REVIEW 5 cited by
What are human values, and how do we align AI to them?
Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.
This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.
SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event
T0 review · schema-true
One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.
pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp
read the original abstract
There is an emerging consensus that we need to align AI systems with human values (Gabriel, 2020; Ji et al., 2024), but it remains unclear how to apply this to language models in practice. We split the problem of "aligning to human values" into three parts: first, eliciting values from people; second, reconciling those values into an alignment target for training ML models; and third, actually training the model. In this paper, we focus on the first two parts, and ask the question: what are "good" ways to synthesize diverse human inputs about values into a target for aligning language models? To answer this question, we first define a set of 6 criteria that we believe must be satisfied for an alignment target to shape model behavior in accordance with human values. We then propose a process for eliciting and reconciling values called Moral Graph Elicitation (MGE), which uses a large language model to interview participants about their values in particular contexts; our approach is inspired by the philosophy of values advanced by Taylor (1977), Chang (2004), and others. We trial MGE with a representative sample of 500 Americans, on 3 intentionally divisive prompts (e.g. advice about abortion). Our results demonstrate that MGE is promising for improving model alignment across all 6 criteria. For example, almost all participants (89.1%) felt well represented by the process, and (89%) thought the final moral graph was fair, even if their value wasn't voted as the wisest. Our process often results in "expert" values (e.g. values from women who have solicited abortion advice) rising to the top of the moral graph, without defining who is considered an expert in advance.
Forward citations
Cited by 5 Pith papers
-
AI Alignment at Your Discretion
The paper formalizes alignment discretion and shows empirically that annotators and models exercise substantial, often arbitrary, and mutually divergent discretion when applying alignment principles.
-
A Roadmap to Impactful Pluralistic Alignment Research
Pluralistic alignment research has produced no public evidence of adoption in deployed frontier models, so the field should focus on empirical justification, settled goals, and hill-climbable evaluations.
-
Value Drifts: Tracing Value Alignment During LLM Post-Training
Value alignment in LLMs is set largely during supervised fine-tuning; standard preference-optimization datasets carry too little stance contrast to re-align it, but with engineered contrast algorithms differ (DPO ampl...
-
AgentMisalignment: Measuring the Propensity for Misaligned Behaviour in LLM-Based Agents
A new nine-task benchmark measures LLM agents' propensity for misalignment and finds more capable models misalign more on average, with persona effects sometimes exceeding model effects.
-
Game Theory Meets Large Language Models: A Systematic Survey with Taxonomy and New Frontiers
A taxonomy-based survey of bidirectional game theory and LLM research, spanning evaluation, alignment, economic competition, and LLM-driven game solving.
Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.