Pith. sign in

REVIEW 4 major objections 2 minor 1 cited by

Unravelling the Probabilistic Forest: Arbitrage in Prediction Markets

T0 review · 4 major / 2 minor · reviewed 2026-08-06 · deepseek-v4-flash

Pith's one-line read This paper estimates that users extracted about $40 million in guaranteed profit from arbitrage on Polymarket, a blockchain prediction market, by exploiting two forms of systematic mispricing.

desk verdict Submission is a packaging mismatch — abstract promises a $40M Polymarket arbitrage study, full text is an unrelated plasma physics paper, so it's unreviewable as-is. read the letter →

arxiv 2508.03474 v1 pith:HDARFBXA submitted 2025-08-05 cs.CR q-fin.TR

classification cs.CRq-fin.TR
keywords predictionmarketsarbitragePolymarketorderbookanalysismarketefficiencyblockchaindatacombinatorialmispricing
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

Polymarket lets users buy shares in the outcomes of future events, with the guarantee that exactly one outcome in each set will occur, so prices should sum to $1 and any deviation is a guaranteed profit opportunity. This paper examines the full on-chain order-book history of the platform and identifies two forms of such arbitrage: Market Rebalancing Arbitrage, inside a single event's outcome set, and Combinatorial Arbitrage, across multiple related events. The authors claim that both forms have been present and that users have extracted roughly $40 million in realized profit. The finding matters because it quantifies, for the first time on a public blockchain, how far a popular prediction market departs from efficient pricing.

What carries the argument

The mechanism that carries the argument is the exhaustive-outcome constraint on Polymarket markets: each market's conditions must be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, so the fair price of the full outcome set is exactly $1. Any observable sum below or above $1 is a guaranteed arbitrage, and the same condition recurring in several markets lets a trader combine contradicting implied probabilities. Because a naive search over all combinations of markets and conditions costs $O(2^{n+m})$ comparisons, the paper's scalability machinery is a heuristic reduction that groups markets by timeliness, topical similarity, and combinatorial links, then validates the groups with expert input. The on-chain order-book records supply the actual prices at which opportunities existed and were filled.

What would settle it

Re-run the analysis on a random sample of markets using an exhaustive scan over all condition combinations instead of the heuristic, and compare the arbitrage sets and profit totals; any substantial mismatch would revise the $40 million estimate. A second check is to take a sample of the order-book fills the paper counts as executed arbitrage and verify against the full transaction history that those fills occurred at the recorded prices.

Watch

Extended reading notes

Core claim

The central discovery is that persistent mispricing does occur on Polymarket and is large enough to have been actively harvested. By reconstructing order-book states from blockchain history and grouping related markets with a heuristic that combines timeliness, topical similarity, and combinatorial relationships, the authors find that dependent outcome sets frequently trade such that buying all outcomes costs less than $1 or selling them yields more than $1. They distinguish two mechanisms: Market Rebalancing Arbitrage, which arises when a single market's own condition prices drift out of sync, and Combinatorial Arbitrage, which arises when the same condition appears in multiple markets whose implied probabilities disagree. Applying the two forms to historical order-book data, the paper estimates that arbitrageurs realized about $40 million in profit.

Load-bearing premise

The estimate depends on the heuristic correctly identifying every set of dependent markets that matters; if it misses or falsely groups markets, or if the on-chain order book does not faithfully record the prices at which trades executed, the $40 million figure would change.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

  • If correct, Polymarket has not been efficient over long stretches, and the $40 million is a lower bound on the platform's pricing error.
  • Platforms running similar condition-based markets can deploy the same reduction strategy to monitor arbitrage in near real time.
  • The measured arbitrage activity indicates both the persistence of mispricing and the speed at which traders correct it.
  • Regulators or auditors could use on-chain order-book analysis to verify whether prediction markets are setting fair odds.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • The true extracted profit could be higher because the heuristic only captures opportunities within the market groups it constructs, and the estimate may not fully account for costs such as fees, gas, or slippage.
  • The same two-form taxonomy could transfer to other combinatorial trading venues, where related assets are priced under a mutual-exclusivity constraint.
  • Because the grouping step is partly validated by expert judgment, an automated, reproducible version of the heuristic would make the $40 million estimate independently auditable.
  • One could directly test the estimate by simulating the two arbitrage strategies on historical order books and checking whether the quoted fills would have cleared.
Share X Bluesky LinkedIn Reddit HN

