Logic in Computer Science · arXiv:2611.17084 v1 · submitted 12 Nov 2026 · 15 references
Strategic disclosure and epistemic manipulation in extensive games
The paper says
“In many strategic settings, agents can influence opponents by selectively disclosing truthful information about their own future actions. We introduce a game-theoretic framework to model this phenomenon.”
more of the abstract
As a case study, we consider a two-player, alternating-move epistemic game in which Player A evaluates actions under a conservative maximin rule, while Player B-the manipulator-leverages this behavior by strategically revealing commitments. We prove that the manipulator can implement every inducible outcome using at most n disclosures in a binary game of depth 2n with n decisions per player. This establishes a sharp contrast between the game tree's exponential size and the linear amount of information required to control the outcome, highlighting a general mechanism by which limited information can exert disproportionate strategic influence.
from the abstract
Pith says
Machine review · deepseek-v4-flash · 13 Nov 2026 · what was read was not recorded · not checked by a person
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Holds up, with conditions. Theorem 1 is definitional, not substantive; the paper is a clean formalization of a narrow setting but overclaims the efficiency result. This line is wrong
4 major objections · 7 minor
How often objections from reviews like this one are right: not yet measured
Not checked: figures, code, what the 15 references say.
The paper says, at §4.2, Definition 1 and Theorem 1
The review did not quote this passage.
Pith says: Objection 1 of 4 · major
The theorem is essentially a restatement of Definition 1. Definition 1 defines a path P as 'possible' precisely when revealing B's moves along P makes following P strictly optimal at every A-node. Theorem 1 then 'proves' that if B reveals moves along a possible path, the play follows P.
more of objection 1
The proof (b138-b144) simply invokes the definition and B's truthfulness. The 'at most n' bound is trivial as it counts B-nodes on the path. This is not a substantive result; it is an unpacking of the definition. The paper's central claim of a 'sharp contrast' (b4) between exponential tree size and linear disclosures is not supported, because the definition of 'possible path' already assumes the condition that makes the path implementable, and the exponential complexity is deferred to the search problem (acknowledged in §5, b173-b175). The result does not establish that any outcome can be efficiently induced; it only shows that if a path satisfies a certain condition, then it can be implemented with linear disclosures. The difficulty of finding such a path is not addressed.
The paper says, at §4.2, Definition 2 and Theorem 1
The review did not quote this passage.
A classifier read this sentence of the paper as acknowledging the concern (probability 0.64):
“While Theorem 1 guarantees that any such path can be realized using at mostnrevelations, the number of candidate paths grows exponentially with the depth of the game tree.”
Pith says: Objection 2 of 4 · major
Definition 2 defines an 'inducible outcome' as the terminal outcome of some possible path. The abstract and introduction (b3-b4, b18) claim that 'the manipulator can implement every inducible outcome using at most n disclosures.' This is true by definition, but it gives no insight into which outcomes are inducible or how to find them.
more of objection 2
The paper does not characterize the set of inducible outcomes beyond the definition. The monotone example in §4.3 enumerates possible paths, but this is a specific case. The claim of a 'sharp contrast' is misleading because the exponential complexity is not circumvented; it is merely shifted to the problem of identifying possible paths.
The paper says, at §5, b173-b175
The review did not quote this passage.
A classifier read this sentence of the paper as acknowledging the concern (probability 0.88):
“This makes even checking a single path nontrivial, and developing efficient algorithms for this problem would be a natural direction for future work.”
Pith says: Objection 3 of 4 · major
The paper acknowledges that finding a possible path requires evaluating recursive reasoning over an exponentially large candidate set, and that even checking a single path is nontrivial. This is a significant limitation that undermines the claimed contrast. The paper presents Theorem 1 as the main result, but the theorem's content is definitional, and the computational difficulty is deferred.
more of objection 3
The paper should either provide a method to find possible paths efficiently or clearly state that the result does not imply efficient control. As it stands, the framing of the result as establishing a 'sharp contrast' is not justified.
The paper says, at §4.2, Definition 1
The review did not quote this passage.
Pith says: Objection 4 of 4 · major
Definition 1 defines a possible path based on the condition that revealing B's moves along P makes following P strictly optimal at every A-node. However, the definition does not require that B's committed moves are themselves optimal for B given the induced continuation.
more of objection 4
The paper does not discuss whether B would have an incentive to deviate from the revealed moves after A's decision. Theorem 1 assumes B follows the revealed moves truthfully (b144), but if B's moves are not optimal for B ex post, the commitment may not be credible. The paper assumes truthfulness as a given, but in a strategic setting, B's incentives to deviate should be considered. This is a gap in the model: the manipulator's own incentives are not fully addressed.
