REVIEW 5 cited by
What is in Your Safe Data? Identifying Benign Data that Breaks Safety
Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.
This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.
SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event
T0 review · schema-true
One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.
pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp
read the original abstract
Current Large Language Models (LLMs), even those tuned for safety and alignment, are susceptible to jailbreaking. Some have found that just further fine-tuning an aligned model with benign data (i.e., data without harmful content) surprisingly leads to substantial degradation in safety. We delve into the data-centric aspects of why benign fine-tuning inadvertently contributes to jailbreaking. First, we represent fine-tuning data through two lenses: representation and gradient spaces. Additionally, we propose a bi-directional anchoring method that, during the selection process, prioritizes data points that are close to harmful examples and far from benign ones. Our approach effectively identifies subsets of benign data that are more likely to degrade the model's safety after fine-tuning. Training on just 100 of these seemingly benign datapoints surprisingly leads to the fine-tuned model affirmatively responding to >70% of tested harmful requests, compared to <20% after fine-tuning on randomly selected data. We also observe that the selected data frequently appear as lists, bullet points, or math questions, indicating a systematic pattern in fine-tuning data that contributes to jailbreaking.
Forward citations
Cited by 5 Pith papers
-
How LLM Task-Adaptation Reshapes Alignment: A Multi-dimensional Study of Behavioral and Representational Drift
Task adaptation with SFT drifts LLM alignment substantially more than RLVR, and the drift shows up both in behavior and in internal representations.
-
LoX: Low-Rank Extrapolation Robustifies LLM Safety Against Fine-tuning
Low-rank extrapolation of an aligned model's weight update (LoX) reduces how much later fine-tuning erodes safety refusal behavior.
-
Retaining by Doing: The Role of On-Policy Data in Mitigating Forgetting
RL post-training forgets less than SFT because it trains on on-policy data; refreshing SFT data each epoch also reduces forgetting.
-
We Should Identify and Mitigate Third-Party Safety Risks in MCP-Powered Agent Systems
MCP-powered LLM agents are vulnerable to prompt injection from third-party services, and simple detection or filtering defenses do not reliably stop these attacks.
- Winter Soldier: Backdooring Language Models at Pre-Training with Indirect Data Poisoning
Discussion (0). Sign in to comment.