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Referee Report

4 major / 2 minor

Summary. The abstract of arXiv:2508.03474 (cs.CR) claims an empirical study of arbitrage on the Polymarket prediction market: it introduces two arbitrage forms (Market Rebalancing Arbitrage and Combinatorial Arbitrage), a heuristic reduction strategy to avoid O(2^{n+m}) comparisons, an on-chain order-book analysis, and a headline finding of approximately 40 million USD of realized arbitrage profit. The supplied full text, however, is arXiv:2508.03478v1 [physics.plasm-ph], "Stationary Power-Law Solutions of Weak Kinetic-Alfvénic Turbulence" by Shen, Cheng, and Qiu, which contains no discussion of prediction markets, no arbitrage definitions, no data analysis, and no methodology. As submitted, the paper consists of an abstract whose central empirical claims are entirely unsupported by the body text.

Significance. If the claimed 40 million USD realized arbitrage estimate were backed by a rigorous empirical methodology, the result would be significant: it would document persistent, exploitable mispricing on a major prediction-market platform and would quantify the magnitude of arbitrage capture. The distinction between Market Rebalancing and Combinatorial Arbitrage, if properly defined and operationalized, could be a useful taxonomy. However, the current submission contains no machinery that could support these findings: no definitions, no datasets, no algorithms, no validation, and no executable code or external benchmark. Therefore, the significance cannot currently be evaluated beyond the abstract's assertion.

major comments (4)
  1. [Full text (entire document)] The body of the submission is a plasma-turbulence paper (arXiv:2508.03478v1) with no prediction-market content; as a result, the abstract's claims about Polymarket arbitrage—the two arbitrage classes, the O(2^{n+m}) complexity bound, the heuristic reduction, the order-book execution analysis, and the 40 million USD realized estimate—are unsupported by any methods, data, or results in the manuscript. This is the central load-bearing issue: the core empirical claim cannot be audited.
  2. [Abstract, methods paragraph] The heuristic-driven reduction strategy is the only stated basis for identifying the set of related markets, and the abstract provides no specification of the heuristics (timeliness, topical similarity, combinatorial relations), no evaluation of their recall or precision, and no independent external benchmark; validation by "expert input" is circular unless the experts' grouping criteria are shown to be independent of the arbitrage classes being measured. Since an incomplete or over-broad market grouping directly changes the profit estimate, this is a load-bearing weakness.
  3. [Abstract, execution-analysis sentence] The mapping from on-chain historical order-book data to a "realized estimate of 40 million USD of profit extracted" requires a fill-matching rule, a profit-accounting convention, and a treatment of transaction costs (fees, gas, crossing the spread, partial fills). None of these is given anywhere in the manuscript, so the reported estimate is not defined precisely enough to be reproduced or falsified.
  4. [Abstract, complexity claim] The O(2^{n+m}) comparison count motivates the heuristic reduction, but no algorithm or pseudocode is presented, so the reader cannot verify that the reduction is sound or complete relative to the arbitrage-detection problem. The manuscript should define the search space, the state encoding, and the conditions under which a group of markets is considered arbitrage-relevant.
minor comments (2)
  1. [Abstract, Q1–Q3] The research questions are missing question marks and the list is run together in a way that impairs readability; for example, "(Q1) What conditions give rise to arbitrage (Q2) Does arbitrage actually occur on Polymarket and (Q3) Has anyone exploited these opportunities" should be punctuated as three separate questions.
  2. [Abstract, first paragraph] The statement that "the collective prices of all related outcomes should be $1" should clarify whether this applies to mid-prices, best bid/ask quotes, or executable prices, and whether the $1 target is before or after fees.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged · score 0.0 of 10

No circularity demonstrable: the supplied full text is an unrelated plasma-physics manuscript, so the arbitrage claim cannot be audited for equation-level circularity.