7 minor objections
The paper says, at §3.1, Figure 2
Pith says: minor objection 1 of 7
The figure caption says 'A revelation that sways player A's decision.' It would be helpful to explicitly state that the revelation is truthful and that B commits to the right-hand outcome at the left B-node.
The paper says, at §4.3, b161
Pith says: minor objection 2 of 7
The sentence 'The resulting pruning raises the target-direction guarantee from 10 to 11 while preserving A's preferred directions' is unclear. It should specify which pruning and which direction.
show 5 more
The paper says, at §4.3, b166
Pith says: minor objection 3 of 7
The sentence 'As in the case of 11, this modification does not alter the induced preferences of player A' could be more precise. It refers to the modification of the final B-move, but the reasoning is not fully explained.
The paper says, at §2.1, b2
Pith says: minor objection 4 of 7
The reference to Artemov [2] is cited as 'TR-2009015'. It would be helpful to provide a more accessible reference or a link if available.
The paper says, at §3.1, b74-b76
Pith says: minor objection 5 of 7
The paper restricts to generic games with strict payoffs. This is a reasonable assumption, but it should be noted that the results may not extend to non-generic settings, as acknowledged in §5 (b180).
The paper says, at §4.2, Definition 1
Pith says: minor objection 6 of 7
The definition of 'possible path' depends on the assumption that B reveals all moves along P. The paper should clarify whether partial revelation could also work, or if this is the minimal condition.
The paper says, at §5, b182
Pith says: minor objection 7 of 7
The paper mentions off-path revelations as unexplored. This is a natural extension, but it also highlights that the current analysis is limited to on-path revelations.
What would settle it
Run the n=1 generic game with left B-node outcomes (5,1),(0,10) and right B-node outcomes (1,0),(2,3) through the paper's Definition 1/Theorem 1 procedure: (1) confirm that path P=(A-left, B-move to (5,1)) satisfies Definition 1, since revealing it makes A's guarantee from left (5) strictly exceed the right-branch guarantee (1); (2) record B's payoff from following the committed move at the left B-node (1) versus the pruned alternative (10) and versus no revelation (3). If these payoffs make the committed move strictly B-dominated and the paper provides no incentive-compatibility condition on revealed moves, the overclaim that every inducible outcome is controllable by a payoff-maximizing manipulator lands.
from the skeptic's reading
How the review went
4 readings by deepseek-v4-flash · 13 Nov 2026
- Reader holds up, with conditions
- Skeptic agrees
- Editor wrote the verdict above
- Referee major revision: 4 major objections, 7 minor
Not run on this paper: the simulated authors' defence.
Pith did not check this review's objections against the paper.
The review in full
The review in brief, machine-written
This paper formalizes a setting where a maximin player A is steered by truthful disclosures from player B. The core idea—that revealing commitments can prune the feasible set and shift a cautious opponent's decision—is not new; it appears in the first author's earlier work on knowledge-based rationality. What is new is the path-based definition of 'possible path' and the explicit bound of at most n disclosures per path in a binary game of depth 2n.
The paper does a few things well. The examples are clear and build intuition. The definitions are precise. The authors honestly acknowledge that finding a payoff-maximizing possible path is computationally hard (b173–b175) and that off-path revelations are unexplored (b182). The writing is direct and the structure is logical.
But the central theorem is weaker than the abstract and introduction claim. Definition 1 defines a path as 'possible' precisely when revealing B's moves along it makes following it strictly optimal at every A-node. Theorem 1 then 'proves' that every possible path can be implemented by revealing B's moves along it. That is a restatement of the definition, not a substantive result. The n-revelation bound is just the number of B-nodes on the path. The claimed 'sharp contrast' between exponential tree size and linear disclosures (b4) is not established, because the exponential cost is deferred into the unaddressed search problem (b173–b175). The paper's own Section 5 concedes this.
A further gap not fully acknowledged: nothing in the definitions requires B's committed moves to be B-optimal. The stress-test counterexample (n=1) shows a path that is 'possible' by Definition 1 but where B's commitment is strictly dominated. The paper assumes B is truthful but does not assume B is payoff-maximizing in choosing which possible path to implement. If B is rational, the set of implementable outcomes is a subset of the possible paths—those that are also B-optimal given the induced continuation. The paper does not address this.
