Artificial Intelligence · arXiv:2608.17588 v1 · submitted 18 Aug 2026 · 16 references
TRUSS: Towards Task-Reliable and User-Safe Automated Agent Skill Generation
The paper says
“Agent Skills package reusable natural language procedures with executable resources, enabling software agents to acquire task specific capabilities without model adaptation.”
more of the abstract
Automatically generating such Skills can improve task performance, yet evaluating a candidate solely from its artifact or final task outcome leaves unresolved which actions the equipped agent will perform and which side effects those actions will produce. We present TRUSS, an evidence guided framework for generating functionally effective and safety reliable Agent Skills. TRUSS first inspects functional claims against source and domain evidence while evaluating the complete artifact under nine predefined safety properties. Candidates admitted by this static gate are loaded by a shadow agent inside a Controllable Execution Environment, where brokered tools expose requested actions to policy enforcement and record their results as provenance preserving execution traces. Functional failures and property violations are linked back to the responsible Skill content and used to guide iterative refinement. We evaluate TRUSS on 168 SkillInject artifacts, 155 SkillSafetyBench cases, and all 187 tasks in SkillGenBench. TRUSS achieves 100.00% precision and recall in vulnerability detection. Repair reduces attack success from 38.71% to 19.35% with GPT 5.5 and from 46.45% to 29.68% with GPT 5.4, with zero attack regression. For Skill generation, TRUSS raises task effectiveness from 17.11% without Skills to 52.94%, while increasing the benchmark Security rate from 50.80% to 100.00%. These results show that execution evidence can expose behavioral failures missed by artifact inspection and can guide Skill generation toward jointly verified functional and safety outcomes.
from the abstract
Pith says
Machine review · deepseek-v4-flash · 27 Aug 2026 · what was read was not recorded · not checked by a person
It can be wrong. Challenge this review or reply to it.
Holds up, with conditions. A genuinely useful integration and a solid empirical study, but the flagship 100% Security figure is a self-referential containment check, not an independent safety certificate. This line is wrong
3 major objections · 3 minor
How often objections from reviews like this one are right: not yet measured
Not checked: figures, code, what the 16 references say.
The paper says, at §4.1, §4.4, Table 4
The review did not quote this passage.
Pith says: Objection 1 of 3 · major
The RQ3 Security metric is not an independent measure of a generated Skill's safety. Section 4.1 defines Safety as the mean pass rate over three controlled property probes, and Section 3.4.2 states that the intermediate breaker evaluates every requested action, blocks violations, and records the blocked event as a property violation.
more of objection 1
Because Section 3.5 admits a candidate only after all applicable safety obligations are resolved under evaluated scenarios, the same checker that gates generation also computes the reported 100% Security rate. The result therefore shows that the final Skills contain no detected violation within scenarios chosen and constrained by TRUSS itself, not that they are safe in an unbrokered deployment. The paper's own conclusion concedes sensitivity to scenario coverage and executor behavior, and the RQ2 results with the external SkillSafetyBench verifier still show 19.35% and 29.68% residual attack success. The abstract and Section 4.4 should be reworded, and the evaluation should include an external safety oracle or an unbrokered execution with independent monitoring before claiming jointly verified safety outcomes.
The paper says, at §3.4.1, Table 1
The review did not quote this passage.
Pith says: Objection 2 of 3 · major
Table 1 lists nine safety properties but provides no completeness argument that these boundaries cover all safety-relevant behavior of an Agent Skill. The evidence phase column assigns some properties entirely to static inspection and others to runtime, yet the paper does not specify how the three controlled property probes used for the RQ3 Security metric map to these nine properties.
more of objection 2
Without a mapping or a coverage argument, the 100% Security result in Table 4 is specific to the chosen probes, not to the property contract as a whole. The conclusion's statement that runtime certification remains sensitive to scenario coverage and executor behavior acknowledges this limitation but is not reflected in the abstract's unqualified 100.00% Security claim.
The paper says, at §4.1–§4.4
The review did not quote this passage.
