Pith. sign in

REVIEW 4 major objections 7 minor 38 references

Towards Emergency Scenarios: An Integrated Decision-making Framework of Multi-lane Platoon Reorganization

T0 review · 4 major / 7 minor · reviewed 2026-08-06 · deepseek-v4-flash

Pith's one-line read A dual-layer RL-plus-game framework lets multi-lane vehicle platoons split, dodge hazards, and re-form, cutting simulated collision rates from above 0.88 to 0.021 and re-formation time by about 28%.

desk verdict A genuinely integrated RL/game platoon-reorganization framework, but the PDI efficiency claim is unsupported by the equations and the safety numbers rest on point estimates in a simulator that makes baselines look absurd. read the letter →

arxiv 2506.16311 v1 pith:5JCG5U2S submitted 2025-06-19 cs.MA

classification cs.MA
keywords vehicleplatoonreorganizationmulti-lanelanechangereinforcementlearningcoalitiongameriskpotentialfieldDispositionIndexautonomousdriving
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

This paper proposes a two-layer decision-making framework for multi-lane autonomous vehicle platoons facing emergency traffic situations. The upper layer uses reinforcement learning to decide when and how the platoon should split into sub-formations based on an assessed risk field, while the lower layer uses a coalition game to assign each vehicle a lane-change or lane-keeping action. A graph-theory-based Platoon Disposition Index (PDI) is added to the game payoff to quantify how far the current formation is from the ideal one, which speeds up re-formation. In simulated cut-in and sudden-braking scenarios under random traffic, the authors report collision rates dropping from 0.884–0.965 to 0.021 in the lateral case and from 0.21 to 0–0.01 in the longitudinal case, with higher average speed and re-formation time reduced from about 6.2–6.5 minutes to 4.56 minutes when PDI is used. The central point is that platoons need not hold a fixed formation; they can reorganize on the fly, and this paper demonstrates a specific mechanism for deciding when, how, and how quickly to do so.

What carries the argument

The framework's load-bearing components are (1) a centralized PPO policy that, from observations including TTC and risk-field intensity, picks a platoon configuration from the finite set of sub-platoon splits; (2) a transferable-utility coalition game whose characteristic function sums per-vehicle profits (safety, efficiency, integration, and tracking error) and whose equilibrium is solved as a mixed-integer program; and (3) the Platoon Disposition Index (PDI), the equivalent-length shortest path through a graph whose nodes are road cells occupied by vehicles and whose edge weights penalize lane changes and longitudinal distance. PDI does the work of capturing the difficulty of moving from the current distribution to the ideal one, something ordinary position-error metrics miss when surrounding traffic cuts into the formation.

What would settle it

Run the same two scenarios with the risk-field constants (GRM, k1, k2 in Eq. 12) doubled or halved; if the collision rates and formation times change substantially, the reported improvements depend on calibration rather than on the algorithm. Alternatively, replace the risk field with a trajectory-based collision oracle and check whether the RL policy's risk ranking still predicts actual collisions.

Watch

Extended reading notes

Core claim

The central claim is that a platoon facing a dynamic hazard should be treated as a reconfigurable multi-agent system rather than a rigid string: the upper level selects a platoon configuration from a finite action space, and the lower level resolves each vehicle's lateral maneuver through a transferable-utility coalition game. The paper introduces PDI, defined as the equivalent-length shortest path in a node-graph representation of the road where edge weights penalize lane changes and longitudinal distance, to quantify the distribution state of the platoon and surrounding obstacles; adding this index to the game reward shortens the time to restore formation. The authors verify the claim in two highway scenarios, one with merging traffic cutting into the platoon and one with a sudden decelerating lead vehicle, and report that the framework cuts collision rates from 0.884 and 0.965 to 0.021 in the lateral case, from 0.21 to 0.01 and 0 in the longitudinal case, and reduces formation time from 6.45 and 6.16 minutes to 4.56 minutes.

