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Trust No AI: Prompt Injection Along The CIA Security Triad
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Trust No AI: Prompt Injection Along The CIA Security Triad
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The CIA security triad - Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability - is a cornerstone of data and cybersecurity. With the emergence of large language model (LLM) applications, a new class of threat, known as prompt injection, was first identified in 2022. Since then, numerous real-world vulnerabilities and exploits have been documented in production LLM systems, including those from leading vendors like OpenAI, Microsoft, Anthropic and Google. This paper compiles real-world exploits and proof-of concept examples, based on the research conducted and publicly documented by the author, demonstrating how prompt injection undermines the CIA triad and poses ongoing risks to cybersecurity and AI systems at large.
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