$Qi⟩ for the EV quantum payoff and E[$Qi] for the expected value of the SV payoff. This distinction is clear, but in Section IV.B, the text refers to 'expected payoff' in the SV context, which is consistent.

more of objection 5

However, the transition from EV to SV could be smoother; consider adding a sentence at the start of Section IV reminding the reader that the SV payoff is random and that the analysis focuses on its expected value and distribution.

The paper says, at References

Pith says: minor objection 6 of 7

Reference [22] (Hymas et al., 2026) is listed as a preprint on arXiv. This is acceptable, but the paper should note that it is a related work by the same group. Also, reference [24] (Ding and Jiang, 2025) is also a preprint. The paper should ensure that all references to unpublished work are clearly marked as such.

The paper says, at Section V, Conclusion

Pith says: minor objection 7 of 7

The conclusion mentions 'potential for a quantum market system to be built as an environment with innate resistance to boom-and-bust behavior.' This is a forward-looking statement that is not directly supported by the analysis, which only considers a single-round game. The authors acknowledge this limitation earlier (Section IV, 'the complexity could lead to some unexpected exploitative strategies in the multi-round game'), so the conclusion could be tempered to reflect that the single-round analysis is a first step.

What would settle it

Verify that the derivation of the expected processed bid ⟨q_i⟩ = e^{2γ}(x_i - x̄) + x̄ in Equation (5) follows from the Baker-Campbell-Hausdorff calculations in Appendix A, and that the resulting effective parameter p_Q = 1 + e^{-2γ}(p-1) in Equation (7) is correct. This can be done by independently re-deriving the action of the squeezing operators on the displacement operators using the commutation relations provided.

from the skeptic's reading

How the review went

4 readings by deepseek-v4-flash · 13 Nov 2026

  1. Reader holds up confidence high
  2. Skeptic agrees 5 s · 23,314 tokens read, 496 written
  3. Editor wrote the verdict above 7 s · 24,095 tokens read, 563 written
  4. Referee major revision: 4 major objections, 7 minor 17 s · 23,562 tokens read, 2,099 written

Not run on this paper: the simulated authors' defence.

Pith did not check this review's objections against the paper.

The review in full

The review in brief, machine-written

This paper does what it says: it takes the p-Beauty Contest, implements it with continuous-variable quantum circuits, and shows that the squeezing parameter gamma renormalizes the effective p towards 1, which mitigates the iterative boom-or-bust dynamics. The math is worked out in detail, the derivations are self-contained, and the authors are upfront about the fact that the Gaussian circuit is classically simulable and that the same transformation can be realized by a classical global mediator. That last point is actually a strength, not a weakness—they identify global mediation as the game-theoretic mechanism, which is a clean conceptual contribution.

The paper is well-structured and honest. The assumptions (position-basis-only displacement, Gaussian states, IDSDS rationality) are stated explicitly. The SV analysis with the payoff PDF divergence is a nice touch, and the authors correctly note that the divergence doesn't translate into a practical advantage because it's an artifact of the continuous limit. The mean-field analysis for N players is straightforward but useful.

Soft spots: the paper is essentially a theoretical exercise with no experimental demonstration or even a realistic noise model. The claim that this could lead to a "quantum market system with innate resistance to boom-and-bust" is speculative and not supported by the analysis here—the paper shows that the rational equilibrium shifts, not that real traders would behave differently. The SV game's complexity is acknowledged but not deeply explored; the authors mention neural network agents as future work, which is the right direction but absent here. The citation pattern is fine; they cite the relevant prior work on quantum games and p-BC.

Who this is for: researchers in quantum game theory and anyone interested in how entanglement can alter strategic incentives in continuous-variable settings. It's a solid theoretical contribution to a niche area. It deserves peer review—the math is sound, the claims are bounded, and the paper is clearly written. I would not cite it in my own work (not my area), but I'd send it to a referee who knows quantum game theory.

Recommendation: accept with minor revisions. The main ask would be to tone down the speculative language about quantum markets in the conclusion, or at least add a sentence acknowledging the gap between the idealized model and any real implementation.