Load-bearing premise

The load-bearing premise is that the risk potential field taken from reference [30] measures real collision danger in these scenarios and that the paper's unsupplied constants and reward weights are set so that higher scores truly correspond to safer and more efficient driving.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

  • In lateral cut-in scenarios, the framework reduces the collision rate from 0.884 (SiPLC) and 0.965 (SuPLC) to 0.021, while raising average platoon speed from about 24.1–24.5 m/s to 25.42 m/s.
  • In longitudinal sudden-braking scenarios, the framework lowers the collision rate from 0.21 (RRL) to 0.01 and 0, while keeping the minimum TTC above 4 seconds.
  • Adding the Platoon Disposition Index to the game reward cuts formation reorganization time from 6.45 minutes (RRL) and 6.16 minutes (GRDF) to 4.56 minutes, and raises the formation success rate from 0.80 and 0.88 to 0.94.
  • The framework lets a platoon maintain a tight formation (average inter-vehicle distance near the 10 m target) while still being able to split and reform under risk, so the safety gains do not come at the cost of efficiency.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • The PDI idea is not tied to platoons: any multi-agent formation problem in which agents must pass around dynamic obstacles and re-form, such as drone swarms or warehouse robot fleets, could use a graph-shortest-path index to bias rewards toward distributions that are cheaper to restore.
  • One testable extension is that the benefit of PDI should grow with the density of surrounding traffic, because the equivalence-distance path then becomes a more discriminative measure of how blocked the platoon's re-formation route is.
  • The framework assumes reliable V2X communication among platoon members; a natural follow-up is to test how degraded latency or packet loss affects the collision-rate advantage reported here.
Share X Bluesky LinkedIn Reddit HN

Signed reviews

No signed human review yet.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Referee Report

4 major / 7 minor

Summary. This paper proposes GRDF, a three-layer decision-making framework for multi-lane platoon reorganization under emergency traffic conditions. The upper layer uses a centralized PPO-based policy to select platoon configurations, the middle layer uses a coalition game to assign lane-change/keep behaviors to individual vehicles, and the lower layer performs trajectory planning and control. A graph-theoretic Platoon Disposition Index (PDI) is introduced, claimed to be incorporated into the game reward to accelerate formation reorganization. The framework is evaluated in two simulated scenarios (lateral cut-in risk and longitudinal deceleration risk) against baselines SiPLC, SuPLC, RRL, and an ablation without PDI (GRDF), reporting collision rates, average speed, minimum TTC, average inter-vehicle distance, formation success rate, and formation time over 100 random episodes per scenario.

Significance. If the claims were established, the paper would make a useful contribution to a real problem: enabling a multi-lane CAV platoon to split, avoid dynamic hazards, and reform more safely and quickly than fixed-formation or rule-based baselines. The two-layer RL/game decomposition is a sensible architectural choice, and PDI is a creative graph-based metric for quantifying platoon spatial disposition. The paper also provides a public repository (with videos) and reports hyperparameters in Table I. However, the current validation does not support the stated conclusions: the PDI is never shown to enter the game objective or RL reward, no statistical uncertainty or significance testing accompanies the headline numbers, and several constants needed to reproduce the risk field and PDI are missing. The significance of the framework is therefore not yet demonstrated.