Pith says: Objection 3 of 3 · major
The paper reports no confidence intervals, standard deviations, or repeated runs for the stochastic LLM-based components. All central numbers, such as the SkillGenBench effectiveness increase from 29.95% to 52.94% (56 vs 99 of 187 samples) and the repair reductions in Table 3, are point estimates that could shift with random seed or temperature. The paper should either run the comparisons over multiple seeds and report variance, or provide a reasoned argument for why the effects are robust to stochasticity.
3 minor objections
The paper says, at §4.1, Table 4
Pith says: minor objection 1 of 3
Section 4.1 defines Reusability as the official success rate on held-out tasks under task-agnostic generation, but Table 4 does not report this metric. The paper should either include the result or state why it is omitted.
The paper says, at §4.1, §4.3
Pith says: minor objection 2 of 3
The definition of attack elimination rate, AER = P(A0=1 and A1=0), appears twice, once in Section 4.1 and once in Section 4.3. One statement of the definition would suffice.
show 1 more
The paper says, at §4.4
Pith says: minor objection 3 of 3
The text says 'the complete framework solves 67 more samples than the underlying agent and 43 more samples than the intermediate generator,' but Table 4 shows 99 vs 32 (=67) and 99 vs 56 (=43) only if 'solves' means task success. This should be stated explicitly to avoid confusion.
What would settle it
Re-run the 187 final SkillGenBench Skills in the CEE with the Intermediate Breaker in logging-only mode (no blocking) and score the resulting traces with an independent verifier, e.g., the SkillSafetyBench attack verifier adapted to these tasks. If any of the 46 samples that TRUSS converted from unsafe to safe, or any other Skill, contains an action that the broker would have blocked, the 100.00% Security rate is an artifact of enforcement rather than a property of the Skill.
from the skeptic's reading
How the review went
4 readings by deepseek-v4-flash · 27 Aug 2026
- Reader holds up, with conditions
- Skeptic partly agrees
- Editor wrote the verdict above
- Referee major revision: 3 major objections, 3 minor
Not run on this paper: the simulated authors' defence.
Pith did not check this review's objections against the paper.
The review in full
The review in brief, machine-written
Zhibo et al. describe TRUSS, a pipeline that generates agent skills and then verifies them with a static gate plus a sandboxed runtime with brokered tools, refining candidates until they pass functional and safety checks. The integration is new, and the empirical work is substantial: 168 SkillInject artifacts, 155 SkillSafetyBench cases, 187 SkillGenBench tasks. The SkillInject detection numbers are striking – 100% precision and recall – and the SkillSafetyBench repair results show real reductions in attack success (residual ASR 19.35% and 29.68%) with zero regression. That last result relies on an external verifier, so it's the most credible evidence in the paper.
The soft spot is the RQ3 Security metric. It is defined as the mean pass rate over three controlled property probes executed inside the same CEE whose Intermediate Breaker enforces the nine properties. The enforcement harness is also the oracle: a skill is certified safe when the broker never has to block anything. That is a containment check, not an independent safety property. The 100% Security figure in Table 4 therefore does not mean the skill is safe in an unbrokered deployment, and the paper's own Section 5 concession that runtime certification is sensitive to scenario coverage and executor behavior narrows but does not remove the problem. The abstract's phrase 'jointly verified safety outcomes' overstates what is shown; the RQ2 results with the external verifier still show nearly one in five attacks succeeding after repair on GPT 5.5.
Other reservations are minor but real: no code or data release, no confidence intervals across stochastic LLM runs, and the task-agnostic generation evaluation is thin. The paper is reasonably honest about some of these, but for a systems paper with such clean numbers, reproducibility is more than a formality.
Who is this for? People working on agent skill safety, automated skill authoring, or sandboxed agent execution. It is a serious systems paper that deserves peer review rather than desk rejection, but the referee should push for an artifact release and an independent safety oracle before accepting, or at least demand a re-framing of the safety claims. I would not cite the 100% safety number in my own work until that is fixed, but I would cite the empirical comparison of static versus runtime inspection.
