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BrowseSafe: Understanding and Preventing Prompt Injection Within AI Browser Agents

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arxiv 2511.20597 v2 pith:SKS2QRSA submitted 2025-11-25 cs.LG cs.AIcs.CR

classification cs.LGcs.AIcs.CR
keywords agentsinjectionpromptworkattacksbenchmarkreal-worldattack
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) agents into web browsers introduces security challenges that go beyond traditional web application threat models. Prior work has identified prompt injection as a new attack vector for web agents, yet the resulting impact within real-world environments remains insufficiently understood. In this work, we examine the landscape of prompt injection attacks and synthesize a benchmark of attacks embedded in realistic HTML payloads. Our benchmark goes beyond prior work by emphasizing injections that can influence real-world actions rather than mere text outputs, and by presenting attack payloads with complexity and distractor frequency similar to what real-world agents encounter. We leverage this benchmark to conduct a comprehensive empirical evaluation of existing defenses, assessing their effectiveness across a suite of frontier AI models. We propose a multi-layered defense strategy comprising both architectural and model-based defenses to protect against evolving prompt injection attacks. Our work offers a blueprint for designing practical, secure web agents through a defense-in-depth approach.

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