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The Wolf Within: Covert Injection of Malice into MLLM Societies via an MLLM Operative

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arxiv 2402.14859 v2 pith:2GVGXCA6 submitted 2024-02-20 cs.CR cs.AIcs.CYcs.LG

The Wolf Within: Covert Injection of Malice into MLLM Societies via an MLLM Operative

classification cs.CR cs.AIcs.CYcs.LG
keywords mllmmllmsagentpromptssocietiessocietyagentscontent
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal T4 reserved
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Due to their unprecedented ability to process and respond to various types of data, Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are constantly defining the new boundary of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). As these advanced generative models increasingly form collaborative networks for complex tasks, the integrity and security of these systems are crucial. Our paper, ``The Wolf Within'', explores a novel vulnerability in MLLM societies - the indirect propagation of malicious content. Unlike direct harmful output generation for MLLMs, our research demonstrates how a single MLLM agent can be subtly influenced to generate prompts that, in turn, induce other MLLM agents in the society to output malicious content. Our findings reveal that, an MLLM agent, when manipulated to produce specific prompts or instructions, can effectively ``infect'' other agents within a society of MLLMs. This infection leads to the generation and circulation of harmful outputs, such as dangerous instructions or misinformation, across the society. We also show the transferability of these indirectly generated prompts, highlighting their possibility in propagating malice through inter-agent communication. This research provides a critical insight into a new dimension of threat posed by MLLMs, where a single agent can act as a catalyst for widespread malevolent influence. Our work underscores the urgent need for developing robust mechanisms to detect and mitigate such covert manipulations within MLLM societies, ensuring their safe and ethical utilization in societal applications.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score.

  1. Conjunctive Prompt Attacks in Multi-Agent LLM Systems

    cs.MA 2026-04 unverdicted novelty 7.0

    Conjunctive prompt attacks split adversarial elements across agents and routing paths in multi-agent LLM systems, evading isolated defenses and succeeding through topology-aware optimization.

  2. When Agents Go Rogue: Activation-Based Detection of Malicious Behaviors in Multi-Agent Systems

    cs.CR 2026-07 conditional novelty 6.0

    Activation-space divergence detects and corrects compromised LLM agents in multi-agent systems without interaction graphs or synchronized rounds, outperforming graph baselines especially under async stealthy attacks.