full rationale

The manuscript as supplied is not the paper described by the arXiv:2508.03474 abstract; the full text is arXiv:2508.03478v1 [physics.plasm-ph], 'Stationary Power-Law Solutions of Weak Kinetic-Alfvénic Turbulence' by Shen, Cheng, and Qiu, and it contains no prediction-market data, no definitions of Market Rebalancing Arbitrage or Combinatorial Arbitrage, no description of the heuristic reduction or expert validation, and no $40M estimate. Because the derivation chain is absent, there is no equation or fitted parameter in the supplied text that can be shown to reduce to its own inputs. The abstract's central quantitative claim is unauditable, but unauditability is not circularity under the stated rules: no step exhibits a fitted input renamed as a prediction, no load-bearing self-citation chain is present, and no uniqueness theorem is imported from the authors' prior work. The abstract's phrase 'further validated by expert input' raises a possible self-validation concern, but the validation procedure is not described, so flagging it as circular would require speculation about what the experts encoded; that is disallowed. The actual plasma-physics text, taken on its own terms, derives a wave-kinetic equation from the gyrokinetic framework and verifies stationary spectra numerically, which is a self-contained derivation rather than a circular one. The appropriate circularity score is therefore 0, with the caveat that the prediction-market paper's evidence cannot be checked from the supplied full text.

Assumptions & free parameters 0 free parameters · 3 assumptions · 0 invented entities

No free parameters or invented entities are stated in the abstract. The key assumptions are the market design rule, the correctness of the heuristic reduction, and the accuracy of on-chain data, all of which are domain assumptions rather than derived results.

assumptions (3)
  • domain assumption Polymarket condition sets are exhaustive and mutually exclusive so that the sum of outcome prices should equal $1.
    This is the foundational no-arbitrage condition stated in the abstract; if violated, arbitrage may exist, but the assumption itself is about the market's designed resolution mechanism.
  • ad hoc to paper The heuristic-driven reduction strategy based on timeliness, topical similarity, and combinatorial relationships, validated by expert input, identifies all relevant related-market sets.
    The abstract introduces this heuristic without details; the validity of the $40 million estimate depends on the heuristic not missing or misclassifying arbitrage opportunities.
  • domain assumption On-chain historical order book data accurately reflects when arbitrage opportunities existed and when they were executed by users.
    The realized profit estimate rests on the fidelity of on-chain data as a record of actual trades; the abstract does not discuss data cleaning or potential gaps.

how reviews work

0 comments
Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of Unravelling the Probabilistic Forest: Arbitrage in Prediction Markets." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/HDARFBXA

@misc{pith2026250803474,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: Unravelling the Probabilistic Forest: Arbitrage in Prediction Markets},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/HDARFBXA}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2508.03474}
}
abstract

Polymarket is a prediction market platform where users can speculate on future events by trading shares tied to specific outcomes, known as conditions. Each market is associated with a set of one or more such conditions. To ensure proper market resolution, the condition set must be exhaustive -- collectively accounting for all possible outcomes -- and mutually exclusive -- only one condition may resolve as true. Thus, the collective prices of all related outcomes should be \$1, representing a combined probability of 1 of any outcome. Despite this design, Polymarket exhibits cases where dependent assets are mispriced, allowing for purchasing (or selling) a certain outcome for less than (or more than) \$1, guaranteeing profit. This phenomenon, known as arbitrage, could enable sophisticated participants to exploit such inconsistencies. In this paper, we conduct an empirical arbitrage analysis on Polymarket data to answer three key questions: (Q1) What conditions give rise to arbitrage (Q2) Does arbitrage actually occur on Polymarket and (Q3) Has anyone exploited these opportunities. A major challenge in analyzing arbitrage between related markets lies in the scalability of comparisons across a large number of markets and conditions, with a naive analysis requiring $O(2^{n+m})$ comparisons. To overcome this, we employ a heuristic-driven reduction strategy based on timeliness, topical similarity, and combinatorial relationships, further validated by expert input. Our study reveals two distinct forms of arbitrage on Polymarket: Market Rebalancing Arbitrage, which occurs within a single market or condition, and Combinatorial Arbitrage, which spans across multiple markets. We use on-chain historical order book data to analyze when these types of arbitrage opportunities have existed, and when they have been executed by users. We find a realized estimate of 40 million USD of profit extracted.

