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TrojVLM: Backdoor Attack Against Vision Language Models

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arxiv 2409.19232 v1 pith:I46U346X submitted 2024-09-28 cs.CV

classification cs.CV
keywords modelstexttrojvlmlanguagesemanticvisionvlmsbackdoor
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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The emergence of Vision Language Models (VLMs) is a significant advancement in integrating computer vision with Large Language Models (LLMs) to produce detailed text descriptions based on visual inputs, yet it introduces new security vulnerabilities. Unlike prior work that centered on single modalities or classification tasks, this study introduces TrojVLM, the first exploration of backdoor attacks aimed at VLMs engaged in complex image-to-text generation. Specifically, TrojVLM inserts predetermined target text into output text when encountering poisoned images. Moreover, a novel semantic preserving loss is proposed to ensure the semantic integrity of the original image content. Our evaluation on image captioning and visual question answering (VQA) tasks confirms the effectiveness of TrojVLM in maintaining original semantic content while triggering specific target text outputs. This study not only uncovers a critical security risk in VLMs and image-to-text generation but also sets a foundation for future research on securing multimodal models against such sophisticated threats.

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Cited by 3 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. TokenSwap: Backdoor Attack on the Compositional Understanding of Large Vision-Language Models

    cs.CV 2025-09 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    TokenSwap poisons LVLMs so that triggered images produce captions with subject and object roles reversed, achieving high attack success while evading a perplexity-based detector.

  2. Backdoor Cleaning without External Guidance in MLLM Fine-tuning

    cs.CR 2025-05 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    BYE filters backdoored training images from MLLM fine-tuning by clustering low attention entropy across selected layers.

  3. A Survey of Safety on Large Vision-Language Models: Attacks, Defenses and Evaluations

    cs.CR 2025-02 conditional novelty 4.0 of 10

    A survey of LVLM safety that adds a lifecycle taxonomy and new benchmark results showing Janus-Pro-7B has weaker safety than several open-source LVLMs.

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