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Lectures on Probability, Entropy, and Statistical Physics

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arxiv 0808.0012 v1 pith:GFNSCACS submitted 2008-07-31 physics.data-an cond-mat.stat-mechcs.ITmath.ITmath.STphysics.gen-phstat.TH

Lectures on Probability, Entropy, and Statistical Physics

classification physics.data-an cond-mat.stat-mechcs.ITmath.ITmath.STphysics.gen-phstat.TH
keywords informationtherephysicsruleswhatinductivelecturesplausible
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These lectures deal with the problem of inductive inference, that is, the problem of reasoning under conditions of incomplete information. Is there a general method for handling uncertainty? Or, at least, are there rules that could in principle be followed by an ideally rational mind when discussing scientific matters? What makes one statement more plausible than another? How much more plausible? And then, when new information is acquired how do we change our minds? Or, to put it differently, are there rules for learning? Are there rules for processing information that are objective and consistent? Are they unique? And, come to think of it, what, after all, is information? It is clear that data contains or conveys information, but what does this precisely mean? Can information be conveyed in other ways? Is information physical? Can we measure amounts of information? Do we need to? Our goal is to develop the main tools for inductive inference--probability and entropy--from a thoroughly Bayesian point of view and to illustrate their use in physics with examples borrowed from the foundations of classical statistical physics.

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    The Coherence Principle supplies a falsifiable prior for Bayesian model selection by converting compatibility with a theory's validated grammar into prior weights via a maximum-entropy exponential controlled by one parameter.