The strongest objection
The central claim that TRUSS yields jointly verified functional and safety outcomes rests most heavily on the RQ3 Security result in Table 4 (100.00%). However, Section 4.1 defines SkillGenBench Safety as the mean pass rate over three controlled property probes, and Section 3.4.2 describes the Intermediate Breaker as both enforcing the nine properties and recording a violation whenever a requested action is blocked. Thus the same component that prevents an unsafe action also serves as the oracle that certifies the absence of unsafe behavior. A final Skill is admitted only when no blocked events are observed in the tested scenarios, so the 100% rate says that the broker found nothing to block, not that the Skill would refrain from unsafe actions in an unbrokered deployment. The authors' own RQ2 results, which use the external SkillSafetyBench attack verifier, show residual attack success of 19.35% (GPT 5.5) and 29.68% (GPT 5.4) after repair, demonstrating that the framework does not actually certify zero unsafe behavior. The paper's concession in Section 5 that runtime certification remains sensitive to scenario coverage and executor behavior narrows the claim, but the self-referential Safety metric in RQ3 is not addressed. This is the load-bearing gap: the flagship safety number is a property of the enforcement harness, not an independent property of the generated Skill.
The reader's weakest_assumption identifies CEE faithfulness and property completeness as the central risk. My concern is related but more specific: the RQ3 Security oracle is the same component that enforces the policy, making the 100% result unable to discriminate intrinsic safety from containment. This is load-bearing because Table 4 is the paper's primary evidence for the safety half of the central claim. RQ2's use of an external attack verifier is a genuine strength, but it still shows residual attack success, which is consistent with the concern that the framework reduces rather than eliminates unsafe behavior. The paper acknowledges scenario-coverage limits, but it does not disclose or remedy the self-referential Safety metric. A logging-only rerun with an external verifier would settle whether the Skills themselves are safe or merely contained. Since the framework may still be valuable as a containment-and-refinement system, the reader's CONDITIONAL verdict remains appropriate; no adjustment is needed, but the condition should explicitly require an independent safety evaluation of the generated Skills.
The referee's report
If its findings are supported, TRUSS would be a meaningful step toward evidence-guided automated skill generation, and the paper's hybrid static/runtime checking loop is a plausible design for joint functional and safety refinement. The paper has notable strengths: RQ1 uses paired clean/injected artifacts, RQ2 relies on the external SkillSafetyBench attack verifier, Table 3 explicitly reports attack regression and safe task completion, and Table 4 provides a direct comparison between the intermediate LLM generator and the full TRUSS pipeline. The conclusion's acknowledgment that runtime certification is sensitive to scenario coverage and executor behavior is honest and important.
Pith's reading of the paper (a machine's summary, not the authors')
Agent skills are reusable instruction-and-code packages that give LLM agents new abilities without retraining; automatically generating them could let agents handle more tasks, but judging a skill from its text or from a single final outcome misses unsafe actions the agent might take along the way. TRUSS is a framework that treats skill generation as a joint functional and safety verification problem: a static gate inspects the skill package against nine predefined safety properties, and admitted candidates are then executed by a shadow agent inside a Controllable Execution Environment whose brokered tools record every action as provenance-preserving traces. The traces are checked against the same properties, and any failure is linked back to the exact skill content that caused it and used to revise the candidate. On 168 SkillInject artifacts TRUSS achieves 100% precision and recall in detecting injected vulnerabilities; on 155 SkillSafetyBench cases it reduces attack success from 38.71% to 19.35% (GPT 5.5) and from 46.45% to 29.68% (GPT 5.4) with zero attack regression; and across all 187 SkillGenBench tasks it lifts effectiveness from 17.11% to 52.94% while raising the security rate from 50.80% to 100.00%. The paper's claim is that execution evidence exposes behavioral failures that artifact inspection misses and can guide generation toward skills that are both effective and safe.
