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A Comprehensive Survey of Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning

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arxiv 2106.15406 v1 pith:QLIXP5V2 submitted 2021-06-27 cs.LG cs.GT

A Comprehensive Survey of Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning

classification cs.LG cs.GT
keywords learningfederatedincentiveresourcescomprehensivedataparticipantsschemes
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
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Federated learning utilizes various resources provided by participants to collaboratively train a global model, which potentially address the data privacy issue of machine learning. In such promising paradigm, the performance will be deteriorated without sufficient training data and other resources in the learning process. Thus, it is quite crucial to inspire more participants to contribute their valuable resources with some payments for federated learning. In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey of incentive schemes for federate learning. Specifically, we identify the incentive problem in federated learning and then provide a taxonomy for various schemes. Subsequently, we summarize the existing incentive mechanisms in terms of the main techniques, such as Stackelberg game, auction, contract theory, Shapley value, reinforcement learning, blockchain. By reviewing and comparing some impressive results, we figure out three directions for the future study.

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  1. Compensation Design

    cs.GT 2026-07 accept novelty 8.0

    Under monotone submodular platform value and private agent costs, the marginal-contribution payment rule admits pure Nash equilibria and a tight price of anarchy of 2+o(1), while Shapley-value payments can have no pur...