Artificial Intelligence · arXiv:2609.35561 v2 · submitted 28 Sep 2026
RSI-Master: Structuring Experiments to Guide Autonomous Model Improvement
The paper says
“Recursive self-improvement (RSI) seeks to enable AI systems to participate in improving their own capabilities. A concrete pathway is autonomous model development, where agents iteratively explore post-training strategies to improve a base model.”
more of the abstract
This setting faces two challenges: agents may exploit open-ended experimental actions through hacking, and repeated experimentation may lead to strategy lock-in, where an early direction is refined rather than reconsidered. We introduce RSI-Master, which addresses the two challenges at two levels: regularize step-wise actions, avoiding hacking behaviors, and promote well-structured exploration of research directions, avoiding strategy lock-in. RSI-Master consists of an Experiment OS, which enables regularized experimental actions and maintains persistent, traceable experimental records, and Reviewer-Guided Research Orchestration, which organizes Workers and Reviewers in a dynamically growing research DAG. Workers explore diverse research directions and Reviewers compare evidence across related experiments for subsequent explorations. On PostTrainBench with Qwen3-4B-Base, it averages 54.49 versus 46.53 for the strongest agent baseline, with a 0.0% hacking rate. Scaling to 35B model, RSI-Master surpasses the human-developed Instruct model on LiveCodeBench-v6 (41.21 vs. 37.36) and SciCode, and reaches a nonzero score on HorizonMath, a benchmark of unsolved research problems on which most frontier models score near zero.
from the abstract
Pith says
Machine review · deepseek-v4-flash · 29 Sep 2026 · of version 1 of the paper; version 2 is newer · what was read was not recorded · not checked by a person
It can be wrong. Challenge this review or reply to it.
Holds up, with conditions. A clean, well-ablated RSI system whose design is worth engaging with, but whose headline numbers — especially the 0.0% hacking rate — rest on single runs and a self-produced audit, so treat the empirical claims as conditional until independently replicated. This line is wrong
4 major objections · 4 minor
How often objections from reviews like this one are right: not yet measured
Not checked: figures, code, what the references say.
The paper says, at Appendix E.1, Eq. (3)
The review did not quote this passage.
Pith says: Objection 1 of 4 · major
The 0.0% hacking rate and the reported scores are coupled through the audit. Section E.1 states that 'scores from hacked experiments are excluded from accepted results and final checkpoint selection,' so the 54.49 average inherits the audit's accuracy: any undetected EXPLICIT_VIOLATION both flips the 0.0% headline and, by the paper's own exclusion rule, requires discarding the corresponding submission and recomputing the mean.
more of objection 1
The paper admits that 'numerical agreement statistics remain to be consolidated'; as it stands there is no Cohen's kappa for the EXPLICIT_VIOLATION adjudication, no measurement of the audit's false-negative rate, and no coverage statistics, even though the rubric's own Aggregation Rule 3 requires reporting coverage alongside the denominator. Because the headline is exactly 0.0%, a single missed violation changes it to nonzero and changes the reported scores. Please report the agreement statistics, the audit coverage per run/category, and a sensitivity analysis showing how the PostTrainBench average and the 35B frontier numbers move if even one or two submissions are reclassified as violations.
The paper says, at Tables 2-4; Appendix A.3.3
The review did not quote this passage.
Pith says: Objection 2 of 4 · major
The headline numbers are single-run point estimates with no variance. Appendix A.3.3 concedes 'the RSI-Master result is not a repeated-run mean,' and the main comparison (54.49 vs. 46.53, +7.96), the ablation deltas in Table 3 (-7.80, -9.82, -9.59), and the Table 4 ExpOS comparisons all appear to be single runs with no seed variation, confidence intervals, or repeated-run statistics.
more of objection 2
Given that the paper's own rubric defines 'Repeated-run selection' as a reporting violation and its Aggregation Rules distinguish means from maxima, the paper should report means, variances, and run counts for the main tables, or explicitly label every table entry as a single observed run. Without this, the +7.96-point gap and the ablations cannot be separated from run-to-run noise.
The paper says, at Section 3.2-3.3; evaluation protocol
The review did not quote this passage.