major comments (4)
  1. [Section V.B and V.C, Eqs. (21)-(29)] The abstract and contribution (ii) state that PDI is incorporated into the game reward function, but no such term appears in the characteristic function. Equations (21)-(22) define the splitting and merging profits as weighted sums of J_s, J_e, J_it, and J_er, none of which contains the equivalent path length from Eqs. (27)-(29). The RL reward R in Eqs. (9)-(17) also has no PDI term. Consequently, the reported decrease in Formation Time from GRDF (6.16 min) to GRDF-GT (4.56 min) in Table III has no demonstrated causal mechanism; it could arise from an uncontrolled implementation difference. In addition, D in Eq. (27) is never defined, so the PDI values cannot be reproduced. The authors must either add an explicit PDI term to J_sp/J_mg or to R, describe how it enters the equilibrium selection, and then re-evaluate, or substantially weaken the PDI-related claims.
  2. [Section VI.B, Tables II and III] All headline claims of "significantly" reducing collision rate and formation time rest on point estimates from 100 episodes per condition, with no confidence intervals, standard deviations, or significance tests reported. The word "significantly" is used repeatedly in the text and abstract, but no p-values or effect-size measures appear anywhere. In Case 1, the baselines collide in 88.4% and 96.5% of episodes, which suggests the scenario may be systematically biased against the baselines rather than representative of reasonable deployment conditions. The authors should report the distribution of metrics (e.g., standard errors, box-plot quantiles) and perform appropriate statistical comparisons, and they should discuss or control for scenario difficulty/calibration of the baselines.
  3. [Section IV.B and V.B, Eqs. (12), (14), (15), (22)-(23)] The reward functions and game payoffs depend on a risk potential field imported from reference [30] with unspecified constants GRM, k1, k2 in Eq. (12), and on a large set of weight parameters (w_s, w_e, w_d, w_r, w_col, w_ris, w_x, w_y, w_v, w_rf, w_re, w_ri, k_t, k_v, w_s, w_e, w_it, w_er, k_tau, k_d, etc.). None of these values is given, and no sensitivity analysis is provided. Since the RL policy and the coalition-game equilibrium are both trained/optimized with these weights, the reported collision-rate and formation-time comparisons are not robust as presented. The authors should provide the full parameter table and test sensitivity of the main metrics to at least the risk-field constants and the largest reward weights.
  4. [Section VI.B, Table III and Figure 13] Formation Time is reported as a single average (4.56 min for GRDF-GT, 6.16 min for GRDF, 6.45 min for RRL), but the Formation Success Rate is only 0.94, 0.88, and 0.80, respectively, with a 15-minute cutoff. The paper does not state how episodes in which the platoon fails to reorganize within 15 minutes are treated when computing the Formation Time average. If failed episodes are excluded or capped, the comparison is biased in favor of methods with lower success rates (since failures are removed). The authors must specify their handling of incomplete episodes and report the full distribution, e.g., Kaplan-Meier style survival curves.
minor comments (7)
  1. [Section VII (Conclusion)] The conclusion states that the method "reduces the collision rate in longitudinal risk scenarios from 0.884 and 0.965 to 0.021," but those values are from Case 1, which is the lateral risk scenario; the scenario label is incorrect.
  2. [Eq. (29)] The fourth constraint repeats "if n_j != n_0" instead of using n_e; this is likely a typo that would make the flow constraints inconsistent as written.
  3. [Eq. (27) and Eq. (3)] The symbol E_ij is used both for the communication edge indicator in Eq. (3) and for the equivalence-distance edge weight in Eq. (27). These should use distinct notations to avoid ambiguity.
  4. [Figure 11] The horizontal axis labels read "GRDF-PDI" while the text and Table III use "GRDF-GT"; the naming should be consistent.
  5. [Eq. (26)] The description following Eq. (26) says x_j and y_j are the lateral and longitudinal positions, but earlier in the paper x is longitudinal and y is lateral; the text appears to swap the terms.
  6. [Eqs. (15)-(17)] The reorganization incentive is written as r_ri in Eq. (15) but referred to as r_rc in the text after Eq. (17); the notation should be unified.
  7. [Definition 4] The adjacency condition "there exits an k such that |x_i - x_j| <= |x_k - x_i|" uses an undefined k; clarify whether k iterates over nodes in the adjacent lane and how the inequality is evaluated.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged · score 1.0 of 10

No circular derivation chain; PDI reorganization-time claim is unsupported but not circular.

full rationale

The paper's main safety and efficiency claims are evaluated against external baselines (SiPLC, SuPLC in Case 1; RRL in Case 2) under random traffic, so the collision-rate and average-speed comparisons are not equivalent to the method's own inputs. The risk field of Eq. (12) is imported from an external reference [30] and used consistently in both the RL reward and the coalition-game safety profit, which is a model choice rather than a circular definition. The only self-citation ([32]) is contextual and does not carry a load-bearing premise. The PDI claim is a genuine support gap: the abstract and conclusion state that PDI is incorporated into the game reward function, but Eqs. (21)-(26) define the splitting/merging payoffs with no PDI term, and Section V.C defines PDI separately as the shortest equivalent-distance path from Eqs. (27)-(29). No equation or algorithm step connects PDI to J_sp/J_mg, to equilibrium selection, or to the RL reward; hence the report that GRDF-GT reduces Formation Time from 6.16 to 4.56 min lacks a demonstrated causal mechanism. This is a missing-integration/correctness problem, not circularity: PDI is not defined in terms of formation time, and formation time is measured independently in simulation. No claimed prediction reduces to its own inputs by construction.