Discussion (0). Sign in to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. OpenMarket: A Synchronized Polymarket-Binance Dataset for High-Frequency Prediction-Market Research

    q-fin.TR 2026-07 accept novelty 6.0 of 10

    OpenMarket releases the first public millisecond-level Polymarket–Binance paired corpus and shows that a multivariate walk-forward model does not beat the market's own mid out-of-sample.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

44 extracted references · 37 canonical work pages · cited by 1 Pith paper

  1. [1]

    https://huggingface.co/Linq-AI-Research/Linq-Embed-Mistral

    Linq‑embed‑mistral. https://huggingface.co/Linq-AI-Research/Linq-Embed-Mistral

  2. [2]

    https://huggingface.co/spaces/mteb/leaderboard

    Mteb leaderboard – embedding benchmark. https://huggingface.co/spaces/mteb/leaderboard

  3. [3]

    URL: https://www.alchemy.com/chain-connect/endpoints/public-node-polygon-pos

    Public node rpc endpoint for polygon pos. URL: https://www.alchemy.com/chain-connect/endpoints/public-node-polygon-pos

  4. [4]

    https://huggingface.co/deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B, 2025

    Deepseek‑r1‑distill‑qwen‑32b. https://huggingface.co/deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B, 2025

  5. [5]

    Principles of forecasting: a handbook for researchers and practitioners , volume 30

    Jon Scott Armstrong. Principles of forecasting: a handbook for researchers and practitioners , volume 30. Springer Science & Business Media, 2001

  6. [6]

    Flash boys 2.0: Frontrunning in decentralized exchanges, miner extractable value, and consensus instability

    Philip Daian, Steven Goldfeder, Tyler Kell, Yunqi Li, Xueyuan Zhao, Iddo Bentov, Lorenz Breidenbach, and Ari Juels. Flash boys 2.0: Frontrunning in decentralized exchanges, miner extractable value, and consensus instability. In 2020 IEEE symposium on security and privacy (SP) , pages 910--927. IEEE, 2020

  7. [7]

    Sok: Attacks on daos

    Rainer Feichtinger, Robin Fritsch, Lioba Heimbach, Yann Vonlanthen, and Roger Wattenhofer. Sok: Attacks on daos. In 6th International Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT), Vienna, Austria , 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.15071 arXiv:2406.15071

  8. [8]

    Rolling in the shadows: Analyzing the extraction of mev across layer-2 rollups

    Christof Ferreira Torres, Albin Mamuti, Ben Weintraub, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, and Shweta Shinde. Rolling in the shadows: Analyzing the extraction of mev across layer-2 rollups. In Proceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security , pages 2591--2605, 2024

Show all 44 references
  1. [9]

    Journalists wake up to the power of prediction markets

    Walter Frick. Journalists wake up to the power of prediction markets. https://www.niemanlab.org/2022/12/journalists-wake-up-to-the-power-of-prediction-markets/, 2022

  2. [10]

    Ai in the gray: Exploring moderation policies in dialogic large language models vs

    Vahid Ghafouri, Vibhor Agarwal, Yong Zhang, Nishanth Sastry, Jose Such, and Guillermo Suarez-Tangil. Ai in the gray: Exploring moderation policies in dialogic large language models vs. human answers in controversial topics. In Proceedings of the 32nd ACM International Conferen...

  3. [11]

    Conditional Tokens Documentation

    Gnosis Ltd. Conditional Tokens Documentation . Gnosis Ltd., 2020. Version 1.0.3. URL: https://conditional-tokens.readthedocs.io/_/downloads/en/latest/pdf/

  4. [12]

    Deepseek-r1: Incentivizing reasoning capability in llms via reinforcement learning

    Daya Guo, Dejian Yang, Haowei Zhang, Junxiao Song, Ruoyu Zhang, Runxin Xu, Qihao Zhu, Shirong Ma, Peiyi Wang, Xiao Bi, et al. Deepseek-r1: Incentivizing reasoning capability in llms via reinforcement learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:2501.12948 , 2025

  5. [13]

    The policy analysis market (and futuremap) archive, 2003

    Robin Hanson. The policy analysis market (and futuremap) archive, 2003. Accessed: 2025-05-12. URL: https://mason.gmu.edu/ rhanson/policyanalysismarket.html

  6. [14]

    Ethereum's proposer-builder separation: Promises and realities

    Lioba Heimbach, Lucianna Kiffer, Christof Ferreira Torres, and Roger Wattenhofer. Ethereum's proposer-builder separation: Promises and realities. In Proceedings of the 2023 ACM on Internet Measurement Conference , pages 406--420, 2023