The strongest objection

The paper's central claim is that the continuous-variable quantum implementation of the p-Beauty Contest mitigates boom-and-bust rational behavior, and that this mitigation is controlled by the squeezing parameter gamma, which renormalizes the effective beauty-contest parameter p_Q towards 1. The analysis is internally consistent, the assumptions are clearly stated, and the derivations are mathematically sound. The paper explicitly acknowledges that the quantum circuit is Gaussian and hence classically simulable, and that the same transformation can be implemented by a classical global mediator. This does not undermine the central claim, as the paper identifies global mediation as the underlying game-theoretic mechanism, and the quantum implementation is presented as a physical realization. The weakest assumption, the restriction of displacement operators to the position basis, is stated explicitly and is a modeling choice. The paper also acknowledges limitations such as the need for many measurements in the EV game and the potential for unexpected strategies in multi-round SV games. No internal inconsistency or unaddressed flaw that would threaten the central claim was identified.

The reader's verdict is ACCEPT with high confidence, and the weakest assumption identified is the restriction to the position basis. My analysis agrees that this is a stated modeling choice and not a hidden flaw. The paper's central claim is well-supported by the derivations, and the limitations are acknowledged. The paper identifies global mediation as the key mechanism, which can be realized classically, but this does not detract from the quantum contribution. No load-bearing concern that would change the verdict was found. The concrete test I propose is a verification of the core mathematical derivation, which would further confirm the soundness of the results.

The referee's report

If the central claim holds, the paper offers a novel connection between quantum information and game theory, demonstrating how a quantum-inspired global transformation can alter strategic incentives in a well-known economic model. The identification of global mediation as the key mechanism, rather than entanglement per se, is a valuable conceptual contribution. The paper provides explicit, falsifiable predictions (e.g., the dependence of p_Q on gamma) and includes a detailed analytical derivation of the payoff pdf for the SV game, which goes beyond typical quantum game analyses. The work is timely given growing interest in quantum economic models and quantum game theory. The strengths include the clear mathematical framework, the explicit derivation of the effective parameter, and the honest discussion of limitations (e.g., Gaussian simulability, need for many measurements in EV game, potential for unexpected strategies in multi-round SV games).

Pith's reading of the paper (a machine's summary, not the authors')

The Keynesian Beauty Contest is a game where players try to guess a fraction p of the average of all players' guesses. In the classical version, rational players inevitably end up bidding at the extremes (boom for p>1, bust for p<1), which is a model for speculative bubbles. This paper introduces a quantum version using continuous-variable quantum states. Each player's bid is encoded in a quantum mode, and a circuit applies multimode squeezing operations that entangle the modes. The key result is that the expected measurement outcome for each player is a transformed version of their original bid: it becomes the average of all bids plus an amplified deviation from that average. This transformation preserves the average but changes the effective scaling factor p to a new value p_Q that is closer to 1. When p_Q is close to 1, the rational strategy no longer drives bids to the extremes, thus mitigating boom and bust. The authors show that this same transformation can be achieved classically by a global mediator who collects all bids, computes the average, and applies the same formula. They analyze the game for two, three, and many players using mean-field theory, and also study a version where each player's payoff is based on a single measurement (single-value) rather than an average over many measurements (expected-value). In the single-value case, they derive the probability distribution of the payoff and show that the on-average optimal strategy still avoids boom and bust.

Core claim. The central claim is that the continuous-variable quantum implementation of the p-Beauty Contest mitigates the boom-and-bust rational behavior present in the classical game, and that this mitigation is controlled by the squeezing parameter gamma, which renormalizes the effective beauty-contest parameter p_Q towards 1 (Section III, Equations 5-7). The paper states: 'We demonstrate a quantum continuous-variable implementation of p-BC where the boom-and-bust rational behavior is mitigated through a global transformation of the players' bids generated by increasing multimode squeezing.' (Abstract) and 'We have demonstrated, by game theoretic analysis of the designed quantum p-BC, that the boom-and-bust rational strategy present in the classical p-BC can be contained by the quantization process.' (Conclusion).

The premise it rests on. The analysis assumes that players are rational in the sense of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IDSDS) and that they know the squeezing parameter gamma and the quantum circuit. The paper also assumes that the quantum circuit can be implemented with the specific multimode squeezing operations described, and that the displacement operators are limited to the position basis (Section III, 'The imaginary component of the displacement x_i is excluded, and the displacement operator D_i limited to the position basis X_i.'). This restriction is a modeling choice that may not correspond to a physically realizable constraint in all quantum optical implementations. Furthermore, the analysis of the single-value game relies on the assumption that measurement outcomes are Gaussian distributed with variance 1/2, which holds for the specific initial vacuum state and squeezing operations, but may not hold for other states or noise sources.

