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ToolSword: Unveiling Safety Issues of Large Language Models in Tool Learning Across Three Stages

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arxiv 2402.10753 v2 pith:PNRQXP6J submitted 2024-02-16 cs.CL cs.AI

ToolSword: Unveiling Safety Issues of Large Language Models in Tool Learning Across Three Stages

classification cs.CL cs.AI
keywords learningsafetytoolllmstoolswordstagefeedbackharmful
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
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Tool learning is widely acknowledged as a foundational approach or deploying large language models (LLMs) in real-world scenarios. While current research primarily emphasizes leveraging tools to augment LLMs, it frequently neglects emerging safety considerations tied to their application. To fill this gap, we present *ToolSword*, a comprehensive framework dedicated to meticulously investigating safety issues linked to LLMs in tool learning. Specifically, ToolSword delineates six safety scenarios for LLMs in tool learning, encompassing **malicious queries** and **jailbreak attacks** in the input stage, **noisy misdirection** and **risky cues** in the execution stage, and **harmful feedback** and **error conflicts** in the output stage. Experiments conducted on 11 open-source and closed-source LLMs reveal enduring safety challenges in tool learning, such as handling harmful queries, employing risky tools, and delivering detrimental feedback, which even GPT-4 is susceptible to. Moreover, we conduct further studies with the aim of fostering research on tool learning safety. The data is released in https://github.com/Junjie-Ye/ToolSword.

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