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arxiv: 2605.22687 · v1 · pith:7A23UK2Enew · submitted 2026-05-21 · 💻 cs.CY · cs.HC

The efficiency-gain illusion: People underestimate the rate of AI use and overestimate its benefits on simple tasks

Pith reviewed 2026-05-22 03:24 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CY cs.HC
keywords AI usemiscalibrationefficiency gainstime savingsoverrelianceuser studiesfeedback loopsimple tasks
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The pith

People underestimate how often they use AI and overestimate the time savings it delivers on simple tasks

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper examines whether people turn to AI for basic tasks like arithmetic or spelling checks because it truly saves time and effort. Three large pre-registered studies show that participants choose AI even when objective measures reveal little or no gain, while also reporting lower personal usage rates than their actual behavior indicates. They further overestimate how much time and effort AI removes. These two miscalibrations interact with a carryover effect in which earlier AI use raises the chance of later use and strengthens the belief in large savings. The pattern points to a self-reinforcing loop of overreliance that could shape everyday work habits if left unaddressed.

Core claim

Participants display self-estimate miscalibration by underreporting their actual AI usage relative to logged behavior, and efficiency-gain illusions by believing AI produces larger reductions in time and effort than the measured differences show. Prior AI use within a session increases adoption in the following session and entrenches the overestimation of benefits, raising the prospect of an overreliance feedback loop.

What carries the argument

The efficiency-gain illusion, the systematic overestimation of time and effort savings from AI on cognitively simple tasks, paired with underestimation of personal usage frequency.

If this is right

  • People select AI assistance for tasks that deliver no meaningful time or effort reduction.
  • AI use in one session raises the probability of AI use in the next session.
  • Overestimation of savings grows stronger with repeated AI exposure.
  • Without external feedback the pattern can settle into a self-sustaining overreliance loop.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • Interfaces that display objective usage statistics or actual time costs could interrupt the miscalibration before it becomes habitual.
  • The same pattern may appear when people decide whether to adopt AI for moderately complex work, not only simple tasks.
  • Training or design interventions that make real savings visible could shift choices even if the underlying illusion remains.

Load-bearing premise

Participants' self-reports of usage frequency and time savings accurately reflect their genuine perceptions rather than study-specific influences or task familiarity.

What would settle it

A replication that logs AI usage and task completion times while showing self-reported usage rates match the logs and that reported savings match or fall below the actual time differences would undermine the miscalibration findings.

read the original abstract

People are increasingly turning to AI assistance for simple tasks, e.g., arithmetic, spell-check, and answering simple questions. But does AI assistance actually save users time and effort? We investigate people's propensity to use AI for cognitively simple tasks and assess whether their reliance is well-calibrated. Across three pre-registered user studies (N = 2691), we find that people frequently choose to use AI even when doing so is inefficient (i.e. provides no meaningful time or effort savings). We identify systematic miscalibration at two levels: (1) a self-estimate miscalibration where people on average believe that they are using AI less than they actually are, and (2) efficiency-gain illusions where people overestimate how much time and effort savings AI use affords. We also identify a session-level carryover effect where a participant's prior AI use leads to further AI adoption and entrenches their miscalibration about time savings. Our results shed light on the mechanisms and biases underlying people's choice of whether to use AI as well as the risk of an overreliance feedback loop.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 2 minor

Summary. The manuscript reports three pre-registered studies (total N=2691) showing that participants choose AI assistance for simple tasks (arithmetic, spell-check, simple questions) even when it yields no meaningful time or effort savings. It documents two forms of miscalibration: underestimation of personal AI usage rates relative to actual behavior, and overestimation of time/effort savings from AI; it further identifies a session-level carryover effect in which prior AI use increases subsequent adoption and entrenches miscalibrations about savings.