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The paper

Abstract

The development of quantum computing has opened up opportunities to re-explore conventional game models by the integration of quantum processes. Through the established framework of quantum game theory, we examine the problem of speculative pricing in the Keynesian Beauty Contest model – the p-Beauty Contest (p-BC). In the p-BC, players are rewarded with the optimal payoff for successfully bidding at some fraction p of the average of all of the players' bids. Consequently, rational plays in the p-BC inexorably lead to boom or bust strategies for p > 1 or p < 1 respectively. We demonstrate a quantum continuous-variable implementation of p-BC where the boom-and-bust rational behavior is mitigated through a global transformation of the players' bids generated by increasing multimode squeezing. While we focus on a quantum mechanical implementation of the p-BC, we show that an entirely analogous game can be formulated via classical channels by a global mediator. Thus we identify global mediation as the underlying game-theoretic mechanism for quenching boom and bust phenomena in our model. We analyze the quantum p-BC for two, three, and many players in a mean-field type implementation. We derive an analytical form for the probability distribution of the payoff under single-value measurements of the quantum processing circuit, and explore how the rational behavior differs from the expected-value measurement setting.

The paper's own sentences, arranged, kept beside the review and separate from it. Each label is drawn from a closed vocabulary; the number beside it is the probability the classifier gave that label. No sentence in this record was written by a model.

abstract compiled · 2026-11-13

The authors' main claim, as the classifier picked it out 0.99

“Thus we identify global mediation as the underlying game-theoretic mechanism for quenching boom and bust phenomena in our model.”

How the main claim is stated: asserted 1.00

What the abstract itself states, as probabilities: claims first 0.05 · states limitation 0.20 · human participants 0.03 · controlled comparison 0.19 · randomized assignment 0.01 · states quantitative result 0.11 · compares with prior results 0.38 · mentions code or data availability 0.02

The abstract, sentence by sentence

This table labels the abstract only (arXiv listing abstract v1). The number is the probability the classifier gave the label.

SentenceRoleThe authors' own workStates the main conclusionStrength
The development of quantum computing has opened up opportunities to re-explore conventional game models by the integration of quantum processes. background 1.00 0.05 0.02 asserted 0.81
Through the established framework of quantum game theory, we examine the problem of speculative pricing in the Keynesian Beauty Contest model -- the $p$-Beauty Contest ($p$-BC). contribution 0.88 0.80 0.04 asserted 0.93
In the $p$-BC, players are rewarded with the optimal payoff for successfully bidding at some fraction $p$ of the average of all of the players' bids. background 1.00 0.05 0.03 asserted 1.00
Consequently, \textit{rational} plays in the $p$-BC inexorably lead to boom or bust strategies for $p>1$ or $p<1$ respectively. background 0.91 0.12 0.08 asserted 1.00
We demonstrate a quantum continuous-variable implementation of $p$-BC where the boom-and-bust rational behavior is mitigated through a global transformation of the players' bids generated by increasing multimode squeezing. result 0.57 0.95 0.47 asserted 1.00
While we focus on a quantum mechanical implementation of the $p$-BC, we show that an entirely analogous game can be formulated via classical channels by a global mediator. contribution 0.62 0.86 0.08 asserted 0.99
Thus we identify global mediation as the underlying game-theoretic mechanism for quenching boom and bust phenomena in our model. interpretation 0.98 0.91 0.75 asserted 1.00
We analyze the quantum $p$-BC for two, three, and many players in a mean-field type implementation. method 0.53 0.94 0.04 asserted 0.99
We derive an analytical form for the probability distribution of the payoff under single-value measurements of the quantum processing circuit, and explore how the rational behavior differs from the expected-value measurement setting. contribution 0.70 0.95 0.06 asserted 0.99

What kind of paper the classifier reports this is: theoretical result 0.97 · evidence from proof or derivation 1.00

What was examined, and what was not

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  • references and citing sentences
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  • C citations
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How the labels were made

Compiled by classifier-1.13.0 via TypeSafe API, question bank abstract-p1-20260923, 2026-11-13: 1 request, 6,992 input tokens.