Assumptions & free parameters 15 free parameters · 6 assumptions · 1 invented entities

The central claims depend on many hand-set constants and unverified modeling assumptions. Risk-field constants are imported without values, reward and game weights are not given, PDI's normalization constant D is undefined, and the PDI reward contribution is asserted but not written as an equation. The framework also assumes a kinematic vehicle model, lossless communication, and that synthetic IDM/MOBIL traffic represents real emergency conditions.

free parameters (15)
  • Risk-field constants GRM, k1, k2 (Eq. 12) = not specified in text
    The risk reward and all game payoffs depend on this field; the paper cites [30] but gives no values or sensitivity study.
  • Reward weights w_s, w_e, w_d, w_r (Eq. 9) = unspecified
    Total RL reward is a weighted sum; no values or tuning procedure are reported.
  • Safety sub-weights w_col, w_ris (Eq. 10) = unspecified
    Balance collision penalty versus risk-field penalty; not given.
  • Formation tracking weights w_x, w_y, w_v (Eq. 14) = unspecified
    Used in the platoon driving performance reward; not given.
  • Reorganization reward weights w_rf, w_re, w_ri (Eq. 15) = unspecified
    Weights for frequency, timer, and incentive components; not given.
  • TTC critical value tau0_min (Eq. 17) = 2.5 s
    Threshold used in the reorganization incentive; chosen by hand.
  • Reorganization incentive coefficients k_t, k_v (Eq. 17) = unspecified
    Scale the TTC and speed terms in the incentive reward.
  • Coalition game profit weights w_s, w_e, w_it, w_er (Eq. 22) = unspecified
    Weights in the splitting and merging payoff functions; not given.
  • Safety profit coefficients k_tau, k_d (Eq. 23) = unspecified
    Trade off TTC and leader distance in the game safety payoff.
  • Coalition formation thresholds ex_lim, ey_lim (Eq. 20) = ex_lim=30 m, ey_lim=1.5 m
    Decide when vehicles can form a coalition; values are stated without justification.
  • PDI node spacing bounds d_min, d_max (Section V-C) = 10 m and 20 m
    Discretization of the road into nodes for the PDI graph; chosen by hand.
  • Lane-change penalty k_l in Equivalence Distance (Eq. 27) = 10
    Relative cost of a lane change in PDI; stated without sensitivity analysis.
  • Normalization constant D in Equivalence Distance (Eq. 27) = undefined in text
    Appears in the ED formula but is never defined, making PDI non-reproducible.
  • Target following distance d_target = 10 m
    Used in rewards and tracking profit; stated but not justified.
  • PDI reward integration weight = unspecified
    The abstract says PDI is incorporated into the game reward, but no equation shows how or with what weight.
assumptions (6)
  • domain assumption Kinematic bicycle model (Eq. 4) adequately represents vehicle motion for collision-risk and decision evaluation.
    The framework ignores tire dynamics, actuator lag, and detailed sensing errors; the collision-rate claims are computed under this simplification.
  • domain assumption Risk field model from Wang et al. [30] with the normalization in Eq. (12) accurately quantifies real collision risk across the randomized highway scenarios.
    The constants GRM, k1, and k2 are not given or validated for the simulated scenarios; all rewards and payoffs depend on this field.
  • ad hoc to paper PDI, computed as the shortest equivalent-distance path through the node graph, is a valid proxy for platoon reorganization difficulty and efficiency.
    No external benchmark or ablation is provided; this is the paper's own construct and is assumed to capture the desired notion of formation state.
  • domain assumption The dynamic equilibria of the TU coalition game (Eq. 19) solved via MIP describe the best cooperative lane-change decisions for the platoon.
    The equivalence between game-theoretic equilibrium and practical safe driving is assumed; no real-world validation is given.
  • domain assumption Random background traffic generated with IDM/MOBIL and random driving styles represents the uncertainty of emergency highway traffic.
    The collision-rate comparison is only as representative as this synthetic traffic generator.
  • domain assumption The LLPF communication topology (Eq. 3) provides lossless, delay-free state sharing among platoon vehicles.
    The framework assumes perfect V2X/DSRC communication; communication failures and delays are not modeled.
invented entities (1)
  • Platoon Disposition Index (PDI)
    purpose: A scalar graph-theoretic measure of platoon spatial distribution and the difficulty of reorganizing into a desired formation, claimed to be incorporated into the game reward.
    PDI is only evaluated inside the paper's own simulator, with no external benchmark, no real-world data, and no ablation separating its effect from other reward changes. The formula also leaves the normalizing constant D undefined.

