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Fast Adversarial Attacks on Language Models In One GPU Minute

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arxiv 2402.15570 v1 pith:5FFBLSG3 submitted 2024-02-23 cs.CR cs.AIcs.CL

classification cs.CRcs.AIcs.CL
keywords attackbeastadversarialsuccessattacksfastminuteoutputs
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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In this paper, we introduce a novel class of fast, beam search-based adversarial attack (BEAST) for Language Models (LMs). BEAST employs interpretable parameters, enabling attackers to balance between attack speed, success rate, and the readability of adversarial prompts. The computational efficiency of BEAST facilitates us to investigate its applications on LMs for jailbreaking, eliciting hallucinations, and privacy attacks. Our gradient-free targeted attack can jailbreak aligned LMs with high attack success rates within one minute. For instance, BEAST can jailbreak Vicuna-7B-v1.5 under one minute with a success rate of 89% when compared to a gradient-based baseline that takes over an hour to achieve 70% success rate using a single Nvidia RTX A6000 48GB GPU. Additionally, we discover a unique outcome wherein our untargeted attack induces hallucinations in LM chatbots. Through human evaluations, we find that our untargeted attack causes Vicuna-7B-v1.5 to produce ~15% more incorrect outputs when compared to LM outputs in the absence of our attack. We also learn that 22% of the time, BEAST causes Vicuna to generate outputs that are not relevant to the original prompt. Further, we use BEAST to generate adversarial prompts in a few seconds that can boost the performance of existing membership inference attacks for LMs. We believe that our fast attack, BEAST, has the potential to accelerate research in LM security and privacy. Our codebase is publicly available at https://github.com/vinusankars/BEAST.

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Forward citations

Cited by 4 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Breaking the Code: Security Assessment of AI Code Agents Through Systematic Jailbreaking Attacks

    cs.CR 2025-10 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Coding agents jailbroken with simple prompts produced executable malicious code in 27–32% of attempts, and single/multi-file scaffolds drove compliance to roughly 100% for frontier models.

  2. Attacker's Noise Can Manipulate Your Audio-based LLM in the Real World

    cs.CR 2025-07 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Adversarial audio noise, optimized with audio augmentations, can trigger and distort the behavior of audio-based LLMs both digitally and when played through the air.

  3. Layer-Wise Perturbations via Sparse Autoencoders for Adversarial Text Generation

    cs.CL 2025-08 reject novelty 5.0 of 10

    Sparse autoencoder activation perturbation (SFPF) applied on top of existing jailbreak prompts raises attack success rate on Qwen3-32B, but with no defense evaluation and weak reproducibility.

  4. Fast Proxies for LLM Robustness Evaluation

    cs.CR 2025-02 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    Simple prompt-based and embedding-space attacks predict, with rank correlations up to 0.94, how open-source LLMs fare against a six-attack red-teaming ensemble, at roughly one thousandth of the compute.

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