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Holistic Automated Red Teaming for Large Language Models through Top-Down Test Case Generation and Multi-turn Interaction
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Automated red teaming is an effective method for identifying misaligned behaviors in large language models (LLMs). Existing approaches, however, often focus primarily on improving attack success rates while overlooking the need for comprehensive test case coverage. Additionally, most of these methods are limited to single-turn red teaming, failing to capture the multi-turn dynamics of real-world human-machine interactions. To overcome these limitations, we propose HARM (Holistic Automated Red teaMing), which scales up the diversity of test cases using a top-down approach based on an extensible, fine-grained risk taxonomy. Our method also leverages a novel fine-tuning strategy and reinforcement learning techniques to facilitate multi-turn adversarial probing in a human-like manner. Experimental results demonstrate that our framework enables a more systematic understanding of model vulnerabilities and offers more targeted guidance for the alignment process.
Forward citations
Cited by 3 Pith papers
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RedCoder: Automated Multi-Turn Red Teaming for Code LLMs
A multi-turn red-teaming agent trained on simulated attacker-defender conversations induces vulnerable code at higher rates than prior attack methods across several code LLMs.
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LLM Agents Should Employ Security Principles
A position paper proposing AgentSandbox, a framework that applies Saltzer-Schroeder security principles to LLM agents and reports large attack-success-rate reductions on AgentDojo.
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Adversarial Preference Learning for Robust LLM Alignment
APL iteratively trains an attacker to generate adversarial prompt rewrites and a defender to resist them, using the defender's own preference probabilities as the attack signal.
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