how reviews work

0 comments
Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of Towards Emergency Scenarios: An Integrated Decision-making Framework of Multi-lane Platoon Reorganization." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/5JCG5U2S

@misc{pith2026250616311,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: Towards Emergency Scenarios: An Integrated Decision-making Framework of Multi-lane Platoon Reorganization},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/5JCG5U2S}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2506.16311}
}
read the original abstract

To enhance the ability for vehicle platoons to respond to emergency scenarios, a platoon distribution reorganization decision-making framework is proposed. This framework contains platoon distribution layer, vehicle cooperative decision-making layer and vehicle planning and control layer. Firstly, a reinforcement-learning-based platoon distribution model is presented, where a risk potential field is established to quantitatively assess driving risks, and a reward function tailored to the platoon reorganization process is constructed. Then, a coalition-game-based vehicle cooperative decision-making model is put forward, modeling the cooperative relationships among vehicles through dividing coalitions and generating the optimal decision results for each vehicle. Additionally, a novel graph-theory-based Platoon Disposition Index (PDI) is incorporated into the game reward function to measure the platoon's distribution state during the reorganization process, in order to accelerating the reorganization process. Finally, the validation of the proposed framework is conducted in two high-risk scenarios under random traffic flows. The results show that, compared to the baseline models, the proposed method can significantly reduce the collision rate and improve driving efficiency. Moreover, the model with PDI can significantly decrease the platoon formation reorganization time and improve the reorganization efficiency.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2506.16311 by the authors.

Figure 1
Figure 1. The communication topology of vehicle platoon [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p003_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. The overall structure of GRDF framwork Definition 1 (Platoon Communication Topology): For ∀i,∈ , [0, n − 1], ∀j, ∈, [1, n], Eij satisfies: Eij = ( 1 if i = 0 ori < j 0 otherwise (3) where n represents the number of platoon vehicles, 0 ∼ n means the numbering of all vehicles in the platoon in de￾scending order based on their longitudinal positions. Eij = 1 denotes the information can be transferred from V c i to V c … view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. The platoon configuration actions The decision-making process is modeled as a general Partial Observation Markov Decision Process (POMDP), (S, A, P, R, γ, O, Z). Among these elements, the action space A, observation space O, and reward function R are particularly important. The action space A includes various platoon configurations, defined in Equation 7. Taking 3-vehicle platoon as an example, the platoon configura… view at source ↗
Figures from the paper (9 more)
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: The risk field distribution The safety reward Rs consists of the collision penalty rcol and the risk penalty rris. Rs = wcol × rcol + wris × rris (10) rcol = ( 0, if collision happened 1, else (11) The risk reward rris is characterized by the field intensity of the dri…
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: PDI calculation process i) The node occupied by the first vehicle of the platoon is considered the starting point. ii) The node occupied by the last vehicle of the platoon is considered the end point. iii) Nodes occupied by background vehicles or obstacles are consider…
Figure 7
Figure 7. Figure 7: The scenario slice diagram of SiPLC and SuPLC [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p010_7.png]
Figure 8
Figure 8. Figure 8: The scenario slice diagram of GRDF TABLE II PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF CASE 1 Index SiPLC SuPLC GRDF Collision Rate 0.884 0.965 0.021 Average Speed (m/s) 24.47 24.08 25.42 Minimum TTC (s) 3.21 3.39 7.23 Average Distance (m) 7.39 9.57 9.09 robustness and insufficient saf…
Figure 9
Figure 9. Figure 9: The box plot of average speed Ours SiPLC SuPLC Method 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Minimum TTC Value (s) [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p012_9.png]
Figure 10
Figure 10. Figure 10: The box plot of minimum TTC change lanes simultaneously, resulting in the shortest Average Distance of 7.39 m. SuPLC, which has the vehicles change lanes in a serpentine manner, leads to the longest Average Distance of 9.57 m. During the platoon reorganization process…
Figure 11
Figure 11. Figure 11: The box plot of average speed and minimum TTC [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p013_11.png]
Figure 12
Figure 12. Figure 12: The violin plot of average distance GRDF GRDF-GT RRL Method 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Formation Time (min) [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p013_12.png]
Figure 13
Figure 13. Figure 13: The violin plot of formation time traffic flow scenarios. There are even many data points below 2.5 s, further decreasing safety. However, after applying the GRDF and GRDF-GT models, the distribution of the platoon’s Minimum TTC indicator is more concentrated, with th…