Significance. If the central behavioral patterns hold, the work is significant for human-AI interaction research: it supplies large-sample, pre-registered evidence of systematic miscalibration and a potential overreliance feedback loop on routine tasks. The pre-registration and sample size are clear strengths that reduce selection bias and support falsifiable claims about usage choices and subjective estimates. These results could guide interface design and user training aimed at aligning expectations with actual efficiency gains.

major comments (2)
  1. [Methods (Studies 1–3)] Methods section (Studies 1–3): the efficiency-gain illusion claim rests on comparing estimated versus actual time/effort savings, yet the manuscript does not specify whether 'actual' savings are derived from objective logs that include prompting, verification, and error-correction overhead or from post-task subjective ratings; without this distinction the overestimation finding risks conflating measurement artifacts with true miscalibration.
  2. [Results (carryover effect)] Results (carryover effect): the session-level carryover finding is load-bearing for the overreliance feedback-loop interpretation, but the reported analyses do not appear to include controls for within-session learning, task-order effects, or individual differences in baseline AI propensity; adding these would be required to rule out alternative explanations for increased subsequent AI adoption.
minor comments (2)
  1. [Figures] Figure legends: error bars should be explicitly labeled as 95% CI or SE to aid interpretation of the miscalibration magnitudes.
  2. [Discussion] Discussion: the generalizability statement could be tightened by noting that the chosen tasks are deliberately simple and that external pressures or multi-session learning were not tested.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for their constructive and detailed feedback on our manuscript. The comments highlight opportunities to improve methodological transparency and analytical robustness, and we address each point below with specific plans for revision.

read point-by-point responses
  1. Referee: Methods (Studies 1–3): the efficiency-gain illusion claim rests on comparing estimated versus actual time/effort savings, yet the manuscript does not specify whether 'actual' savings are derived from objective logs that include prompting, verification, and error-correction overhead or from post-task subjective ratings; without this distinction the overestimation finding risks conflating measurement artifacts with true miscalibration.

    Authors: We appreciate this observation on measurement clarity. In our studies, actual time and effort savings were computed from objective platform logs that recorded total task completion time for each trial, explicitly incorporating all overhead associated with prompting the AI, reviewing outputs, and making corrections. These logs were timestamped from task start to submission and did not rely on post-task subjective ratings for the 'actual' values. Participant estimates were collected separately via self-report after each block. We will revise the Methods section (and add a dedicated subsection on measurement) to explicitly describe this distinction and the logging procedure, thereby eliminating any ambiguity about potential measurement artifacts. revision: yes

  2. Referee: Results (carryover effect): the session-level carryover finding is load-bearing for the overreliance feedback-loop interpretation, but the reported analyses do not appear to include controls for within-session learning, task-order effects, or individual differences in baseline AI propensity; adding these would be required to rule out alternative explanations for increased subsequent AI adoption.

    Authors: We agree that strengthening the carryover analysis with additional controls would enhance confidence in the feedback-loop interpretation. Our pre-registered primary models already incorporated session fixed effects and participant-level random intercepts to account for repeated measures. To directly address the referee's concern, we will add exploratory (non-pre-registered) regression specifications in the revision that include (a) task-order position as a covariate, (b) an interaction term for within-session learning (trial number within block), and (c) a participant-level baseline AI propensity score derived from the first block. These supplementary analyses will be clearly labeled as robustness checks and will be reported alongside the pre-registered results. revision: partial

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity: empirical claims rest on independent behavioral data

full rationale

The paper reports findings from three pre-registered user studies with direct measurements of AI usage choices, self-estimates, and perceived time/effort savings across N=2691 participants. No mathematical derivations, equations, fitted parameters presented as predictions, or uniqueness theorems appear in the abstract or described methods. Central claims derive from observed participant behavior rather than reducing by construction to self-citations, ansatzes, or input data. The study is self-contained against external benchmarks of experimental reporting.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

This is an empirical behavioral study; it does not introduce new mathematical axioms or free parameters. It relies on standard assumptions about honest self-report and task representativeness.

axioms (1)
  • domain assumption Participants provide honest and accurate self-reports of their AI usage frequency and perceived time savings.
    The miscalibration claims depend on comparing actual choice data to post-task estimates; if self-reports are systematically biased beyond the measured effect, the illusion finding weakens.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5747 in / 1356 out tokens · 35818 ms · 2026-05-22T03:24:53.191954+00:00 · methodology

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