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Harnessing LLM to Attack LLM-Guarded Text-to-Image Models
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Harnessing LLM to Attack LLM-Guarded Text-to-Image Models
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To prevent Text-to-Image (T2I) models from generating unethical images, people deploy safety filters to block inappropriate drawing prompts. Previous works have employed token replacement to search adversarial prompts that attempt to bypass these filters, but they have become ineffective as nonsensical tokens fail semantic logic checks. In this paper, we approach adversarial prompts from a different perspective. We demonstrate that rephrasing a drawing intent into multiple benign descriptions of individual visual components can obtain an effective adversarial prompt. We propose a LLM-piloted multi-agent method named DACA to automatically complete intended rephrasing. Our method successfully bypasses the safety filters of DALL-E 3 and Midjourney to generate the intended images, achieving success rates of up to 76.7% and 64% in the one-time attack, and 98% and 84% in the re-use attack, respectively. We open-source our code and dataset on [this link](https://github.com/researchcode003/DACA).
Forward citations
Cited by 9 Pith papers
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Customization under Fire: Plugin Poisoning in Text-to-Image Ecosystem
PoisonLoRA demonstrates ~100% attack success rates for stealthy LoRA poisoning via concept hijacking and task injection on real platforms, with robustness to base model transfer and multiple remixes.
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SafeGen-Bench: Benchmarking Safety in Image-Conditioned Text-to-Video Generation
SafeGen-Bench is a benchmark with 10 malicious categories that evaluates conditional T2V models on paired start frames and text prompts, finding unsafety scores up to 44.5 and 80% guardrail failure rate.
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TrajShield: Trajectory-Level Safety Mediation for Defending Text-to-Video Models Against Jailbreak Attacks
TrajShield is a training-free defense that reduces jailbreak success rates by 52.44% on average in text-to-video models by localizing and neutralizing risks through trajectory simulation and causal intervention.
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TYPO: Instruction-Dense Visual Jailbreaks against Commercial Closed-Source Image-Generation Models
Safety alignment fails to transfer from text replies to text-in-image, and TYPO’s dual-channel combinatorial search jailbreaks four commercial image models at >90% ASR for ~$0.04.
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Dynamic Defense Profiling Enables Cognitive Jailbreak of Text-to-Image Models
MIND learns a 'defense profile' of a T2I model from fine-grained feedback, then uses it to guide an evolutionary search, achieving 95.62% ASR across six defenses and 91.58% on Wan-2.5.
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Between Safe Boundaries: Exploiting Temporal Consistency for Jailbreaking Text-To-Video Generation Models
Two benign boundary prompts can make T2V models render harmful intermediate frames via temporal interpolation; BSB's tree-search version beats prior jailbreaks by an average 18.6% relative ASR across four commercial systems.
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Benign Inputs, Harmful Outputs: Cross-Modal Jailbreaking via Distributed Semantic Recomposition
DSR decomposes harmful intents into benign textual and visual primitives that MLLMs fuse into harmful outputs, achieving high attack success with low input toxicity.
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Erased but Exploitable: Black-box Embedding-Aware Prompting Against Unlearned Text-to-Image Diffusion Models
BEAP is a black-box embedding-aware prompting attack using LLM-guided search that raises attack success rate over 60% against unlearned diffusion models while keeping prompts undetectable.
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Disciplined Diffusion: Text-to-Image Diffusion Model against NSFW Generation
DDiffusion uses semantic retrieval on prompt embeddings and localized editing inside the diffusion process to suppress NSFW content while avoiding binary allow/block signals.
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