What carries the argument. The load-bearing mechanism is the pairing of a static gate with a runtime loop. The static gate evaluates the complete skill package under nine predefined safety properties (control integrity, access boundary, execution integrity, lifecycle isolation, resource boundedness, evidence integrity, authority integrity, composition integrity, transaction safety), using source and open-world evidence to decide whether functional claims are plausible. Candidates that pass are loaded by a shadow agent in a Controllable Execution Environment (CEE): a disposable sandbox in which command networking is disabled, HTTP requests terminate at brokered mock services, the skill is mounted read-only, and every requested action passes through an intermediate breaker that can block it and record the attempt. The resulting execution trace is checked against the same properties, and every conclusion is stored in a Function and Safety Record that binds each finding to the artifact span or execution event that caused it. That record is the input to the Refiner, which edits the implicated content to fix failures while preserving satisfied obligations, producing a new candidate that re-enters the whole loop; the loop terminates when a candidate discharges every applicable obligation.
Core claim. The central discovery is that runtime execution traces inside a controlled environment close detection gaps left by static artifact inspection and provide refinement evidence that safety or functionality can be improved together. The paper argues that a skill's true behavior emerges only when an agent loads the artifact and interacts with tool calls, and that actions like downloading then executing an installation fragment only become visible as a dangerous chain after multiple individually plausible steps. By evaluating functional outcomes and safety properties on the same execution trace—blocking violating actions while still recording the attempt, and pairing each skill run with an empty-skill baseline—TRUSS measures utility as a gain over the base agent and risk as the absolute probability of property violation. Across three benchmarks, the paper reports that TRUSS detects all 84 injected-skill vulnerabilities among 168 artifacts (100% precision and recall), eliminates attacks on SkillSafetyBench without introducing new ones, and raises SkillGenBench effectiveness from 17.11% to 52.94% while attaining a 100% security rate. The authors therefore conclude that execution evidence can expose behavioral failures missed by artifact inspection and can guide skill generation toward jointly verified functional and safety outcomes.
The premise it rests on. The safety certificate assumes that the nine predefined properties cover every safety-relevant behavior a skill can induce, and that the sandboxed execution environment—with networking disabled and HTTP mocked—faithfully reproduces how the skill would behave in real deployment.
If the paper is right (Pith's inferences, not the authors')
Static screening alone, even with strong LLM judgment, misses a large share of runtime vulnerabilities; the reported jump from 87.36% F1 for the static checker to 100% F1 for TRUSS implies that execution evidence should be part of any skill certification pipeline.
Safety repair does not have to trade away functionality: on SkillSafetyBench the framework eliminated attacks with zero attack regression, and on SkillGenBench it simultaneously raised effectiveness and security, suggesting that evidence-guided refinement can satisfy both objectives.
Functional gains should be measured as a paired difference over the base agent, not as absolute success, so that a skill is credited only for the utility it adds; the reported improvement of +35.83 percentage points rests on this paired protocol.
Because violations are recorded even when the broker blocks the action, the checker can measure a skill's unsafe intent as well as its safe outcome; this lets the generator learn from attempts that never reached the system.
The same nine-property catalog can serve as a stable contract for both static and runtime phases, making safety a testable obligation with traceable evidence rather than a single evaluator impression.
A natural extension is to run TRUSS's refinement loop on other agent extension points—tool servers, MCP connectors, prompt-injected workflows—where state-dependent attacks are also missed by artifact-only review; the mechanism of brokered execution plus property-linked repair transfers readibly.
The 100% security figure is a property of the benchmark's scenario budget, not of the real world: because the CEE disables networking and mocks HTTP, a skill that only exfiltrates data through a live external channel would pass certification, so the completeness of the nine properties should be validated with deployment-style probes before claiming user safety.
The paired empty-skill utility protocol suggests a general evaluation norm for generated skills: report delta utility against the base agent, otherwise a verbose skill that merely repeats existing behavior can look better than it is.
One could try to synthesize runtime monitors automatically from the property catalog, so that scenarios are generated adversarially to violate each of the nine properties; this would turn the paper's fixed scenario set into an evolving test suite.
