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Instruction Tuning for Secure Code Generation

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arxiv 2402.09497 v2 pith:6XNWX3T4 submitted 2024-02-14 cs.CR cs.AIcs.LGcs.SE

classification cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGcs.SE
keywords securityinstructiontuningcodesafecoderutilityfine-tuningable
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Modern language models (LMs) have gained widespread acceptance in everyday and professional contexts, particularly in programming. An essential procedure enabling this adoption is instruction tuning, which substantially enhances LMs' practical utility by training them to follow user instructions and human preferences. However, existing instruction tuning schemes overlook a crucial aspect: the security of generated code. As a result, even the state-of-the-art instruction-tuned LMs frequently produce unsafe code, posing significant security risks. In this work, we introduce SafeCoder to address this gap. SafeCoder performs security-centric fine-tuning using a diverse and high-quality dataset that we collected using an automated pipeline. We integrate the security fine-tuning with standard instruction tuning, to facilitate a joint optimization of both security and utility. Despite its simplicity, we show that SafeCoder is effective across a variety of popular LMs and datasets. It is able to drastically improve security (by about 30%), while preserving utility.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Breaking the Rounding Trap: Securing LLMs against Quantization-Conditioned Backdoors

    cs.CR 2026-06 unverdicted novelty 6.0 of 10

    QuantGuard uses differentiable rounding control to break quantization-boundary backdoors in LLMs, reducing post-quantization attack success to clean-model levels across six models and INT8/FP4/NF4.

  2. GoodVibe: Security-by-Vibe for LLM-Based Code Generation

    cs.CR 2026-02 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Retraining only the neurons most responsive to security judgments raises a code LLM's default safe-code rate to 87.5% on C++ (average) with about 1.9 million trainable parameters.

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