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Internal Activation Revision: Safeguarding Vision Language Models Without Parameter Update

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arxiv 2501.16378 v1 pith:S6CT7TRM submitted 2025-01-24 cs.LG cs.AIcs.CLcs.CV

classification cs.LGcs.AIcs.CLcs.CV
keywords internalmodelmodelsrevisionactivationactivationsvlmsdemonstrate
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Vision-language models (VLMs) demonstrate strong multimodal capabilities but have been found to be more susceptible to generating harmful content compared to their backbone large language models (LLMs). Our investigation reveals that the integration of images significantly shifts the model's internal activations during the forward pass, diverging from those triggered by textual input. Moreover, the safety alignments of LLMs embedded within VLMs are not sufficiently robust to handle the activations discrepancies, making the models vulnerable to even the simplest jailbreaking attacks. To address this issue, we propose an \textbf{internal activation revision} approach that efficiently revises activations during generation, steering the model toward safer outputs. Our framework incorporates revisions at both the layer and head levels, offering control over the model's generation at varying levels of granularity. In addition, we explore three strategies for constructing positive and negative samples and two approaches for extracting revision vectors, resulting in different variants of our method. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that the internal activation revision method significantly improves the safety of widely used VLMs, reducing attack success rates by an average of 48.94\%, 34.34\%, 43.92\%, and 52.98\% on SafeBench, Safe-Unsafe, Unsafe, and MM-SafetyBench, respectively, while minimally impacting model helpfulness.

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Cited by 3 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Secure Tug-of-War (SecTOW): Iterative Defense-Attack Training with Reinforcement Learning for Multimodal Model Security

    cs.CR 2025-07 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    An iterative attacker-defender reinforcement learning method that makes a multimodal LLM refuse more jailbreak prompts without over-refusing ordinary queries.

  2. Self-Aware Safety Augmentation: Leveraging Internal Semantic Understanding to Enhance Safety in Vision-Language Models

    cs.AI 2025-07 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A tuning-free method that projects middle-layer semantic representations back onto early safety layers, improving vision-language model safety with minimal utility loss.

  3. VSCBench: Bridging the Gap in Vision-Language Model Safety Calibration

    cs.IR 2025-05 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    A new benchmark, VSCBench, measures oversafety and undersafety in vision-language models and shows that most models, including proprietary ones, are miscalibrated on at least one safety dimension.

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