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The paper
Abstract
Agent Skills package reusable natural language procedures with executable resources, enabling software agents to acquire task specific capabilities without model adaptation. Automatically generating such Skills can improve task performance, yet evaluating a candidate solely from its artifact or final task outcome leaves unresolved which actions the equipped agent will perform and which side effects those actions will produce. We present TRUSS, an evidence guided framework for generating functionally effective and safety reliable Agent Skills. TRUSS first inspects functional claims against source and domain evidence while evaluating the complete artifact under nine predefined safety properties. Candidates admitted by this static gate are loaded by a shadow agent inside a Controllable Execution Environment, where brokered tools expose requested actions to policy enforcement and record their results as provenance preserving execution traces. Functional failures and property violations are linked back to the responsible Skill content and used to guide iterative refinement. We evaluate TRUSS on 168 SkillInject artifacts, 155 SkillSafetyBench cases, and all 187 tasks in SkillGenBench. TRUSS achieves 100.00% precision and recall in vulnerability detection. Repair reduces attack success from 38.71% to 19.35% with GPT 5.5 and from 46.45% to 29.68% with GPT 5.4, with zero attack regression. For Skill generation, TRUSS raises task effectiveness from 17.11% without Skills to 52.94%, while increasing the benchmark Security rate from 50.80% to 100.00%. These results show that execution evidence can expose behavioral failures missed by artifact inspection and can guide Skill generation toward jointly verified functional and safety outcomes.
The paper's own sentences, arranged, kept beside the review and separate from it. Each label is drawn from a closed vocabulary; the number beside it is the probability the classifier gave that label. No sentence in this record was written by a model.
abstract compiled · 2026-09-23
The authors' main claim, as the classifier picked it out 1.00
“These results show that execution evidence can expose behavioral failures missed by artifact inspection and can guide Skill generation toward jointly verified functional and safety outcomes.”
How the main claim is stated: asserted 1.00
What the abstract itself states, as probabilities: claims first 0.06 · states limitation 0.18 · human participants 0.04 · controlled comparison 0.90 · randomized assignment 0.01 · states quantitative result 0.99 · compares with prior results 0.93 · mentions code or data availability 0.04
The abstract, sentence by sentence
This table labels the abstract only (arXiv listing abstract v1). The number is the probability the classifier gave the label.
| Sentence | Role | The authors' own work | States the main conclusion | Strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Agent Skills package reusable natural language procedures with executable resources, enabling software agents to acquire task specific capabilities without model adaptation. | background 1.00 | 0.06 | 0.03 | asserted 1.00 |
| Automatically generating such Skills can improve task performance, yet evaluating a candidate solely from its artifact or final task outcome leaves unresolved which actions the equipped agent will perform and which side effects those actions will produce. | gap 0.91 | 0.10 | 0.04 | asserted 0.54 |
| We present TRUSS, an evidence guided framework for generating functionally effective and safety reliable Agent Skills. | contribution 1.00 | 0.84 | 0.09 | asserted 0.99 |
| TRUSS first inspects functional claims against source and domain evidence while evaluating the complete artifact under nine predefined safety properties. | method 0.96 | 0.82 | 0.05 | asserted 0.99 |
| Candidates admitted by this static gate are loaded by a shadow agent inside a Controllable Execution Environment, where brokered tools expose requested actions to policy enforcement and record their results as provenance preserving execution traces. | method 1.00 | 0.82 | 0.03 | asserted 0.99 |
| Functional failures and property violations are linked back to the responsible Skill content and used to guide iterative refinement. | method 0.99 | 0.83 | 0.07 | asserted 1.00 |
| We evaluate TRUSS on 168 SkillInject artifacts, 155 SkillSafetyBench cases, and all 187 tasks in SkillGenBench. | method 0.69 | 0.94 | 0.03 | asserted 0.92 |
| TRUSS achieves 100.00\% precision and recall in vulnerability detection. | result 1.00 | 0.94 | 0.10 | asserted 1.00 |
| Repair reduces attack success from 38.71\% to 19.35\% with GPT 5.5 and from 46.45\% to 29.68\% with GPT 5.4, with zero attack regression. | result 1.00 | 0.93 | 0.06 | asserted 1.00 |
| For Skill generation, TRUSS raises task effectiveness from 17.11\% without Skills to 52.94\%, while increasing the benchmark Security rate from 50.80\% to 100.00\%. | result 1.00 | 0.95 | 0.13 | asserted 1.00 |
| These results show that execution evidence can expose behavioral failures missed by artifact inspection and can guide Skill generation toward jointly verified functional and safety outcomes. | interpretation 1.00 | 0.91 | 0.88 | asserted 1.00 |
What kind of paper the classifier reports this is: method or tool 1.00 · evidence from observation or experiment 0.96
What was examined, and what was not
Sources read
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Not examined
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How the labels were made
Compiled by classifier-1.13.0 via TypeSafe API, question bank abstract-p1-20260923, 2026-09-23: 1 request, 8,364 input tokens.