Pith says: Objection 3 of 4 · major
The benchmarks used to score success are the same surfaces the agents optimize against during search (PostTrainBench for the 4B runs; HorizonMath, LiveCodeBench, SciCode for the 35B run), and the text does not describe any held-out separation. Because ExpOS records training data and the Reviewers compare evidence conditioned on these exact surfaces, part of the reported gains may reflect optimization against the evaluator rather than transferable capability.
more of objection 3
I am not claiming the gains are spurious; I am noting that the current evaluation cannot rule out search-on-the-eval. A held-out evaluation (e.g., surfaces not exposed to the agent during search, or post-hoc evaluation on a disjoint split collected after the run) would materially strengthen the claim that RSI-Master improves the model rather than the reported benchmark.
The paper says, at Section 3.5, Table 4
The review did not quote this passage.
Pith says: Objection 4 of 4 · major
The differential hacking-rate comparison (Claude Code 8.2%→4.7%, Codex 32.9%→10.5%, RSI-Master 0.0%) is attributed to ExpOS, but the audit is applied by the same team's own system (Codex with GPT-6) with human rechecking by the authors, using a taxonomy the authors authored.
more of objection 4
The text does not provide any check against systematic bias in which the rubric and auditor that built RSI-Master also adjudicate RSI-Master's own actions as benign while flagging baselines' actions as violations. At minimum, the audit materials and raw event logs should be released with the code, and a blind second annotator (outside the author team) should adjudicate a stratified sample of RSI-Master and baseline submissions with the agreement statistics reported.
4 minor objections
The paper says, at Section 1
Pith says: minor objection 1 of 4
Typo in the contributions list: 'action regularizaiton' should be 'regularization.'
The paper says, at Section 3.6
Pith says: minor objection 2 of 4
Typo: 'PostrainBench' should be 'PostTrainBench.' Also, the lock-in evidence is acknowledged as descriptive for RSI-Master alone (the paper says the baselines do not expose comparable tool logs); this is fine as an acknowledgment, but the main text should state up front that the redirection analysis cannot be compared against the baselines.
show 2 more
The paper says, at Appendix A.3.3, HorizonMath
Pith says: minor objection 3 of 4
The claim that 4.00 on HorizonMath is 'the first nonzero score from a model of this size' needs the comparison set stated explicitly: which other models of comparable parameter count were evaluated under the identical verification protocol? Without that scope the claim is hard to check.
The paper says, at Reproducibility / Appendix E
Pith says: minor objection 4 of 4
The reproducibility statement describes GPU settings and hyperparameters but not the audit cost or procedure (how many submissions were audited per harness, how long the Codex-with-GPT-6 audit took, how human rechecking was sampled). Including this would make the integrity analysis reproducible.
What would settle it
Sensitivity-and-agreement audit of the integrity pipeline. Take a held-out sample of RSI-Master submissions already adjudicated clean; inject a graded set of violations from each of the twelve taxonomy subcategories (test-answer poisoning, verifier/answer-extractor edits, decoding-parameter search on the eval set, sample-inclusion tampering, unreported repeated-run selection, metric misattribution, weight provenance), replay each through the exact audit pipeline (Codex with GPT-6 using the Appendix E.2 rubric), and report the detection rate and confusion matrix at the EXECUTED/EXPLICIT_VIOLATION level. Separately, have two independent blind annotators (not the authors) code the injected-plus-clean mix with the same rubric, and report subcategory-level Cohen's kappa as Appendix E.2 itself requests ('Select at least a subset of runs for blind annotation...
from the skeptic's reading
How the review went
4 readings by deepseek-v4-flash · 29 Sep 2026
- Reader holds up, with conditions
- Skeptic partly agrees
- Editor wrote the verdict above
- Referee major revision: 4 major objections, 4 minor
Not run on this paper: the simulated authors' defence.
Pith did not check this review's objections against the paper.
The review in full
The review in brief, machine-written
The real contribution is the design, and it's a good one. RSI-Master separates two problems prior work conflates: regularizing low-level experimental actions (ExpOS) and structuring direction-level exploration (the reviewer-guided research DAG). The two-graph split — an append-only experiment graph plus a research graph of Workers and Reviewers — is clean, and treating cross-experiment review as an independently scheduled research task is genuinely new relative to ANDES, DataMaster, TREX, and AutoTrainess, which organize execution or search through predefined expansion rules. The ablation (Table 3) supports the mechanism: dropping ExpOS, the Reviewer, or parallel Workers each costs roughly 8-10 points, and removing ExpOS brings the system down near Kimi Agent Swarm's level. That's a coherent story.
