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DrAttack: Prompt Decomposition and Reconstruction Makes Powerful LLM Jailbreakers
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The safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) is vulnerable to both manual and automated jailbreak attacks, which adversarially trigger LLMs to output harmful content. However, current methods for jailbreaking LLMs, which nest entire harmful prompts, are not effective at concealing malicious intent and can be easily identified and rejected by well-aligned LLMs. This paper discovers that decomposing a malicious prompt into separated sub-prompts can effectively obscure its underlying malicious intent by presenting it in a fragmented, less detectable form, thereby addressing these limitations. We introduce an automatic prompt \textbf{D}ecomposition and \textbf{R}econstruction framework for jailbreak \textbf{Attack} (DrAttack). DrAttack includes three key components: (a) `Decomposition' of the original prompt into sub-prompts, (b) `Reconstruction' of these sub-prompts implicitly by in-context learning with semantically similar but harmless reassembling demo, and (c) a `Synonym Search' of sub-prompts, aiming to find sub-prompts' synonyms that maintain the original intent while jailbreaking LLMs. An extensive empirical study across multiple open-source and closed-source LLMs demonstrates that, with a significantly reduced number of queries, DrAttack obtains a substantial gain of success rate over prior SOTA prompt-only attackers. Notably, the success rate of 78.0\% on GPT-4 with merely 15 queries surpassed previous art by 33.1\%. The project is available at https://github.com/xirui-li/DrAttack.
Forward citations
Cited by 19 Pith papers
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