Who is this for? Readers interested in a clean formalization of a specific epistemic manipulation scenario. It is not a breakthrough but a useful building block. The paper deserves a serious referee—the definitions are coherent and the limitations are mostly stated—but the referee should push the authors to reframe the significance claim and address the B-optimality gap.
Recommendation: accept for peer review with major revision expected.
The strongest objection
The paper's central claim, in the abstract and b3-b4, is that a linear number of truthful disclosures lets a manipulator 'control' a game tree whose outcome set is exponential. The reader is right that this is not a proved efficiency result: Definition 1 defines a path P as 'possible' precisely when revealing B's moves along P makes following P strictly dominant at every A-node on P, and the proof of Theorem 1 (Section 4.2) invokes exactly this condition together with B's truthfulness (b144). The theorem is therefore a restatement of its own definition, and the 'at most n' bound is simply the number of B-nodes on the path. Section 5 (b173-b175) concedes that finding and even checking a possible path requires evaluating the induced recursive reasoning over an exponentially large candidate set, so the exponential-vs-linear 'sharp contrast' (b4) is not established: the exponential cost is deferred into an unaddressed search problem, and the theorem's content is definitional. A second gap reinforces the overclaim and is not among the authors' acknowledged limitations (b89-b183). Nothing in Definition 1, Definition 2, or Theorem 1 requires the committed moves along a possible path to be B's best responses at the revealed B-nodes given the induced continuation; in fact Definition 1 'depends only on player A's reasoning.' Concrete counterexample (generic n=1): left B-node outcomes (5,1),(0,10); right B-node outcomes (1,0),(2,3). Without revelation A's guarantee left = min(5,0) = 0 < 1 = right, so play yields (2,3). Path P to (5,1) is 'possible' (revealing it gives A guarantee 5 > 1 at the root), so Theorem 1 declares it implementable; but the commitment to the (5,1) move is strictly dominated for B at the left B-node (payoff 1 vs 10) and strictly worse than non-disclosure (payoff 3), so a payoff-maximizing B neither makes nor honors it.
I read the paper in good faith: it builds a formal framework for truthful commitment revelation in two-player alternating games with maximin (guaranteed-payoff) evaluation by player A, and proves that paths that are locally A-optimal under disclosure of B's moves can be realized with at most n disclosures. The formal work is internally consistent: Definition 1's condition is exactly what is needed for A to follow P given B's truthfulness (b144), the worked monotone example (Section 4.3) is computed correctly (possible outcomes 10,11,14,15), and the generic-game restriction (b75) is stated. My leading concern matches the reader's weakest assumption: the theorem is a direct restatement of Definition 1, so the at-most-n bound is a trivial count of B-nodes and the exponential-vs-linear contrast advertised in the abstract is not supported by the theorem's content; Section 5 (b173-b175) itself concedes the candidate-path search is exponential. This is a significance and overclaim issue rather than a soundness failure, so I keep the reader's CONDITIONAL verdict rather than moving to reject; the paper does contain a usable formalization and a correct worked example, and its stated limitations (b89-b183) are genuine acknowledgments. The point where I go beyond the reader is the incentive-compatibility of revealed moves: nothing in the definitions requires B's commitment along a possible path to be B's best response at the reached node, and my numeric n=1 example shows a 'possible' path whose committed move is strictly dominated for B (payoff 1 vs 10) and worse than no revelation (3). Such possible paths make Definition 2's 'inducible outcome' set over-inclusive for a self-interested manipulator, and this gap is not among the authors' acknowledged limitations. The concrete test resolves whether the gap actually lands by running the example through the framework; if it lands, the condition for acceptance should include either an incentive-compatibility requirement on revealed moves (or a characterization of which possible paths a payoff-maximizing B would choose) and a reframing of Theorem 1 as a definitional characterization rather than a substantive efficiency result.
The referee's report
If the result were as claimed, it would be significant for understanding how limited information can exert strategic influence. However, the central theorem is essentially a restatement of the definition of 'possible path', and the claimed contrast is not established because the exponential complexity is deferred to the search problem. The paper acknowledges this limitation but still presents the result as a sharp contrast. The framework is clearly presented, but the main result is definitional rather than substantive.