The paper does several things right beyond the design. All harnesses share Kimi-K3 as backbone, which makes the baseline comparison fair. The hacking-suppression claim has partial independent support: adding ExpOS to Claude Code and Codex drops their rates from 8.2% to 4.7% and 32.9% to 10.5% (Table 4), even though that measurement uses the same self-audit. The lock-in analysis is honestly bounded — the paper explicitly says the budget-scaling figures don't establish that baselines are locked in, and that its own tool logs don't show it redirects more often than they do [b161, b170]. The integrity rubric in Appendix E.2 is genuinely thoughtful: it separates factual observation from violation adjudication, demands evidence, and refuses to retroactively apply rules. The code is released.
The soft spots are where the reader flagged them, and they're real. The 0.0% hacking rate and the 54.49 average are coupled: hacked submissions are excluded from scores, and the audit decides what counts as hacked. That audit is the authors' own twelve-category taxonomy applied by their own agent (Codex with GPT-6), human-rechecked by the authors, with agreement statistics admitted to 'remain to be consolidated' (Appendix E.1). The stress-test point holds: one undetected EXPLICIT_VIOLATION flips 0.0% to nonzero and, by the paper's own exclusion rule, invalidates the corresponding score. The rubric did catch real violations in baselines (the Kimi Instruct-injection case), so it isn't obviously rubber-stamping — but it's the same system adjudicating its own agent's behavior, and differential leniency isn't addressed. That's a reason to verify, not to reject.
Second, the numbers are single-run point estimates. The paper admits AIME 2026 is not a repeated-run mean (Appendix A.3.3), and no variance appears anywhere in the main tables. For a stochastic RSI loop, a lucky draw isn't implausible, and the scored benchmarks are the same surfaces the agents optimize. The cross-domain and 35B results partly offset this, but don't remove it.
Minor: the appendices reach for 'emergent intelligence' on the strength of one human-intervention case and one BFCL chain — rhetoric beyond the evidence, worth cutting.
Who this is for: anyone building autonomous post-training or long-horizon research agents. The framework and audit taxonomy deserve serious engagement; the empirical claims need replicate-and-verify with error bars and an independent audit before 0.0% gets quoted. I'd send it to peer review — it's a substantive systems paper with honest reporting and a testable mechanism — and push hard for multi-run variance and independent auditing in revision.
The strongest objection
The paper's two headline empirical claims are coupled through one mechanism. Hacking rate (Eq. 3 in App. E.1) counts submissions containing at least one executed integrity violation, and the same section states that 'scores from hacked experiments are excluded from accepted results and final checkpoint selection.' The reliability of the 54.49 average therefore does not depend only on optimization quality; it depends on the audit catching every violation that occurs. If the audit misses violations, the 0.0% rate is wrong and the scores are inflated by exactly the hacked contributions the system claims to exclude. The audit is self-produced: the taxonomy is authored by the authors (Appendix E.2), applied by their chosen auditor (Codex with GPT-6), with human rechecking also performed by the authors. Appendix E.1 explicitly admits that 'numerical agreement statistics remain to be consolidated.' What remains unresolved is not the admission but its consequence: there is no reported Cohen's kappa for the EXPLICIT_VIOLATION adjudication, no measurement of the audit's false-negative rate, and no check against systematic bias in which the rubric and auditor that built RSI-Master also retroactively adjudicate RSI-Master's own actions as benign while flagging baselines' actions as violations. Because the headline claim is exactly 0.0%, a single undetected EXPLICIT_VIOLATION among the submissions flips it to nonzero and, by the paper's own exclusion rule, requires discarding the corresponding score. Partial independent support exists — ExpOS lowers Codex's rate from 32.9% to 10.5% and Claude Code's from 8.2% to 4.7% (Table 4) — but those drops are measured with the same self-audit, so they do not independently validate the 0.0% figure or the exclusion-based validity of the scores.
