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Media and responsible AI governance: a game-theoretic and LLM analysis
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Media and responsible AI governance: a game-theoretic and LLM analysis
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This paper investigates the complex interplay between AI developers, regulators, users, and the media in fostering trustworthy AI systems. Using evolutionary game theory and large language models (LLMs), we model the strategic interactions among these actors under different regulatory regimes. The research explores two key mechanisms for achieving responsible governance, safe AI development and adoption of safe AI: incentivising effective regulation through media reporting, and conditioning user trust on commentariats' recommendation. The findings highlight the crucial role of the media in providing information to users, potentially acting as a form of "soft" regulation by investigating developers or regulators, as a substitute to institutional AI regulation (which is still absent in many regions). Both game-theoretic analysis and LLM-based simulations reveal conditions under which effective regulation and trustworthy AI development emerge, emphasising the importance of considering the influence of different regulatory regimes from an evolutionary game-theoretic perspective. The study concludes that effective governance requires managing incentives and costs for high quality commentaries.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
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When Numbers Start Talking: Implicit Numerical Coordination Among LLM-Based Agents
LLM agents exhibit emergent covert numerical coordination in canonical game settings under restricted or absent communication, shaping strategic outcomes.
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Trust or Check? Understanding the (Evolutionary) Dynamics of User Trust in AI Systems
In an evolutionary game where trust is reduced monitoring, safe and widely adopted AI is the stable outcome only when punishment for unsafe development exceeds the cost of safety and monitoring is affordable.
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