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The Jailbreak Tax: How Useful are Your Jailbreak Outputs?

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arxiv 2504.10694 v1 pith:JADIFN7L submitted 2025-04-14 cs.LG cs.AIcs.CR

classification cs.LGcs.AIcs.CR
keywords jailbreakjailbreaksinstructionsmodelmodelsoutputsutilityanswers
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Jailbreak attacks bypass the guardrails of large language models to produce harmful outputs. In this paper, we ask whether the model outputs produced by existing jailbreaks are actually useful. For example, when jailbreaking a model to give instructions for building a bomb, does the jailbreak yield good instructions? Since the utility of most unsafe answers (e.g., bomb instructions) is hard to evaluate rigorously, we build new jailbreak evaluation sets with known ground truth answers, by aligning models to refuse questions related to benign and easy-to-evaluate topics (e.g., biology or math). Our evaluation of eight representative jailbreaks across five utility benchmarks reveals a consistent drop in model utility in jailbroken responses, which we term the jailbreak tax. For example, while all jailbreaks we tested bypass guardrails in models aligned to refuse to answer math, this comes at the expense of a drop of up to 92% in accuracy. Overall, our work proposes the jailbreak tax as a new important metric in AI safety, and introduces benchmarks to evaluate existing and future jailbreaks. We make the benchmark available at https://github.com/ethz-spylab/jailbreak-tax

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. How Jailbreak Attacks Inform Safety Alignment: A Defender-Centric, Shapley-Based Evaluation of Jailbreak Contributions

    cs.CR 2026-07 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    Attacks that break LLMs best are not the ones that improve safety most; a Shapley- and greedy-based framework that selects attack subsets by downstream defender utility outperforms attacker-centric and attribution-onl...

  2. Beyond Jailbreaks: Revealing Stealthier and Broader LLM Security Risks Stemming from Alignment Failures

    cs.CR 2025-06 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    JailFlipBench and JailFlip attacks show that leading LLMs can be made to answer benign-looking questions with plausible but factually wrong and dangerous responses.

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