Pith's reading of the paper (a machine's summary, not the authors')
Imagine a two-player game drawn as a tree where the players take turns. One player, A, is cautious: whenever it is A's turn, A picks the direction that guarantees the highest worst-case payoff, assuming the worst happens later. The other player, B, knows this. B can announce, truthfully, what they will do at some of their own future turns. Those announcements are commitments: A now knows that some later outcomes can never happen, so A's worst-case calculations change, and A may switch directions. The paper's central claim is that B can steer the game to any target they want by announcing at most one plan per B-turn along the chosen path. In a game with n decisions per player, that is at most n announcements, even though the tree contains exponentially many outcomes. The catch is hidden in the definition. The paper calls a path 'possible' when revealing B's moves along it already makes A prefer that path everywhere. The main theorem then states, in effect, that possible paths are exactly what B can implement. That is true, but the truth is built into the definition, so the theorem is mostly a restatement of it. The real work, choosing which path to reveal when there are many candidates, is left open, and the paper notes that checking even one path is not trivial. So the headline contrast between a huge tree and a tiny set of announcements is less striking than it sounds, because the difficult part is choosing the right announcements.
Core claim. Theorem 1: 'Every possible path P can be implemented by player B through truthful revelation. If B reveals all of their moves along P to player A, then the resulting play of the game follows P. Moreover, this requires at most n revelations.' (sentence b138). If true, the claim asserts that any path which is locally strictly optimal for the cautious player A, once B's moves along that path are announced, can be realized with at most n truthful disclosures, one per B-node on the path, in a binary game of depth 2n.
The premise it rests on. The load-bearing premise is Definition 1, which defines a path P as 'possible' precisely when revealing B's moves along P already makes A's guaranteed payoff from following P strictly higher than from any deviation at every A-node on P. The proof of Theorem 1 then restates this definition: because the local condition is exactly the condition that the revealed path is A-optimal, the theorem's conclusion is contained in its premise (Section 4.2). The second, quieter assumption is that A's decision is fully determined by the recursive guaranteed-payoff computation over the pruned feasible set and that only on-path B-moves need be revealed; the paper flags off-path revelations as unexplored (sentence b182), so if off-path prunings could matter at A-nodes, the local condition would not be sufficient.
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The paper
Abstract
In many strategic settings, agents can influence opponents by selectively disclosing truthful information about their own future actions. We introduce a game-theoretic framework to model this phenomenon. As a case study, we consider a two-player, alternating-move epistemic game in which Player A evaluates actions under a conservative maximin rule, while Player B-the manipulator-leverages this behavior by strategically revealing commitments. We prove that the manipulator can implement every inducible outcome using at most n disclosures in a binary game of depth 2n with n decisions per player. This establishes a sharp contrast between the game tree's exponential size and the linear amount of information required to control the outcome, highlighting a general mechanism by which limited information can exert disproportionate strategic influence.
The paper's own sentences, arranged, kept beside the review and separate from it. Each label is drawn from a closed vocabulary; the number beside it is the probability the classifier gave that label. No sentence in this record was written by a model.
abstract compiled · 2026-11-14
The authors' main claim, as the classifier picked it out 0.85
“This establishes a sharp contrast between the game tree's exponential size and the linear amount of information required to control the outcome, highlighting a general mechanism by which limited information can exert disproportionate strategic influence.”
How the main claim is stated: asserted 1.00
What the abstract itself states, as probabilities: claims first 0.07 · states limitation 0.13 · human participants 0.03 · controlled comparison 0.04 · randomized assignment 0.01 · states quantitative result 0.96 · compares with prior results 0.16 · mentions code or data availability 0.02
The abstract, sentence by sentence
This table labels the abstract only (arXiv listing abstract v1). The number is the probability the classifier gave the label.