Every quoted sentence on this record is the authors'. Every label is from Pith's closed vocabulary, with the probability shown beside it. This record as JSON

Figures (14)
Figure 1 of the paper
Figure 1. A visualization of the IDSDS process for “Guess
Figure 2 of the paper
Figure 2. N-player continuous-variable quantization scheme. The core element in the quantization is this quantum circuit. Here, Dˆi is the single-mode displacement operator encoding player i’s bid on their corresponding mode, where the dis￾placement parameter xi is limited to the position axis, omit￾ting the complex momentum component. The two N-mode squeezing operators Jˆ & Jˆ† are as described in Equation (3), which introduce correlations between the modes and hence the strategies of all players. Finally, each mode is measured in its corresponding positional basis Xˆi given Dˆi(xi), with…
Figure 3 of the paper
Figure 3. Wigner Function Plots. Given 2 players who
Figure 4 of the paper
Figure 4. Logic Flow Diagram to visualize the classical com
Figure 5 of the paper
Figure 5. Effective scaling factor pQ as a function of γ: by adjusting γ the level of squeezing, the effective p in the quan￾tum game (pQ) can be adjusted towards 1 regardless of the chosen value of p in the classical game. Under the limit of large squeezing γ ≫ 1, the ef￾fective scaling parameter pQ is approximately 1. As a result, the region of dominated strategy becomes neg￾ligible, and the strategy space eliminated through the iterative elimination process becomes insignificant. As the k-rational strategy becomes less relevant, the Nash equilibria approximately spans the entire strategy…
Figure 6 of the paper
Figure 6. Two-player quantum p-BC, player 1’s payoff spec￾trum with respect to both players’ bids: a) the payoff spectra for γ set at {0, 1, 2}, where the peak gradient approaches 1 with increasing level of squeezing; b) since the only signifi￾cant feature here is the peaks of the payoff spectra, which are incidentally the best-response curves for player 1, the player interactions in the quantum game can then be simplified to observing how the best response changes with respect to γ. Additionally, the iterative elimination process is visualized by the dashed lines drawn. The best response…
Figure 7 of the paper
Figure 7. Three player quantum p-BC: Player 1’s best re￾sponse curves for different γ settings given the different bids from player 2 & 3. Comparing the intercepts in Figure (7) to Figure (6b), player 2 now has less influence on player 1’s payoff as anticipated, with the span of the best response at γ = 2 decreasing from 100 to 50. On the other hand, similar to the 2-player game, there is an increase in responsiveness between the players under higher levels of entanglement. 3. Mean-field Type N-player Games To visualize the EV quantum p-BC for N > 3, a mean￾field type approach is used by creat
Figure 8 of the paper
Figure 8. Mean-field type game for 1 vs N − 1: a) Player 1’s best response curve under different γ settings with respect to the N − 1 group’s bid; b) The term pQ(N−1) N−pQ shows how the player should account for their bid’s influence on average in calculating their bid for 2/3 average. When pQ N−pQ is far from p, the player’s bid has a large sway on the average bid. When pQ N−pQ → p, the average is independent of the player’s bid; c) The N − 1 group’s best response curve under different γ settings with respect to the player 1’s bid. Here an unrealistic upper limit of γ = 10 is used to…
Figure 9 of the paper
Figure 9. Mean-field type game for 1 vs 1 vs N − 2: Player 1’s best response curve given γ, player 2’s bid and the N − 2 group’s bids. participant. In this section, we present the SV quantum p-BC, where each player’s quantum-processed bid is pro￾duced by a single quantum measurement. The introduced quantum probabilistic measurements can substantially alter the game’s physical implemen￾tation and rational behavior. Each player’s quantum￾processed bid is not only influenced by the bids of other players through the entanglement, but is now also sam￾pled from a random distribution due to the Born…
Figure 10 of the paper
Figure 10. Payoff Probability Spectrum by Monte Carlo: a)
Figure 11 of the paper
Figure 11. Computing payoff distribution through uniform
Figure 12 of the paper
Figure 12. Analytical Solution of $Q i ’s Probability Density: a) for player 1 and player 2 with support a$ Q 1 and a$ Q 2 re￾spectively; b) $Q 1 with γ ∈ [0, 0.8] (in 0.02 increments); c) $Q 2 for γ ∈ [0, 0.8], where small values are plotted separately to show the divergence; d) The expected value and variance of the payoffs as a function of γ. also shown for the given example in Figure (12b&c). The decreasing expected payoff is a result of the squeezing operations amplifying the distance between the player’s bids and the average bid as discussed in Section III B, while under lower e
Figure 13 of the paper
Figure 13. a) Expected value and variance of the SV pay
Figure 14 of the paper
Figure 14. a) Left: The most probable payoff $ Q i

Figures are the authors', reproduced from the paper.

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