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

38 extracted references · 37 canonical work pages

  1. [30]

    Concept, principle and modeling of driving risk field based on 15 driver-vehicle-road interaction

    Jian-qiang Wang, Jian Wu, and Yang Li. “Concept, principle and modeling of driving risk field based on 15 driver-vehicle-road interaction”. In:China Journal of Highway and Transport29.1 (2016), pp. 105–114

  2. [1]

    Collaborative Control of Vehi- cle Platoon Based on Deep Reinforcement Learning

    Jianzhong Chen et al. “Collaborative Control of Vehi- cle Platoon Based on Deep Reinforcement Learning”. In:IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology73.10 (2024), pp. 14399–14414

  3. [2]

    A coevolutionary algorithm for cooperative platoon formation of connected and auto- mated vehicles

    Zhiyun Deng et al. “A coevolutionary algorithm for cooperative platoon formation of connected and auto- mated vehicles”. In:IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology71.12 (2022), pp. 12461–12474. 14

  4. [3]

    Cooperative platoon formation of connected and autonomous vehicles: Toward efficient merging coordination at unsignalized intersections

    Zhiyun Deng et al. “Cooperative platoon formation of connected and autonomous vehicles: Toward efficient merging coordination at unsignalized intersections”. In: IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Sys- tems24.5 (2023), pp. 5625–5639

  5. [4]

    Digital twin empowered cooperative trajectory planning of platoon vehicles for collision avoidance with unexpected obstacles

    Hao Du et al. “Digital twin empowered cooperative trajectory planning of platoon vehicles for collision avoidance with unexpected obstacles”. In:Digital Com- munications and Networks(2023)

  6. [5]

    Centralized vehicle trajectory plan- ning on general platoon sorting problem with multi- vehicle lane changing

    Leyi Duan et al. “Centralized vehicle trajectory plan- ning on general platoon sorting problem with multi- vehicle lane changing”. In:Transportation research part C: emerging technologies154 (2023), p. 104273

  7. [6]

    Cooperative lane-change motion planning for connected and automated vehicle platoons in multi-lane scenarios

    Xuting Duan et al. “Cooperative lane-change motion planning for connected and automated vehicle platoons in multi-lane scenarios”. In:IEEE Transactions on In- telligent Transportation Systems24.7 (2023), pp. 7073– 7091

  8. [7]

    European Research Project’s Contributions to a Safer Automated Road Traffic

    Felix Fahrenkrog et al. “European Research Project’s Contributions to a Safer Automated Road Traffic”. In: Automotive Innovation6.4 (2023), pp. 521–530

Show all 38 references
  1. [8]

    Game theory-based decision-making and iterative predictive lateral control for cooperative obstacle avoidance of guided vehicle platoon

    Xinle Gong et al. “Game theory-based decision-making and iterative predictive lateral control for cooperative obstacle avoidance of guided vehicle platoon”. In:IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology72.6 (2023), pp. 7051–7066

  2. [9]

    Strategic and tactical decision-making for cooperative vehicle platooning with organized be- havior on multi-lane highways

    Xu Han et al. “Strategic and tactical decision-making for cooperative vehicle platooning with organized be- havior on multi-lane highways”. In:Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies145 (2022), p. 103952

  3. [10]

    Deep reinforce- ment learning for intelligent transportation systems: A survey

    Ammar Haydari and Yasin Yılmaz. “Deep reinforce- ment learning for intelligent transportation systems: A survey”. In:IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Trans- portation Systems23.1 (2020), pp. 11–32

  4. [11]

