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IP Leakage Attacks Targeting LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems

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arxiv 2505.12442 v3 pith:5CGJPQWI submitted 2025-05-18 cs.CR cs.AIcs.CL

classification cs.CRcs.AIcs.CL
keywords masleakagentapplicationssystemarchitectureattackincludingadversary
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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abstract

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has led to the emergence of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) to perform complex tasks through collaboration. However, the intricate nature of MAS, including their architecture and agent interactions, raises significant concerns regarding intellectual property (IP) protection. In this paper, we introduce MASLEAK, a novel attack framework designed to extract sensitive information from MAS applications. MASLEAK targets a practical, black-box setting, where the adversary has no prior knowledge of the MAS architecture or agent configurations. The adversary can only interact with the MAS through its public API, submitting attack query $q$ and observing outputs from the final agent. Inspired by how computer worms propagate and infect vulnerable network hosts, MASLEAK carefully crafts adversarial query $q$ to elicit, propagate, and retain responses from each MAS agent that reveal a full set of proprietary components, including the number of agents, system topology, system prompts, task instructions, and tool usages. We construct the first synthetic dataset of MAS applications with 810 applications and also evaluate MASLEAK against real-world MAS applications, including Coze and CrewAI. MASLEAK achieves high accuracy in extracting MAS IP, with an average attack success rate of 87% for system prompts and task instructions, and 92% for system architecture in most cases. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings and the potential defenses.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Attacking and Defending Multi-Agent Collaborative Filtering Systems Through Connectivity

    cs.IR 2026-08 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    In agent-based collaborative filtering, attack spread and privacy leakage grow with interaction connectivity, but the effect is asymmetric between user and item agents and differs between early and steady-state phases.

  2. When Prompts Control Robots: Prompt Injection Attacks in Multi-Agent Robotic Systems

    cs.RO 2026-08 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Prompt injection can hijack multi-agent LLM robot planners, spread from an injected agent to clean teammates through shared prompts, and partially survives a per-agent separation defense via shared memory.

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