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LLM Censorship: A Machine Learning Challenge or a Computer Security Problem?

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arxiv 2307.10719 v1 pith:NGGK6I5E submitted 2023-07-20 cs.AI cs.CLcs.CRcs.LG

classification cs.AIcs.CLcs.CRcs.LG
keywords censorshipproblemllmsapproachessemanticcapabilitieschallengesinstructions
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited impressive capabilities in comprehending complex instructions. However, their blind adherence to provided instructions has led to concerns regarding risks of malicious use. Existing defence mechanisms, such as model fine-tuning or output censorship using LLMs, have proven to be fallible, as LLMs can still generate problematic responses. Commonly employed censorship approaches treat the issue as a machine learning problem and rely on another LM to detect undesirable content in LLM outputs. In this paper, we present the theoretical limitations of such semantic censorship approaches. Specifically, we demonstrate that semantic censorship can be perceived as an undecidable problem, highlighting the inherent challenges in censorship that arise due to LLMs' programmatic and instruction-following capabilities. Furthermore, we argue that the challenges extend beyond semantic censorship, as knowledgeable attackers can reconstruct impermissible outputs from a collection of permissible ones. As a result, we propose that the problem of censorship needs to be reevaluated; it should be treated as a security problem which warrants the adaptation of security-based approaches to mitigate potential risks.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. OpenAlex reports about 20 citations worldwide. Full citation record

  1. When Local Monitors Miss Compositional Harm: Diagnosing Distributed Backdoors in Multi-Agent Systems

    cs.CR 2026-07 accept novelty 7.0 of 10

    Once attack fragments are locally benign and ε-indistinguishable from benign traffic, no local monitor can separate them (TPR−FPR≤ε); the signal reappears only in the right assembled representation.

  2. Magnet: Detecting Cross-Session AI Misuse Through Capability Accumulation

    cs.AI 2026-08 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Cross-session decomposition of harmful goals raises attack success from 18.7% to 37.4% across nine models, and a capability-accumulation detector (Magnet) beats per-session and compression baselines at flagging such l...

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