    Where to De- cide? Centralized Versus Distributed Vehicle Assign- ment for Platoon Formation

    Julian Heinovski and Falko Dressler. “Where to De- cide? Centralized Versus Distributed Vehicle Assign- ment for Platoon Formation”. In:IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems(2024)

  5. [12]

    Kinematic design for platoon-lane-change maneuvers

    Harry Chia-Hung Hsu and Alan Liu. “Kinematic design for platoon-lane-change maneuvers”. In:IEEE Transac- tions on Intelligent Transportation Systems9.1 (2008), pp. 185–190

  6. [13]

    Platoon-aware cooperative lane- changing strategy for connected automated vehicles in mixed traffic flow

    Yangsheng Jiang et al. “Platoon-aware cooperative lane- changing strategy for connected automated vehicles in mixed traffic flow”. In:Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications640 (2024), p. 129689

  7. [14]

    Research of obstacle vehicles avoidance for automated heavy vehicle platoon by switching the formation

    Jianjie Kuang et al. “Research of obstacle vehicles avoidance for automated heavy vehicle platoon by switching the formation”. In:IET Intelligent Transport Systems18.4 (2024), pp. 630–644

  8. [15]

    Deep reinforcement learning based incen- tive mechanism design for platoon autonomous driving with social effect

    Bo Li et al. “Deep reinforcement learning based incen- tive mechanism design for platoon autonomous driving with social effect”. In:IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology71.7 (2022), pp. 7719–7729

  9. [16]

    A reinforcement learning-based vehicle platoon control strategy for re- ducing energy consumption in traffic oscillations

    Meng Li, Zehong Cao, and Zhibin Li. “A reinforcement learning-based vehicle platoon control strategy for re- ducing energy consumption in traffic oscillations”. In: IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems32.12 (2021), pp. 5309–5322

  10. [17]

    Continual driver behaviour learn- ing for connected vehicles and intelligent transporta- tion systems: Framework, survey and challenges

    Zirui Li et al. “Continual driver behaviour learn- ing for connected vehicles and intelligent transporta- tion systems: Framework, survey and challenges”. In: Green Energy and Intelligent Transportation(2023), p. 100103

  11. [18]

    A multistep cooperative lane change strategy for connected and autonomous vehicle platoons departing from dedicated lanes

    Chenglin Liu et al. “A multistep cooperative lane change strategy for connected and autonomous vehicle platoons departing from dedicated lanes”. In:Trans- portation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies165 (2024), p. 104720

  12. [19]

    Decentralized Multi-Vehicle Mo- tion Planning for Platoon Forming in Mixed Traffic Using Monte Carlo Tree Search

    Chenglin Liu et al. “Decentralized Multi-Vehicle Mo- tion Planning for Platoon Forming in Mixed Traffic Using Monte Carlo Tree Search”. In:IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems(2024)

  13. [20]

    Coordinated lane-changing scheduling of multilane CA V platoons in heterogeneous scenarios

    Qingquan Liu et al. “Coordinated lane-changing scheduling of multilane CA V platoons in heterogeneous scenarios”. In:Transportation Research Part C: Emerg- ing Technologies147 (2023), p. 103992

  14. [21]

    Behavioral Decision-Making Approach for Vehicle Platoon Control: Two Noncooperative Game Models

    Yang Liu et al. “Behavioral Decision-Making Approach for Vehicle Platoon Control: Two Noncooperative Game Models”. In:IEEE Transactions on Transportation Electrification9.3 (2023), pp. 4626–4638

  15. [22]

    Collision-avoidance lane change con- trol method for enhancing safety for connected vehicle platoon in mixed traffic environment

    Yitao Ma et al. “Collision-avoidance lane change con- trol method for enhancing safety for connected vehicle platoon in mixed traffic environment”. In:Accident Analysis & Prevention184 (2023), p. 106999

  16. [23]

    A novel multimode hybrid control method for cooperative driving of an automated vehi- cle platoon

    Yulin Ma et al. “A novel multimode hybrid control method for cooperative driving of an automated vehi- cle platoon”. In:IEEE Internet of Things Journal8.7 (2020), pp. 5822–5838

  17. [24]

    Optimal-Control- Based Eco-Driving Solution for Connected Battery Electric Vehicle on a Signalized Route