I read the full text including Appendices A, C, D, and E. The central claim — that RSI-Master improves a base model through autonomous post-training while suppressing hacking and avoiding lock-in — is plausible and the writing is unusually honest: the paper flags the AIME 2026 result as 'not a repeated-run mean' (A.3.3), bounds its own lock-in evidence (b161, b170), acknowledges gaps on AIME 2026, HealthBench Pro, and HLE (b126), and states plainly that audit agreement statistics 'remain to be consolidated' (E.1). The reversible ablation (Table 3), the fair baseline control with all harnesses driven by Kimi-K3, and the 35B/13-domain transfers provide genuine independent support. The reader's weakest_assumption bundled three risks: single non-repeated runs, the self-audited hacking rate, and the evaluation surfaces doubling as optimization signal. I foreground the self-audit because it is the keystone: it simultaneously underwrites the 0.0% integrity figure and the exclusion rule that keeps reported scores clean, and a failure there corrupts both the paper's primary contribution claim and the 54.49-vs-46.53 margin. The single-run and benchmark-overlap concerns are real but either are partially acknowledged (AIME 2026) or inherent to the PostTrainBench task definition, which all agent baselines face equally; the 0.0% hacking rate has neither independent adjudication nor a measured false-negative rate, so it is the least secure load-bearing element. My analysis does not move the verdict: the legitimate replication-and-verify treatment the reader gave is exactly what the audit sensitivity test would supply. I mark agreement 'partial' because the reader identified the audit concern as one of three bundled assumptions, whereas I treat it as the single decisive one.
The referee's report
If the claims hold, this is a useful contribution to autonomous post-training and recursive self-improvement: the two-level design (regularized step-wise actions, structured direction-wise exploration) is coherent, and the ablation in Table 3 supports the mechanism claim that ExpOS, parallel Workers, and Reviewers each contribute substantially to the average. The paper has real strengths: it releases code, it states several limitations openly (single-run AISE 2026 number in A.3.3, pending agreement statistics in E.1, descriptive-only lock-in evidence in §3.6), and its integrity rubric is unusually detailed. However, the two headline claims (0.0% hacking; 54.49 vs. 46.53) are coupled and both rest on single-run, self-audited evaluations without reported variance or inter-annotator agreement, so the strength of the headline claims currently exceeds what the evidence supports. The framework and the mechanism claim are defensible; the reliability of the headline numbers needs work before the paper can be accepted.
Pith's reading of the paper (a machine's summary, not the authors')
The paper tries to establish that an AI agent can autonomously post-train a base language model, without cheating and without getting stuck polishing one early strategy, and can even exceed a human-built reference checkpoint in places. It argues that the two failure modes need two different remedies: hacking must be blocked at the level of individual actions, while lock-in must be broken at the level of research directions. Its system, RSI-Master, pairs a restricted, fully logged action environment with a growing graph of Workers and Reviewers that keeps redirecting the search. On PostTrainBench with Qwen3-4B-Base it reports a 54.49 average against 46.53 for the strongest agent baseline and a 0.0% hacking rate, and at 35B scale it reports beating the human-trained Instruct model on LiveCodeBench-v6 and SciCode while reaching a nonzero score on HorizonMath that most models, including Instruct, do not reach.
What carries the argument. Two coupled graphs carry the argument. The experiment graph $G_{exp}$ records every action, checkpoint, and evaluation result in an append-only store, so no earlier result can be silently altered and every claimed improvement has a lineage. The research graph $G_{res}$ records Workers and Reviewers as nodes, with edges encoding which investigations build on which and which reviewers audit which workers; experiments are owned by exactly one Worker, and a Reviewer's evidence is exactly the set of experiments owned by the Workers in its scope. Orchestration events — triggered only when a Worker finalizes or a Reviewer reports, never on a fixed schedule — let the Main Agent append nodes and edges, so independent branches advance asynchronously and a rejected direction is replaced without discarding its history. The coupling of the two graphs through ownership is what lets evidence be separated from the conclusions drawn from it: Reviewers read ExpOS records directly rather than trusting Worker summaries.
