Pith. sign in

REVIEW 3 cited by

SPML: A DSL for Defending Language Models Against Prompt Attacks

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv 2402.11755 v1 pith:WHJ7RPFI submitted 2024-02-19 cs.LG cs.CLcs.CRcs.PL

classification cs.LGcs.CLcs.CRcs.PL
keywords languagepromptsspmlchatbotchatbotsattacksdefinitionsinputs
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
0 comments
read the original abstract

Large language models (LLMs) have profoundly transformed natural language applications, with a growing reliance on instruction-based definitions for designing chatbots. However, post-deployment the chatbot definitions are fixed and are vulnerable to attacks by malicious users, emphasizing the need to prevent unethical applications and financial losses. Existing studies explore user prompts' impact on LLM-based chatbots, yet practical methods to contain attacks on application-specific chatbots remain unexplored. This paper presents System Prompt Meta Language (SPML), a domain-specific language for refining prompts and monitoring the inputs to the LLM-based chatbots. SPML actively checks attack prompts, ensuring user inputs align with chatbot definitions to prevent malicious execution on the LLM backbone, optimizing costs. It also streamlines chatbot definition crafting with programming language capabilities, overcoming natural language design challenges. Additionally, we introduce a groundbreaking benchmark with 1.8k system prompts and 20k user inputs, offering the inaugural language and benchmark for chatbot definition evaluation. Experiments across datasets demonstrate SPML's proficiency in understanding attacker prompts, surpassing models like GPT-4, GPT-3.5, and LLAMA. Our data and codes are publicly available at: https://prompt-compiler.github.io/SPML/.

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 3 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. What Really Matters in Many-Shot Attacks? An Empirical Study of Long-Context Vulnerabilities in LLMs

    cs.CL 2025-05 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    Many-shot jailbreak success in several LLMs depends mainly on total context length, not on whether the in-context examples are harmful, safe, or meaningless.

  2. SoK: Systematizing LLM Prompt Security: Taxonomies, Datasets, and Unified Evaluation of Attacks and Defenses

    cs.CR 2025-10 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A systemization of LLM jailbreak security that adds linked taxonomies, an evaluation platform, and JailbreakDB, while its main attack–defense comparison results remain deferred.

  3. Layer-Wise Perturbations via Sparse Autoencoders for Adversarial Text Generation

    cs.CL 2025-08 reject novelty 5.0 of 10

    Sparse autoencoder activation perturbation (SFPF) applied on top of existing jailbreak prompts raises attack success rate on Qwen3-32B, but with no defense evaluation and weak reproducibility.

Pith tools