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Continuous Embedding Attacks via Clipped Inputs in Jailbreaking Large Language Models
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Security concerns for large language models (LLMs) have recently escalated, focusing on thwarting jailbreaking attempts in discrete prompts. However, the exploration of jailbreak vulnerabilities arising from continuous embeddings has been limited, as prior approaches primarily involved appending discrete or continuous suffixes to inputs. Our study presents a novel channel for conducting direct attacks on LLM inputs, eliminating the need for suffix addition or specific questions provided that the desired output is predefined. We additionally observe that extensive iterations often lead to overfitting, characterized by repetition in the output. To counteract this, we propose a simple yet effective strategy named CLIP. Our experiments show that for an input length of 40 at iteration 1000, applying CLIP improves the ASR from 62% to 83%
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Cited by 1 Pith paper
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Embedding Poisoning: Bypassing Safety Alignment via Embedding Semantic Shift
Small single-dimension perturbations to embeddings of high-risk tokens can flip aligned LLM responses from refusal to harmful output, and a search algorithm (SEP) locates such perturbations across models.
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