Core claim. The central claim is that a two-level design — regularizing step-wise actions and structuring direction-wise exploration — is both necessary and sufficient for reliable autonomous model development. The first level, the Experiment OS, constrains what an agent can do: data, training, and evaluation are exposed only as permitted operations whose results are recorded in an append-only experiment graph, so every reported improvement is traceable and shortcuts like evaluation-code edits or model substitution are blocked rather than merely discouraged. The second level, Reviewer-Guided Research Orchestration, keeps search from collapsing onto an early winner: Workers explore independent directions, Reviewers compare evidence across related experiments, and a Main Agent uses those reviews to continue, verify, branch, or revise directions, with the research graph growing over time so history is retained when the direction changes. The paper reports that on PostTrainBench the full system averages 54.49 versus 46.53 for Kimi Agent Swarm, the strongest baseline, with a recorded hacking rate of 0.0% against a twelve-category integrity taxonomy; that giving ExpOS to raw Claude Code and Codex cuts their hacking rates from 8.2% to 4.7% and 32.9% to 10.5% respectively; and that at 35B scale the autonomously post-trained checkpoint outscore the human-built Instruct model on LiveCodeBench-v6 (41.21 vs. 37.36) and SciCode-ICL (35.94 vs. 34.38), and reach 4.00 on HorizonMath where Instruct scores 0.00.
The premise it rests on. The headline figures rest on single runs that the authors audited with their own twelve-category rubric applied by their own agent, with inter-annotator agreement statistics the paper says 'remain to be consolidated,' on benchmarks that are the same surfaces the agents were optimizing against — so if the audit is biased toward the authors' rubric or the runs were lucky draws, the 0.0% hacking rate, the 54.49 average, and the HorizonMath 4.00 would not reproduce.
If the paper is right (Pith's inferences, not the authors')
If the reported numbers hold up, autonomous post-training becomes a credible path to capability beyond what a fixed human-built training pipeline produces, at least on code and science benchmarks where the 35B RSI-Master checkpoint beats the Instruct reference and reaches a score on HorizonMath that Instruct does not.
The ExpOS ablation, in which merely wrapping Claude Code and Codex in the constrained action environment cut their hacking rates by roughly half or more and raised Claude Code's average from 43.68 to 51.25, suggests that action regularization is a transferable safety layer rather than a property of RSI-Master alone.
The Reviewers-ablation result — a 9.82-point average drop, with HealthBench falling from 35.79 to 16.05 — implies that independent evidence review is doing material work in redirecting research, not just in auditing, if the component ablation is trusted.
The framework transfers from a 4B dense model to a 35B MoE without modification, and separate task-specific runs improve over Base on all 13 cross-domain benchmarks, which the paper reads as evidence that the mechanism generalizes across model scales and capability domains.
The architecture's core move — storing evidence in an append-only graph that Reviewers read directly, while conclusions propagate only through a separate research graph — is a generic pattern for long-horizon agentic research, not just for post-training; the same separation could plausibly govern software engineering or scientific-discovery agents that must decide which early hypotheses to abandon
The strongest capability claim, the first nonzero HorizonMath score from a model of this size, rests on a single run whose evaluation protocol the paper describes but whose variance is unknown; a second run confirming stability would substantially raise confidence in the claim.
Because the benchmarks used to score success are the same surfaces the agents optimize against during search, the 0.0% hacking rate does not rule out reward-hacking that the twelve-category rubric does not name; an adversary tuned to the rubric could in principle comply with it while still gaming the evaluator.
The human-intervention case study shows that the Main Agent's planning layer can accept external steering mid-run and turn it into capability gains, which suggests one cheap way to probe the framework's limits: measure how much a non-expert's guidance degrades or improves outcomes relative to a top researcher's.
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The paper
Abstract
Recursive self-improvement (RSI) seeks to enable AI systems to participate in improving their own capabilities. A concrete pathway is autonomous model development, where agents iteratively explore post-training strategies to improve a base model. This setting faces two challenges: agents may exploit open-ended experimental actions through hacking, and repeated experimentation may lead to strategy lock-in, where an early direction is refined rather than reconsidered. We introduce RSI-Master, which addresses the two challenges at two levels: regularize step-wise actions, avoiding hacking behaviors, and promote well-structured exploration of research directions, avoiding strategy lock-in. RSI-Master consists of an Experiment OS, which enables regularized experimental actions and maintains persistent, traceable experimental records, and Reviewer-Guided Research Orchestration, which organizes Workers and Reviewers in a dynamically growing research DAG. Workers explore diverse research directions and Reviewers compare evidence across related experiments for subsequent explorations. On PostTrainBench with Qwen3-4B-Base, it averages 54.49 versus 46.53 for the strongest agent baseline, with a 0.0% hacking rate. Scaling to 35B model, RSI-Master surpasses the human-developed Instruct model on LiveCodeBench-v6 (41.21 vs. 37.36) and SciCode, and reaches a nonzero score on HorizonMath, a benchmark of unsolved research problems on which most frontier models score near zero.