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Figures (1)
References (16)
- [1] Salaheddin Alzubi, Noah Provenzano, Jaydon Bingham, Weiyuan Chen, and Tu Vu. 2026. EvoSkill: Automated Skill Discovery for Multi-Agent Systems. arXiv preprint. arXiv:2603.02766 https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.02766 on PithPith's reviewarXiv
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- [7] Yi Liu, Weizhe Wang, Ruitao Feng, Yao Zhang, Guangquan Xu, Gelei Deng, Yuekang Li, and Leo Zhang. 2026. Agent Skills in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities at Scale. arXiv preprint. arXiv:2601.10338 https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.10338 on PithPith's reviewarXiv
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- [11] David Schmotz, Luca Beurer-Kellner, Sahar Abdelnabi, and Maksym Andriushchenko. 2026. Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks. arXiv preprint. arXiv:2602.20156 https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.20156 , Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: August 2027. ... on PithPith's reviewarXiv
- [12] Guanzhi Wang, Yuqi Xie, Yunfan Jiang, Ajay Mandlekar, Chaowei Xiao, Yuke Zhu, Linxi Fan, and Anima Anandkumar on Pith
- [13] Yifan Zhou, Zhentao Zhang, Ziming Cheng, Shuo Zhang, Qizhen Lan, Zhangquan Chen, Zhi Yang, Qianyu Xu, Ronghao Chen, Huacan Wang, and Sen Hu. 2026. SkillGenBench: Benchmarking Skill Generation Pipelines for LLM Agents. arXiv preprint. arXiv:2605.18693 https://arxiv.org/abs/2605... on PithPith's reviewarXiv
- [15] Voyager: An Open-Ended Embodied Agent with Large Language Models. Transactions on Machine Learning Research. https://openreview.net/forum?id=ehfRiF0R3a on Pith
- [2024] Skill Set Optimization: Reinforcing Language Model Behavior via Transferable Skills. InProceedings of the 41st International Conference on Machine Learning (Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, Vol. 235), Ruslan Salakhutdinov, Zico Kolter, Katherine Heller, Adrian Weller,... on Pith
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Cited by 1 Pith paper
Reviewed papers on Pith that cite this one. The full citation record
How the literature uses it
What this paper does with the arXiv papers it cites
What it cites · 11 sentences without a confident label
Uses the method or tool of 1 paper
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We follow the generation regimes introduced by SkillGenBench [ref] .
SkillGenBench: Benchmarking Skill Generation Pipelines for LLM Agents · Runtime Execution Traces · 1.00
Uses data or values from 4 papers
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We conduct the experiment on all 187 samples in SkillGenBench [ref] and compare three conditions under the same benchmark tasks and evaluation procedure.
SkillGenBench: Benchmarking Skill Generation Pipelines for LLM Agents · RQ3 Automated Skill Generation · 0.89
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RQ2 evaluates the repaired Skills on all 155 cases from SkillSafetyBench [ref] .
SkillSafetyBench: Evaluating Agent Safety under Skill-Facing Attack Surfaces · RQ2 Refinement Under Executable Attacks · 0.99
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We use all 84 matched pairs from SkillInject [ref] .
Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks · RQ1 Safety Vulnerability Detection · 0.99
Cites as support 1 paper
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Recent security studies have shown that unsafe skills can introduce serious vulnerabilities into LLM-based agents, exposing users and their local environments to substantial security risks [ref] .
Agent Skills in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities at Scale · Introduction · 0.97
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