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SoK: On the Semantic AI Security in Autonomous Driving

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arxiv 2203.05314 v2 pith:6UZTMHAO submitted 2022-03-10 cs.CR cs.AIcs.RO

SoK: On the Semantic AI Security in Autonomous Driving

classification cs.CR cs.AIcs.RO
keywords securitysemanticresearchleveldrivingplatformworksaddress
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
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Autonomous Driving (AD) systems rely on AI components to make safety and correct driving decisions. Unfortunately, today's AI algorithms are known to be generally vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, for such AI component-level vulnerabilities to be semantically impactful at the system level, it needs to address non-trivial semantic gaps both (1) from the system-level attack input spaces to those at AI component level, and (2) from AI component-level attack impacts to those at the system level. In this paper, we define such research space as semantic AI security as opposed to generic AI security. Over the past 5 years, increasingly more research works are performed to tackle such semantic AI security challenges in AD context, which has started to show an exponential growth trend. In this paper, we perform the first systematization of knowledge of such growing semantic AD AI security research space. In total, we collect and analyze 53 such papers, and systematically taxonomize them based on research aspects critical for the security field. We summarize 6 most substantial scientific gaps observed based on quantitative comparisons both vertically among existing AD AI security works and horizontally with security works from closely-related domains. With these, we are able to provide insights and potential future directions not only at the design level, but also at the research goal, methodology, and community levels. To address the most critical scientific methodology-level gap, we take the initiative to develop an open-source, uniform, and extensible system-driven evaluation platform, named PASS, for the semantic AD AI security research community. We also use our implemented platform prototype to showcase the capabilities and benefits of such a platform using representative semantic AD AI attacks.

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