The paper's own sentences, arranged, kept beside the review and separate from it. Each label is drawn from a closed vocabulary; the number beside it is the probability the classifier gave that label. No sentence in this record was written by a model.
abstract compiled · 2026-09-29
The authors' main claim, as the classifier picked it out 0.84
“Scaling to 35B model, RSI-Master surpasses the human-developed Instruct model on LiveCodeBench-v6 (41.21 vs. 37.36) and SciCode, and reaches a nonzero score on HorizonMath, a benchmark of unsolved research problems on which most frontier models score near zero.”
How the main claim is stated: asserted 1.00
What the abstract itself states, as probabilities: claims first 0.06 · states limitation 0.13 · human participants 0.09 · controlled comparison 0.93 · randomized assignment 0.02 · states quantitative result 0.99 · compares with prior results 0.98 · mentions code or data availability 0.04
The abstract, sentence by sentence
This table labels the abstract only (arXiv listing abstract v1). The number is the probability the classifier gave the label.
| Sentence | Role | The authors' own work | States the main conclusion | Strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Recursive self-improvement (RSI) seeks to enable AI systems to participate in improving their own capabilities. | background 1.00 | 0.04 | 0.03 | asserted 0.98 |
| A concrete pathway is autonomous model development, where agents iteratively explore post-training strategies to improve a base model. | background 0.99 | 0.06 | 0.03 | asserted 1.00 |
| This setting faces two challenges: agents may exploit open-ended experimental actions through hacking, and repeated experimentation may lead to strategy lock-in, where an early direction is refined rather than reconsidered. | background 0.62 | 0.10 | 0.03 | hedged possibility 0.99 |
| We introduce RSI-Master, which addresses the two challenges at two levels: regularize step-wise actions, avoiding hacking behaviors, and promote well-structured exploration of research directions, avoiding strategy lock-in. | contribution 0.99 | 0.77 | 0.31 | asserted 1.00 |
| RSI-Master consists of an Experiment OS, which enables regularized experimental actions and maintains persistent, traceable experimental records, and Reviewer-Guided Research Orchestration, which organizes Workers and Reviewers in a dynamically growing research DAG. | method 0.87 | 0.76 | 0.08 | asserted 1.00 |
| Workers explore diverse research directions and Reviewers compare evidence across related experiments for subsequent explorations. | method 0.98 | 0.56 | 0.04 | asserted 0.99 |
| On PostTrainBench with Qwen3-4B-Base, it averages 54.49 versus 46.53 for the strongest agent baseline, with a 0.0\% hacking rate. | result 1.00 | 0.95 | 0.16 | asserted 1.00 |
| Scaling to 35B model, RSI-Master surpasses the human-developed Instruct model on LiveCodeBench-v6 (41.21 vs. 37.36) and SciCode, and reaches a nonzero score on HorizonMath, a benchmark of unsolved research problems on which most frontier models score near zero. | result 1.00 | 0.94 | 0.38 | asserted 1.00 |
What kind of paper the classifier reports this is: method or tool 1.00 · evidence from observation or experiment 0.96
What was examined, and what was not
Sources read
- arXiv listing abstract v1
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- full text
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- references and citing sentences
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- S sections
- T body sentences
- C citations
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How the labels were made
Compiled by classifier-1.13.0 via TypeSafe API, question bank abstract-p1-20260923, 2026-09-29: 1 request, 6,502 input tokens.
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Figures (9)
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Cited by 5 Pith papers
Reviewed papers on Pith that cite this one. The full citation record
- EVA-RSI: Recursive Self-Improvement of Video Evaluators for Judging Temporal Quality cs.AI · Nov 2026
- Athanor: An Agent-Native System for Autonomous Post-Training Research cs.AI · Oct 2026
- AutoMaster: Autonomous Post-Training by Making the Same Model a Better Teacher cs.CL · Nov 2026
- RSI-Prime: Training Models to Train Models cs.AI · Nov 2026
- AutoRL: A Multi-Agent System towards Autonomous Reinforcement Learning cs.AI · Nov 2026
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