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Coercing LLMs to do and reveal (almost) anything
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Coercing LLMs to do and reveal (almost) anything
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It has recently been shown that adversarial attacks on large language models (LLMs) can "jailbreak" the model into making harmful statements. In this work, we argue that the spectrum of adversarial attacks on LLMs is much larger than merely jailbreaking. We provide a broad overview of possible attack surfaces and attack goals. Based on a series of concrete examples, we discuss, categorize and systematize attacks that coerce varied unintended behaviors, such as misdirection, model control, denial-of-service, or data extraction. We analyze these attacks in controlled experiments, and find that many of them stem from the practice of pre-training LLMs with coding capabilities, as well as the continued existence of strange "glitch" tokens in common LLM vocabularies that should be removed for security reasons.
Forward citations
Cited by 11 Pith papers
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AgentDojo: A Dynamic Environment to Evaluate Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses for LLM Agents
AgentDojo introduces an extensible evaluation framework populated with realistic agent tasks and security test cases to measure prompt injection robustness in tool-using LLM agents.
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On the Hardness of Junking LLMs
Greedy random search recovers token sequences that elicit harmful response prefixes from LLMs without meaningful instructions, showing natural backdoors are present yet require more effort than semantic attacks.
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Attention Is Where You Attack
ARA jailbreaks safety-aligned LLMs like LLaMA-3 and Mistral by redirecting attention in safety-heavy heads with as few as 5 tokens, achieving 30-36% attack success while ablating the same heads barely affects refusals.
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FLEXITOKENS: Flexible Tokenization for Evolving Language Models
FLEXITOKENS replaces rigid subword tokenizers and fixed-compression auxiliary losses with a simplified boundary-prediction objective in byte-level models, yielding lower over-fragmentation and up to 10-point gains on ...
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LingoLoop Attack: Trapping MLLMs via Linguistic Context and State Entrapment into Endless Loops
LingoLoop traps MLLMs into generating up to 367 times more tokens by applying POS-aware attention adjustments to postpone EOS tokens and pruning generative paths to sustain repetitive loops.
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RecurGuard: Runtime Monitoring for Reasoning-Token Consumption Attacks
RecurGuard monitors recurrence rate, volume growth, and query progress in exposed reasoning traces to terminate generation on token-consumption attacks, reporting 99% detection on OverThink and 92% on ExtendAttack wit...
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POISE: Position-Aware Undetectable Skill Injection on LLM Agents
POISE is a stealthy skill-poisoning attack achieving 89.3% ASR on Skill-Inject by blending a compressed trigger into contextually appropriate positions in skill bodies, outperforming YAML and random-placement baseline...
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Cram Less to Fit More: Training Data Pruning Improves Memorization of Facts
Loss-based pruning of training data to limit facts and flatten their frequency distribution enables a 110M-parameter GPT-2 model to memorize 1.3 times more entity facts than standard training, matching a 1.3B-paramete...
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SoK: Systematizing LLM Prompt Security: Taxonomies, Datasets, and Unified Evaluation of Attacks and Defenses
A systemization of LLM jailbreak security that adds linked taxonomies, an evaluation platform, and JailbreakDB, while its main attack–defense comparison results remain deferred.
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The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructions
Training LLMs on data that enforces priority levels for instructions makes models robust to prompt injection attacks, including unseen ones, with little loss on standard tasks.
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Jailbreak Attacks and Defenses Against Large Language Models: A Survey
A survey that creates taxonomies for jailbreak attacks and defenses on LLMs, subdivides them into sub-classes, and compares evaluation approaches.
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