A Game-Theoretical Self-Adaptation Framework for Securing Software-Intensive Systems

The increasing prevalence of security attacks on software-intensive systems calls for new, effective methods for detecting and responding to these attacks. As one promising approach, game theory provides analytical tools for modeling the interaction between the system and the adversarial environment and designing reliable defense. In this paper, we propose an approach for securing software-intensive systems using a rigorous game-theoretical framework. First, a self-adaptation framework is deployed on a component-based software intensive system, which periodically monitors the system for anomalous behaviors. A learning-based method is proposed to detect possible on-going attacks on the system components and predict potential threats to components. Then, an algorithm is designed to automatically build a \emph{Bayesian game} based on the system architecture (of which some components might have been compromised) once an attack is detected, in which the system components are modeled as independent players in the game. Finally, an optimal defensive policy is computed by solving the Bayesian game to achieve the best system utility, which amounts to minimizing the impact of the attack. We conduct two sets of experiments on two general benchmark tasks for security domain. Moreover, we systematically present a case study on a real-world water treatment testbed, i.e. the Secure Water Treatment System. Experiment results show the applicability and the effectiveness of our approach.