    Hafiz Muhammad Yasir Naeem et al. “Optimal-Control- Based Eco-Driving Solution for Connected Battery Electric Vehicle on a Signalized Route”. In:Automotive Innovation6.4 (2023), pp. 586–596

  18. [25]

    A cooperative lane change approach for heterogeneous platoons under different communication topologies

    Guangming Nie et al. “A cooperative lane change approach for heterogeneous platoons under different communication topologies”. In:IET Intelligent Trans- port Systems16.1 (2022), pp. 53–70

  19. [26]

    Research on multi-lane energy- saving driving strategy of connected electric vehicle based on vehicle speed prediction

    Chaofeng Pan et al. “Research on multi-lane energy- saving driving strategy of connected electric vehicle based on vehicle speed prediction”. In:Green Energy and Intelligent Transportation2.6 (2023), p. 100127

  20. [27]

    Coalitional game theory for commu- nication networks

    Walid Saad et al. “Coalitional game theory for commu- nication networks”. In:Ieee signal processing magazine 26.5 (2009), pp. 77–97

  21. [28]

    Cut through traffic like a snake: Cooperative adaptive cruise control with successive pla- toon lane-change capability

    Haoran Wang et al. “Cut through traffic like a snake: Cooperative adaptive cruise control with successive pla- toon lane-change capability”. In:Journal of Intelligent Transportation Systems28.2 (2022), pp. 141–162

  22. [29]

    Make space to change lane: A cooperative adaptive cruise control lane change con- troller

    Haoran Wang et al. “Make space to change lane: A cooperative adaptive cruise control lane change con- troller”. In:Transportation research part C: emerging technologies143 (2022), p. 103847

  23. [31]

    A homogeneous multi-vehicle co- operative group decision-making method in complicated mixed traffic scenarios

    Yuning Wang et al. “A homogeneous multi-vehicle co- operative group decision-making method in complicated mixed traffic scenarios”. In:Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies167 (2024), p. 104833

  24. [32]

    Towards Safe and Robust Au- tonomous Vehicle Platooning: A Self-Organizing Co- operative Control Framework

    Chengkai Xu et al. “Towards Safe and Robust Au- tonomous Vehicle Platooning: A Self-Organizing Co- operative Control Framework”. In:arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.09468(2024)

  25. [33]

    A Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning Based Control Method for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles in A Mixed Platoon

    Yaqi Xu et al. “A Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning Based Control Method for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles in A Mixed Platoon”. In:IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology(2024)

  26. [34]

    An Efficient Rolling-Horizon Ap- proach for Cooperative Multi-Lane Platoon Formation With Undefined Configurations

    Siwen Yang et al. “An Efficient Rolling-Horizon Ap- proach for Cooperative Multi-Lane Platoon Formation With Undefined Configurations”. In:IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems(2024)

  27. [35]

    A cooperative lane change control strategy for cooperative adaptive cruise control pla- toons with insufficient headway gaps

    Yanduo Yin et al. “A cooperative lane change control strategy for cooperative adaptive cruise control pla- toons with insufficient headway gaps”. In:Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications655 (2024), p. 130175

  28. [36]

    Hybrid MPC system for platoon based cooperative lane change con- trol using machine learning aided distributed optimiza- tion

    Hanyu Zhang, Lili Du, and Jinglai Shen. “Hybrid MPC system for platoon based cooperative lane change con- trol using machine learning aided distributed optimiza- tion”. In:Transportation Research Part B: Methodolog- ical159 (2022), pp. 104–142

  29. [37]

    Deep Q- network based multi-layer safety lane changing strat- egy for vehicle platoon

    Jinqi Zhang, Maode Yan, and Lei Zuo. “Deep Q- network based multi-layer safety lane changing strat- egy for vehicle platoon”. In:IET Intelligent Transport Systems18.4 (2024), pp. 645–656

  30. [38]

    Enforcing Cooperative Safety for Reinforcement Learning-based Mixed-Autonomy Platoon Control

    Jingyuan Zhou et al. “Enforcing Cooperative Safety for Reinforcement Learning-based Mixed-Autonomy Platoon Control”. In:arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.10031 (2024)

Pith tools

Reviewed August 6, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.