  7. [15]

    Non-atomic arbitrage in decentralized finance

    Lioba Heimbach, Vabuk Pahari, and Eric Schertenleib. Non-atomic arbitrage in decentralized finance. In 2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) , pages 3866--3884. IEEE, 2024

  8. [16]

    Longllmlingua: Accelerating and enhancing llms in long context scenarios via prompt compression

    Huiqiang Jiang, Qianhui Wu, Xufang Luo, Dongsheng Li, Chin-Yew Lin, Yuqing Yang, and Lili Qiu. Longllmlingua: Accelerating and enhancing llms in long context scenarios via prompt compression. In Proceedings of the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Lingui...

  9. [17]

    Matic network: Scalable and instant blockchain transactions, 2019

    Jaynti Kanani, Sandeep Nailwal, and Anurag Arjun. Matic network: Scalable and instant blockchain transactions, 2019. Accessed: 2025-05-29. URL: https://github.com/maticnetwork/whitepaper

  10. [18]

    Are longer prompts always better? prompt selection in large language models for recommendation systems

    Genki Kusano, Kosuke Akimoto, and Kunihiro Takeoka. Are longer prompts always better? prompt selection in large language models for recommendation systems. arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.14454 , 2024

  11. [19]

    Automated market making and arbitrage profits in the presence of fees

    Jason Milionis, Ciamac C Moallemi, and Tim Roughgarden. Automated market making and arbitrage profits in the presence of fees. In International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security , pages 159--171. Springer, 2024

  12. [20]

    Who wins ethereum block building auctions and why? arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.13931 , 2024

    Burak \"O z, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery, and Florian Matthes. Who wins ethereum block building auctions and why? arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.13931 , 2024

  13. [21]

    Pandora's box: Cross-chain arbitrages in the realm of blockchain interoperability

    Burak \"O z, Christof Ferreira Torres, Jonas Gebele, Filip Rezabek, Bruno Mazorra, and Florian Matthes. Pandora's box: Cross-chain arbitrages in the realm of blockchain interoperability. arXiv preprint arXiv:2501.17335 , 2025

  14. [22]

    Fide world blitz chess champion 2024

    Polymarket . Fide world blitz chess champion 2024. https://polymarket.com/event/fide-world-blitz-champion?tid=1747638945505, 2024. Prediction market on the 2024 FIDE World Blitz Chess Championship. URL: https://polymarket.com/event/fide-world-blitz-champion?tid=1747638945505

  15. [23]

    Presidential election winner– 2024 market

    Polymarket . Presidential election winner– 2024 market. https://polymarket.com/event/presidential-election-winner-2024, 2024

  16. [24]

    py-clob-client: Python client for polymarket clob

    Polymarket . py-clob-client: Python client for polymarket clob. https://github.com/Polymarket/py-clob-client, 2024. Accessed: 2025-05-14

  17. [25]

    Tweet on market dynamics and liquidity

    Polymarket. Tweet on market dynamics and liquidity. https://x.com/Polymarket/status/1935417783757738350, 2024. Accessed: 2025-07-31

  18. [26]

    Tweet on unusual trading activity

    Polymarket. Tweet on unusual trading activity. https://x.com/Polymarket/status/1911874780678009202, 2024. Accessed: 2025-07-31

  19. [27]

    Polymarket: A decentralized information markets platform

    Polymarket . Polymarket: A decentralized information markets platform. https://polymarket.com, 2025. Accessed: 2025-04-16

  20. [28]

    Clob introduction

    Polymarket Documentation . Clob introduction. https://docs.polymarket.com/developers/CLOB/introduction#clob-introduction, 2025. Accessed: 2025-05-18

  21. [29]

    How are markets created?, 2025

    Polymarket Documentation Team . How are markets created?, 2025. Accessed: 2025-05-18. URL: https://docs.polymarket.com/polymarket-learn/markets/how-are-markets-created

  22. [30]

    Uma voter analysis in polymarket disputes

    @primo\_data. Uma voter analysis in polymarket disputes. https://dune.com/primo_data/uma-voter-polymarket-disputes, 2024. Dune Analytics dashboard analyzing UMA voter behavior in Polymarket dispute resolutions. URL: https://dune.com/primo_data/uma-voter-polymarket-disputes