| Sentence | Role | The authors' own work | States the main conclusion | Strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| In many strategic settings, agents can influence opponents by selectively disclosing truthful information about their own future actions. | background 1.00 | 0.06 | 0.05 | hedged possibility 0.70 |
| We introduce a game-theoretic framework to model this phenomenon. | contribution 0.85 | 0.91 | 0.02 | asserted 0.83 |
| As a case study, we consider a two-player, alternating-move epistemic game in which Player A evaluates actions under a conservative maximin rule, while Player B-the manipulator-leverages this behavior by strategically revealing commitments. | method 0.72 | 0.63 | 0.06 | asserted 0.96 |
| We prove that the manipulator can implement every inducible outcome using at most n disclosures in a binary game of depth 2n with n decisions per player. | result 1.00 | 0.94 | 0.65 | asserted 1.00 |
| This establishes a sharp contrast between the game tree's exponential size and the linear amount of information required to control the outcome, highlighting a general mechanism by which limited information can exert disproportionate strategic influence. | interpretation 1.00 | 0.88 | 0.62 | asserted 1.00 |
What kind of paper the classifier reports this is: theoretical result 1.00 · evidence from proof or derivation 1.00
What was examined, and what was not
Sources read
- arXiv listing abstract v1
Not examined
- full text
- figures and tables
- references and citing sentences
- relations to other papers
Levels run
- P abstract
Not run
- S sections
- T body sentences
- C citations
- R cross-paper relations
How the labels were made
Compiled by classifier-1.13.0 via TypeSafe API, question bank abstract-p1-20260923, 2026-11-14: 1 request, 4,278 input tokens.
Every quoted sentence on this record is the authors'. Every label is from Pith's closed vocabulary, with the probability shown beside it. This record as JSON
Figures (8)
Figures are the authors', reproduced from the paper.
References (15)
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- [2] S. Artemov. TR-2009015: Knowledge-Based Rational Decisions and Nash Paths. 2009. URL 12 https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/TR-2009015%3A-Knowledge-Based-Rationa l-Decisions-and-Artemov/c960d6eeeb8f1baec5e77009ce346111bf1e983d on Pith
- [3] Robert J. Aumann. Agreeing to Disagree.The Annals of Statistics, 4(6), November 1976. ISSN 0090-5364. doi: 10.1214/aos/1176343654. URLhttps://projecteuclid.org/journa ls/annals-of-statistics/volume-4/issue-6/Agreeing-to-Disagree/10.1214/aos/11 76343654.full on Pithdoi:10.1214/aos/1176343654
- [4] Robert J. Aumann. Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality.Games and Economic Behavior, 8(1):6–19, January 1995. ISSN 08998256. doi: 10.1016/S0899-8256(05)8 0015-6. URLhttps://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0899825605800156 on Pithdoi:10.1016/s0899-8256(05)8
- [5] Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris. Information Design: A Unified Perspective.Journal of Economic Literature, 57(1):44–95, March 2019. ISSN 0022-0515. doi: 10.1257/jel.20181489. URLhttps://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/jel.20181489 on Pithdoi:10.1257/jel.20181489
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- [7] Jelle Gerbrandy. Communication strategies in games.Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 17(2):197–211, January 2007. ISSN 1166-3081, 1958-5780. doi: 10.3166/jancl.17.197-211. URL https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3166/jancl.17.197-211 on Pithdoi:10.3166/jancl.17.197-211
- [8] John C. Harsanyi.Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and So- cial Situations. Cambridge University Press, 1 edition, October 1977. ISBN 978-0-521- 20886-4 978-0-521-31183-0 978-0-511-57175-6. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511571756. URL https://www.cambridge.org/core/... on Pithdoi:10.1017/cbo9780511571756
- [9] Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow. Bayesian Persuasion.American Economic Review, 101(6):2590–2615, October 2011. ISSN 0002-8282. doi: 10.1257/aer.101.6.2590. URLhttps: //pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590 on Pithdoi:10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
- [10] Morton I. Kamien, Yair Tauman, and Shmuel Zamir. On the value of information in a strategic conflict.Games and Economic Behavior, 2(2):129–153, 1990. ISSN 0899-8256. doi: https: //doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90026-Q. URLhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/scienc e/article/pii/08998... on Pithdoi:10.1016/0899-8256(90)90026-q
- [11] Rohit Parikh and Ramaswamy Ramanujam. A Knowledge Based Semantics of Messages. Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 12(4):453–467, September 2003. ISSN 1572- on Pith
- [12] Rohit Parikh, C ¸ a˘ gil Ta¸ sdemir, and Andreas Witzel. The Power of Knowledge in Games. International Game Theory Review, 15(04):1340030, December 2013. ISSN 0219-1989, 1793- on Pith
- [13] John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern.Theory of games and economic behavior. A Princeton classic edition. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 60. anniversary ed., 4. print., and 1. paperb. print edition, 2007. ISBN 978-0-691-13061-3 978-1-4008-2946-0. 13 on Pith
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