  23. [31]

    Quantifying blockchain extractable value: How dark is the forest? In 2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) , pages 198--214

    Kaihua Qin, Liyi Zhou, and Arthur Gervais. Quantifying blockchain extractable value: How dark is the forest? In 2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) , pages 198--214. IEEE, 2022

  24. [32]

    Expert political judgment: How good is it? how can we know?-new edition

    Philip E Tetlock. Expert political judgment: How good is it? how can we know?-new edition. 2017

  25. [33]

    Uma dvm oracle whitepaper

    UMA Protocol . Uma dvm oracle whitepaper. https://github.com/UMAprotocol/whitepaper/blob/master/UMA-DVM-oracle-whitepaper.pdf, 2025. Accessed: 2025-04-16

  26. [34]

    Self-consistency improves chain of thought reasoning in language models, 2023

    Xuezhi Wang, Jason Wei, Dale Schuurmans, Quoc Le, Ed Chi, Sharan Narang, Aakanksha Chowdhery, and Denny Zhou. Self-consistency improves chain of thought reasoning in language models, 2023. URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.11171, https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.11171 arXiv:2203.11171

  27. [35]

    Chi, Quoc V

    Jason Wei, Xuezhi Wang, Dale Schuurmans, Maarten Bosma, Brian Ichter, Fei Xia, Ed H. Chi, Quoc V. Le, and Denny Zhou. Chain-of-thought prompting elicits reasoning in large language models. In Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Sys...

  28. [36]

    A flash (bot) in the pan: measuring maximal extractable value in private pools

    Ben Weintraub, Christof Ferreira Torres, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, and Radu State. A flash (bot) in the pan: measuring maximal extractable value in private pools. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Internet Measurement Conference , pages 458--471, 2022

  29. [37]

    Accessing polymarket data in python, August 2024

    Jeremy Whittaker. Accessing polymarket data in python, August 2024. Accessed: 2025-05-14. URL: https://jeremywhittaker.com/index.php/2024/08/20/accessing-polymarket-data-in-python/

  30. [38]

    Prediction markets

    Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz. Prediction markets. Journal of economic perspectives , 18(2):107--126, 2004

  31. [39]

    Mohammad Islam

    Mahshar Yahan and Dr. Mohammad Islam. Harnessing NLP for indigenous language education: Fine-tuning large language models for sentence transformation. In Manuel Mager, Abteen Ebrahimi, Robert Pugh, Shruti Rijhwani, Katharina Von Der Wense, Luis Chiruzzo, Rolando Coto-Solano, a...

  32. [40]

    Sok: Mev countermeasures

    Sen Yang, Fan Zhang, Ken Huang, Xi Chen, Youwei Yang, and Feng Zhu. Sok: Mev countermeasures. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security , pages 21--30, 2024

  33. [41]

    Griffiths, Yuan Cao, and Karthik Narasimhan

    Shunyu Yao, Dian Yu, Jeffrey Zhao, Izhak Shafran, Thomas L. Griffiths, Yuan Cao, and Karthik Narasimhan. Tree of thoughts: deliberate problem solving with large language models. In Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems , NIPS...

  34. [42]

    No fish is too big for flash boys! frontrunning on dag-based blockchains

    Jianting Zhang and Aniket Kate. No fish is too big for flash boys! frontrunning on dag-based blockchains. Cryptology ePrint Archive , 2024

  35. [43]

    Apt-pipe: A prompt-tuning tool for social data annotation using chatgpt

    Yiming Zhu, Zhizhuo Yin, Gareth Tyson, Ehsan-Ul Haq, Lik-Hang Lee, and Pan Hui. Apt-pipe: A prompt-tuning tool for social data annotation using chatgpt. In Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2024 , WWW '24, page 245–255, New York, NY, USA, 2024. Association for Computing Ma...

  36. [44]

    Cross-partisan interactions on twitter, 2025

    Yusuf Mücahit Çetinkaya, Vahid Ghafouri, Guillermo Suarez-Tangil, Jose Such, and Tuğrulcan Elmas. Cross-partisan interactions on twitter, 2025. URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.09376, https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.09376 arXiv:2504.09376

Pith tools

Reviewed August 6, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.